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Abstract 
 
 Given the terrifying potentialities linked to global warming, some 
have suggested that the only means of abating a worst-case scenario is to 
double down, so to speak.  Geoengineering is the intentional manipulation 
and augmentation of the global climate system.  Critics and enthusiasts 
have commenced a lively debate around this complex issue, and 
scenarios have recently emerged as a constitutive practice to confront the 
uncertainties permeating research, implementation, and prospective 
governance.  Using a synthesis of critical political frames to engage with a 
range of geoengineered imaginaries, this dissertation employs both textual 
and practice-based modes of research to argue that there are more 
dynamic and efficacious means to engage people in thinking through the 
radical possibilities and postnormal potentialities inherent to 
geoengineering.  Turning to games and deploying play as a modality for 
experimentation, this dissertation assembles a design for exploring the 
core themes of the debate and enacting an embodied politics for 
geoengineering. GeoFutr is an alternative futures-driven gaming platform 
designed to critique, create, and ultimately contest geoengineered 
imaginaries.  
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Introduction 
Organic gardening, not rocket science1 	
 In 2007, Russ George intimated to the New York Times that his 
proposed ocean iron fertilization (hereafter OIF) project was “organic 
gardening, not rocket science” (Richtel 2007).  By enhancing the ocean’s 
biological pump, OIF can produce carbon-absorbing plankton blooms, 
which creates a literal sink for carbon dioxide (hereafter CO2) and provides 
an essential ingredient for oceanic life systems.  While the outspoken 
entrepreneur's candor was likely intended to raise funds from investors, as 
well as a few eyebrows, George’s 2007 experiment ultimately failed to 
materialize—if only because of pressure from the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (hereafter EPA) and other concerned parties (Hester 
2013, 273).   
 In spite of his detractors, George continued exalting the positive 
effects of OIF as a means to combat climate change and, perhaps not 
surprisingly, seed a profitable enterprise.  Many, however, within the 
scientific community are weary of accelerating, or further modifying 
already stressed, oceanic systems, especially as a number of studies 
suggest that only a small percentage of the sequestered CO2 remains 																																																								
1 Portions of this dissertation have been published in peer-reviewed journals and as book 
chapters over the past four years. Specifically, the introduction and chapter two draw 
from Sweeney (2013; 2014) and my contributions to Sweeney et al. (In press). Chapter 
four pulls extensively from Sweeney (2017).  
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effectively stored and, perhaps most importantly, the overall effects of 
large-scale OIF interventions on oceanic life systems are uncertain (Batten 
and Gower 2014; Bodansky 1996; Bodle et al. 2012; Burns and Strauss 
2013; Courvoisier et al. 2018; Fuentes-George 2017; IPCC 2012; National 
Research Council 2015a; Royal Society 2009; Williamson et al. 2012a; 
Williamson et al. 2012b).   
 Notwithstanding scientific and legal challenges, a recalcitrant 
George did not waiver from seeking to produce “lucrative carbon credits to 
trade on international markets” and generating invaluable data to 
legitimate future experiments (Specter 2012).  In 2012, George finally 
realized his vision, at least in part.  Coordinating an effort to dump 100 
tons of iron sulfate off the coast of northern British Columbia, George 
appears to have convinced the Haida Nation to support a “salmon 
enhancement project” and received $2.5 million from the First Nations 
community to carry out his “research” (Lukacs 2012a).  While there have 
been reports that George’s OIF experiment created a plankton bloom of 
“10,000 square kilometers” (Parson 2012), many were more interested in 
the region’s record salmon yields that followed, although some contend 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to make such causal, or even 
correlational, linkages (Johnson 2013; Learn 2014).  Many, if not most, 
within both the scientific and environmental protection communities 
condemned George’s maverick approach to “research” (Hume 2012), but 
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mainstream calls to carry out further experiments (Güssow et al. 2013) 
have surfaced since the 2012 incident, whose purported success led some 
to herald further opportunities for “unleashing abundance” (Zubrin 2014). 
 In light of the media buzz surrounding the experiment, the Haida 
Salmon Restoration Corporation (HSRC) has done its utmost to distance 
itself from George, who was removed from his position as Director with the 
company in 2013.  Arguing that they were intentionally misled, the HSRC 
voiced concerns as to whether George’s project might have contravened 
the 1972 London Convention on marine dumping and a 2010 United 
Nations Convention on Biodiversity, which specifically “calls for precaution 
in the absence of an adequate scientific basis on which to justify 
intentional climate modification activities and appropriate consideration of 
the associated risks for the environment and biodiversity, and associated 
social, economic and cultural impacts” (Williamson et al. 2012a, 18).  The 
2010 Convention does allow for small-scale experiments that "are 
conducted in a controlled setting, scientifically justified and subject to prior 
environmental impact assessments […]” (Williamson et al. 2012a, 141).  
The Planktos experiment did not meet any of the aforementioned criteria. 
 George appears to have escaped legal penalty, although some 
have stated publicly that the dumping was illegal, which points toward 
possible hurdles ahead for future experiments—should they be undertaken 
(Hume 2012).  Ultimately, the Planktos incident illuminates the lack of a 
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comprehensive regulatory framework for research and potential 
deployment, enforcement obstacles and chasms within international law, 
and the absence of an overarching governance treaty on geoengineering 
(Bipartisan Policy Centre Task Force on Climate Remediation Research 
2011; Bodansky 1996; Brent et al. 2018; Cicerone et al. 1992; Cicerone 
2006; Crutzen 2006; Fleming 2010; Hamilton 2013; Horton et al. 2015; 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010; Kintisch 
2010; Klein 2014; Payne et al. 2015; Royal Society 2009; Stilgoe 2015; 
Stilgoe 2016; Victor 2008).  Furthermore, the Planktos incident highlights 
the potentiality for geoengineering to be used as a tool for further 
exploitation of communities already on the frontlines of environmental 
degradation and climate change.  Writing in anticipation of such events, 
Whyte presciently observes: 
For many Indigenous peoples, [geoengineering] represents a 
particular, global path-dependence for responding to climate 
change that will simply sweep them up before they have had any 
chance to influence or meaningfully consent to various courses of 
action. Non-Indigenous persons push to gain support and fund 
even early research represents an emerging crystallization of a 
commitment that will give some people greater capacity to impact 
the climate system (2012, 175).   
 
As with the diffuse effects of global warming, climate engineering presents 
another threat to collective continuance, which “is a community’s capacity 
to be adaptive in ways sufficient for the livelihoods of its members to 
flourish into the future” (Whyte 2013).  In failing to confront the historical 
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and continuing injustice(s) faced by native communities, George’s 
positionality is quite clear: experimentation upon rather than with 
communities like the Haida Nation. 
 In light of his contention that he only works “to restore nature,” 
George invokes a modernist fable (2013).2  The Romantic construction of 
the natural world as something static, manageable, and ultimately under 
the purview of human control is precisely what enabled “progress” to 
facilitate and enact a host of crises and genocides.  Furthermore, the 
perpetuation of a separation between nature and culture positioned 
Western “science” as the proverbial go-between for understanding, 
classifying, and ultimately knowing the world (Morton 2007; Morton 2010).3  
As Latour reflects: 
So long as Nature was remote and under control, it still vaguely 
resembled the constitutional pole of tradition, and science could still 
be seen as a mere intermediary to uncover it.  Nature seemed to be 
held in reserve, transcendent, inexhaustible, distant enough.  But 
where are we to classify the ozone hole story, or global warming or 																																																								
2 Appadurai (1996) talks about the concept of “modernity at large,” which focuses on 
science, technological development, (neo)colonial dynamics, and the continuing 
dominance of statist identities and communities. In this project, modernity is treated as a 
global nexus of actual and perceptual forces that manifest within regional, national, and 
local contexts in various ways. As such, I am not interested in reifying modernity but 
rather exploring the “modernist” aspects and dynamics of geoengineering imaginaries. 
3 In response, Morton promotes an “ecology without nature” (2007).  Although he attacks 
modernity head on, Morton’s engagement with indigenous perspectives is slight, to put it 
mildly, and he relies primarily on (neo)colonial generalizations.  For example, he writes, 
“Given that much ecocriticism and ecological literature is primitivist, it is ironic that 
indigenous societies often refer to nature as a shape-shifting trickster rather than as a 
firm basis” (2007, 21).  Morton clearly misidentifies the locus of irony, and in failing to 
provide additional context, Morton’s pithiness comes across as more than a mere 
oversight.    
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deforestation? (1993, 50). 
 
In light of Latour’s provocation, where are we to situate geoengineering?  
Or rather, how might one situate geoengineering in light of the Planktos 
incident?  In lacking attentiveness toward historical and contemporary 
disproportions of power, George is emblematic of a certain, all-too-familiar, 
politics. 
 Fomenting this politics is a lack of headway on reducing current 
atmospheric carbon concentrations as well as a litany of uncertainties 
concerning an appropriate, which is also to say safe, warming target, and 
numerous studies now suggest that it might be too late to forestall a 
dramatic, if not catastrophic, increase in global average temperature by 
2100 (Courvoisier et al. 2018; Frölicher et al. 2014).  Consequently, 
debates over one and a half versus two degrees Celsius of global warming 
might be tantamount to choosing a shorter or longer song for the Titanic’s 
infamous quartet to play, and entrepreneurs, such as George, are keen to 
squeeze some profit from whatever tune gets played, especially as some 
contend that the only achievable means to the one and a half to two 
degrees Celsius reduction target is via “negative emissions,” which was 
included in scenarios developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and rose to prominence during the 2015 Paris 
Agreement meetings (Anderson 2015; Courvoisier et al. 2018; Neslen 
2015; UNFCCC 2015).  The most recent IPCC report (2018) suggests with 
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“high confidence” that global warming is likely to reach one and a half 
degree Celsius between 2030 and 2052, so the proverbial clock is ticking. 
 Keeping pace, and perhaps playing into, increasing concerns over 
our collective climate futures, George has taken to calling himself 
Greenfinger—a tongue-in-cheek moniker that heightens his now Bond-
villain-esque persona (George 2013).  Dubbed the world's “first geo-
vigilante," George has embraced the spectacle surrounding his exploits, 
and regardless of what one thinks about his intentions and methods, his 
sanguine proclivity for “public relations” is undeniable (Specter 2012). On 
his personal blog, which is aptly entitled “Greenfinger speaks,” George 
cheerily proclaims, "The work can be done by just 100 villages.  To 
become one of the hundred follow this link, we just need 99 more" (George 
2013).  After a brief hiatus, George resurfaced in a 2018 interview with The 
Ecologist, a longstanding and widely read environmental affairs 
publication.  Defending his project and focusing squarely on increased 
fishing yields, George wistfully opines, “The salmon were the best science 
result, right?” (Breeze 2018).   
 What becomes clear from George’s reflection is that he was, and 
perhaps remains, content in experimentation upon rather than 
experimentation with the collective continuance of the Haida, if not the 
global climate system.  Channeling Machiavelli, the ends justify the means 
for George, which is to say that results (e.g. salmon) trumps any and all 
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ethico-political considerations.  Given the increasingly bleak forecasts for 
climate change (IPCC 2018), the Planktos incident is potentially a sign of 
things to come and articulates the contours of the ongoing geoengineering 
debate.  At one end of the spectrum, there are those, such as George, 
who champion research, if only to prove what might and might not work 
should the need arise to deploy such technologies.  Proponents also 
highlight the need “to dilute the geo-clique,” which refers to the insider 
community of geoengineering researchers (Keith 2013)—some of whom 
have commercial interests in climate engineering technologies (Keith et al. 
2010; Parson and Keith 2013).  At the other end, there are those who 
consider geoengineering a “Promethean dream” and believe research 
itself might be an obstacle to reducing emissions as even the promise of a 
down-the-road solution alleviates the pressure needed to enact change in 
the here and now (Hamilton 2013; Wetter and Zundel 2017).  Across this 
spectrum, one finds a range of positionalities on research, implementation, 
and governance.  As with any debate concerning the impact of other 
emerging technologies, the public, broadly defined, is struggling to find a 
meaningful way to engage, although a surge in media reporting on climate 
engineering as well as various efforts to foster exploratory exchanges on 
climate engineering, including scenarios, have taken center stage over the 
past decade (Asayama et al. 2017; Anshelm and Hanssen 2014; Banerjee 
et al. 2013; Bellamy and Lezaun 2017; Bodansky 2011; Burns 2011; 
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Burns et al. 2016; Cairns 2015; Cairns and Stirling 2014; Carr et al. 2013; 
Corner et al. 2012; Galaz 2012; Gannon and Hulme 2018; Jones 2018; 
Luokkanen et al. 2014; McLaren et al. 2016; Nicholson et al. 2013; Payne 
et al. 2015; Scheer and Renn 2014; Stilgoe et al. 2013; Sugiyama et al. 
2017; Wong 2013).  Indeed, scenarios on geoengineering have 
proliferated exponentially, although many, if not most, focus on technical 
aspects and technological conditions of possibility (Low 2017; Talberg et 
al. 2018).4  Consequently, such scenarios “frame assumptions and create 
expectations” and, as some argue, implicitly promote “simplification and 
standardization” by normalizing radical potentialities (Talberg et al. 2018).  
Public, civic, and social engagement is a constant and consistent refrain 
within the ongoing geoengineering debate, but some have observed that 
such declarations are wholly and intentionally performative, which is also 
to say perfunctory (Bellamy and Lezaun 2017).  
At its core, the ongoing geoengineering debate on research, 
implementation, and governance both reveals and conceals a politics that 
is deeply imbued with systemic uncertainties, global high stakes, and 
conflicts surrounding questions of value at a variety of scales.  																																																								
4 In a comprehensive review for geoengineering scenarios, researchers found, “[…] 102 
publications comprising 87 peer-reviewed journal articles from 41 journals and 15 ‘gray’ 
reports from 14 institutions.  The most represented disciplines were meteorology and 
atmospheric sciences, environmental sciences, economics, ethics and engineering.  The 
most represented journals were the Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres (13), 
Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics (6), and Environmental Research Letters (6)” 
(Talberg et al. 2018, 1096). 	
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Consequently, climate engineering has been deemed an inherently post-
normal science (Bellamy et al. 2012; Bellamy et al. 2013; Chris 2016; 
Dilling and Hauser 2013; Rayner 2015; Talberg et al. 2018).  In the 
remaining sections, I provide some conceptual clarity concerning my 
approach to geoengineering as envisaged through the lens of postnormal 
science.  Next, I introduce heuristics from postnormal times (PNT), which 
is one of the critical political and futures frames I use to situate 
geoengineering and its politics.  Then, I offer a practice-based reflection 
that interrogates the practice of scenarios, as well as the workshop space, 
culminating in a trajectory for a politics for geoengineering.  Turning to 
games, I provide some definitional and theoretical clarity to contextualize 
how this project deploys play as a modality to enliven an alternative 
politics to the one embodied by George’s experiment.  Next, I introduce 
Causal Layered Analysis (CLA), which provides a methodological 
framework for analyzing the narrative frames underlying and driving 
geoengineered imaginaries.  Finally, I conclude with a brief review and 
then sketch out the remaining chapters.  
Postnormal science and geoengineered imaginaries 	
 To say that Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962) had an impact on a range of discourses and disciplines would be a 
gross understatement.  Indeed, few, if any, could have predicted that this 
tome would end up as the March 2015 selection on Mark Zuckerberg’s 
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book club (Flood 2015).  Regardless of what one makes of the Facebook 
CEO’s selection, Kuhn’s text forever changed a host of disciplines.  
Arguing that scientific processes are either revolutionary (creating a new 
paradigm) or normal (operating within or extending a current paradigm), 
Kuhn’s work garnered acclaim and criticism for calling attention to the 
myriad dynamics surrounding means and modes of scientific inquiry.  
Breakthroughs are not the result of accumulated facts, as Kuhn puts it, but 
rather the result of challenging existent traditions.  Normal Science, on the 
other hand, is the act of puzzle solving within a particular, and most 
importantly unchallenged, paradigm (Kuhn and Hacking 2012, 35).  The 
paradigmatic shift from Newtonian to Quantum physics is perhaps one of 
the clearest examples of Kuhn’s argument, and while many, if not most, 
are content to live within a world confined by Newton’s theorems, it is 
impossible, if not unadvisable, to ignore the quantum realm.  While Kuhn’s 
“normal science” thesis drew immense critiques, including sharp 
condemnation from contemporaries such as Karl Popper, his dichotomy 
remains a key text in the history of science.  Additionally, Kuhn’s treatise 
induced the birth of post-normal science. 
 In 1991, Funtowicz and Ravetz published “A New Scientific Method 
for Global Environmental Issues” to “mark the passing of an age when the 
norm for effective scientific practice could be a process of puzzle-solving 
in ignorance of the wider methodological, societal, and ethical issues 
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raised by the activity and its results” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991, 138).  
For Funtowicz and Ravetz, global environmental challenges, namely 
climate change, require a democratic re-framing, or perhaps more 
accurately an unframing, of scientific practice—one that is acutely 
attenuated to non-expert audiences and stakeholders whose concerns, 
lifestyles, and values should be seen as more than externalities in relation 
to the possible impacts of scientific research and practice.5  Post-normal 
science, then, was conceived as a conduit for making questions of value 
both central and explicit to research, and its originators note how their 
approach is best seen as a complementary tool for making previously 
bracketed externalities an internal and integral aspect of scientific practice 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993).  For Funtowicz and Ravetz, this is 
accomplished, in part, by introducing and entertaining “‘extended facts,’” 
which can range from anecdotes to unofficial records (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz 1991, 150).  At its core, an extended fact is a fundamentally 
human accounting of things, which is also to say that it is highly subjective 
and potentially based upon ideology rather than observation.6 
																																																								
5 Writing about the affects of artistic practice, Guattari argues, “The work of art, for those 
who use it, is an activity of unframing, of rupturing sense, of baroque proliferation or 
extreme impoverishment, which leads to a recreation and reinvention of the subject itself” 
(Guattari 1995, 131).  My usage of this concept centers on the rupturing of one’s sense 
what is and is not normal, which is to say that I position unframing as precisely the aim of 
postnormal science and its intellectual inheritors, particularly postnormal times, which I 
introduce later in this chapter.  
6 Although the concept of extended facts foreshadows our all-too-postnormal 
mediascapes, Funtowicz and Ravetz did not forecast the rise and subsequent 
weaponization of social media, specifically how “fake news,” as part meme and mythos, 
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 In expanding the scope of scientific inquiry and bringing values, 
which is also to say non-expert desires, to the fore, Funtowicz and Ravetz 
contend that an extended peer community consisting of people with a 
vested interest should be engaged to democratize research inputs and 
outputs.  Postnormal science contends that engagement with an extended 
peer community (hereafter EPC) can and might lead toward the integration 
and absorption of localized knowledge, which can shape areas of study 
and bring about alternative, including more collaborative and responsive, 
modes of research, which was the case surrounding the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 753).  In the context of 
geoengineering, there are a number of issues that both compliment and 
complicate using postnormal science and EPC, in particular.  Given the 
scale of geoengineering, the only sufficient EPC is, or ought to be, nothing 
short of the world itself—a rather large community for which no one has 
yet to devise an adequate means of equitable engagement.  If the world 
cannot be engaged en masse, then participatory approaches and 
processes must be speculative and, perhaps most importantly, guided by 
an “ethics of expanded obligations,” which is explicated fully in chapter 
three (Zylinska 2014, 17).  Noting the ethical challenges at the heart of 
geoengineering, some researchers have put forward an analogy between 
																																																																																																																																																							
has come to dominate “civic” discourse across numerous contexts (Tandoc et al. 2017). 
This receives greater attention in the next chapter. 	
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biomedical experimentation and geoengineering proposals in seeking to 
establish norms, customs, and principles.7  One of geoengineering’s first 
"out-of-the-lab" experiments was cancelled due to concerns over 
governance and intellectual property, and the proverbial plug was pulled 
by the researchers themselves, if only to assuage the buzz surrounding 
their project (Stilgoe 2015).  Aside from intentionally altering how the 
planet operates, the most recalcitrant challenges of geoengineering are 
decidedly human—how to communicate what it is, how it might (or might 
not) work, and how to forge spaces of critical and reflective engagement 
for a diverse array of participants, specifically within the nexus between 
public, science, and policy spheres.  The core issues surround what is 
unknown and the degree of confidence in what is known—in sum, 
ignorance and uncertainty.  
 In the context of postnormal science, Funtowicz and Ravetz 
observe, “uncertainty and ignorance […] must be managed for the 
common good” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991, 146).  From climate change 
deniers to chemtrail truthers, it ought to be painfully clear that any attempt 
to "manage" uncertainty and ignorance is a fool's errand—to say nothing 
about how one might go about establishing a "common good" related to 
the "stability" (actual, perceptual, and/or some combination of the two) of 
																																																								
7 The complications of situating identity, both biologically and socio-culturally, makes for 
an interesting comparison—one that receives greater attention in chapter three (Morrow 
et al. 2013).   
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the global climate system8 (Tingley and Wagner 2017).  And yet, this is 
precisely what climate change seems to demand—thinking and acting at 
the interstices of the all-too-familiar and the truly unthinkable.  Overcoming 
the "cognitive dissonance" that this quagmire fosters is an immense 
undertaking, to say the least (Festinger 2001).  As Scranton puts it, 
climate change confronts us with nothing less than learning how to die 
through the process of realizing civilizational collapse, which, for many, 
signals a liberation from the tyranny of the past and present (2013; 2015).  
That Scranton makes absolutely no mention of indigenous communities, 
such as the Haida Nation, in his magnum opus is telling—particularly as to 
how various forms of privilege continues to haunt even the best intentions.  
This is especially concerning given the real locus of Scranton’s argument: 
carbon-based capitalism9 (Scranton 2015, 19).  If anything, climate 																																																								
8 At the heart of this challenge one finds a range of epistemological approaches.  Within 
the context of climate change, inductive approaches center on local impacts leading 
toward truly global shifts. On the other hand, deductive contentions position “global 
warming” as an unifying threat—one that can and will only be felt in highly-localized 
ways. Abductive reasoning, which was championed by Charles Sanders Pierce, 
emphasizes plausibility as a means of reducing uncertainty by focusing on the most likely 
possibility (Psillos 2004).  Given the importance of plausibility in the practice of creating 
scenarios, this mode of inquiry is explored further in chapter three.  
9 Scranton’s omission is quite surprising given that indigenous communities have been 
and continue to be at the forefront of contesting the exploitative practices inherent to 
carbon-driven capitalism.  As Klein explains, “Space is opening up for a growing influence 
of Indigenous thought on new generations of activists, beginning, most significantly, with 
Mexico’s Zapatista uprising in 1994, and continuing, as we will see, with the important 
leadership role that Indigenous land-rights movements are playing in pivotal anti-
extraction struggles in North America, Latin America, Australia, and New Zealand. In part 
through these struggles, non-Indigenous progressive movements are being exposed to 
worldviews based on relationships of reciprocity and interconnection with the natural 
world that are the antithesis of extractivism. These movements have truly heard the 
message of climate change and are winning battles to keep significant amounts of carbon 
in the ground” (Klein 2014, 160). 
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change requires a resolute acceptance of uncertainty in all its horrific 
splendor driven by devout knowledge in the limits of our scientific, if not 
biological, capacities with a resolute attentiveness toward the historical 
and contemporary injustices underlying our collective crises, which is not 
equally shared.  Climate change necessitates an ethico-political 
reckoning—one that geoengineering cannot abate or forestall.  Indeed, 
what is most terrifying about geoengineering proposals is not just that they 
might “work,” but rather the potentiality that such efforts would be wholly 
impotent or perhaps even foment further crises.  Queue the Pandora’s box 
references.  
 At present, the best “evidence” to support (or not support) 
geoengineering relies upon forecast models that often show complex and 
dynamic variability—from the potential disruption of the monsoon cycle 
(Burns 2011; Robock et al. 2008) to uncertain impacts on numerous life 
systems, such as oceanic food webs (Lin 2013).  In short, there is simply 
no way to understand fully and completely the impacts and effects of 
large-scale climate engineering initiatives.  Hence, some have 
championed the potential for a new models of governance, especially 
those emphasizing experimentation, born out of our dire need to mitigate 
climate change, although any kind or type of “techno-fix,” especially one 
that might attempt to negate politics, has been widely disavowed 																																																																																																																																																								
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(Hamilton 2013; House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 
2010; Scott 2012; Stilgoe 2015; Stilgoe 2016; Wapner and Elver 2016).   
Given geoengineering’s meteoric rise amongst scientists, 
researchers, and pundits, post-normal science has been used as a 
descriptor and conceptual lens from which to contextualize research 
(importance of uncertainty and extended facts), civic engagement (the 
concept of an extended peer community), and potential implementation of 
climate engineering initiatives (how values might shape such initiatives) 
(Bellamy et al. 2012; Bellamy et al. 2013; Chris 2016; Dilling and Hauser 
2013; Rayner 2015).  As one might expect, there has also been a 
proliferation of articles, research initiatives, meetings, and workshops 
aimed at fostering dialogue on geoengineering within and amongst civic 
participants, although, as previous noted, few presence ethico-political 
questions, concerns, and issues (Burns 2011; Cairns and Stirling 2014; 
Carr et al. 2013; Corner et al. 2012; Galaz 2012; Nicholson et al. 2013; 
Scheer and Renn 2014; Stilgoe et al. 2013). 
In light of the shortcomings inherent to contemporary imaginings, 
some have called for “a novel class of scenarios […] that supports co-
evolution of governance and technology, and co-production of knowledge 
as part of an iterative, actionable, and aspirational transition strategy” 
(Talberg et al. 2018, 1101).  Articulating the need for “technologies of 
humility,” Jasanoff argues for “[…] habits of thought [that] come to grips 
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with the ragged fringes of human understanding – the unknown, the 
uncertain, the ambiguous, and the uncontrollable” (2003, 227).  In 
response to such calls and in anticipation of further escalation with regards 
to more than just rhetoric, this investigation deploy heuristics from 
postnormal times (PNT), which I introduce in the next section, to illuminate 
the ethico-political aspects of geoengineering.  My specific interest in 
using this approach centers on how geoengineered imaginaries are 
conditioned, created, and communicated. 
 Operating as “structures of contingency,” imaginaries shape the 
very conditions of possibility for geoengineered futures (Marcus 1995).  At 
the exact intersection between the actual and perceptual, imaginaries are 
assemblages—shared beliefs, desires, fears, hopes, assumptions, and 
other percepts that manifest as and create norms within various social 
contexts (Jasanoff 2015).  Functioning as spheres of common reference, 
imaginaries condition current trajectories and shape future(s) possibilities 
across and at a variety of scales.10  As Jasanoff and Kim argue: 
Unlike master narratives, which are often extrapolated from past 																																																								
10 Echoing Funtowicz and Ravetz’s call for an “Extended Peer Community,” Jasanoff 
argues, “Living creatively with climate change will require re-linking larger scales of 
scientific representation with smaller scales of social meaning. How, at the levels of 
community, polity, space and time, will scientists’ impersonal knowledge of the climate be 
synchronized with the mundane rhythms of lived lives and the specificities of human 
experience? (2010, 238).  Curiously, postnormal science is absent from this piece, and 
this speaks to how epistemic imaginaries shape discursive parameters, even amongst 
those who critically analyze both.  
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events and serve explanatory or justificatory purposes, imaginaries 
are instrumental and futuristic: they project visions of what is good, 
desirable, and worth attaining for a political community; they 
articulate feasible futures (2009, 123). 
As Jasanoff observes, all imaginaries conceal, as well as reveal, a politics.  
Originally emphasizing statist imaginings, Jasanoff revisited the concept of 
“sociotechnical imaginaries” and outlined a broader framing—one that 
engaged more expressly with social and ethico-political dynamics.  In 
updating sociotechnical imaginaries, Jasanoff argues that they are 
“collectively held, institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions 
of desirable futures, animated by shared understandings of forms of social 
life and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in 
science and technology” (Jasanoff 2015, 4).  In creating a perceptual 
space for “good” climate engineering potentialities, geoengineered 
imaginaries are constitutive of possible (as well as preferable) futures.  
Indeed, it is the primary function of geoengineered imaginaries to condition 
“desirable” futures, and they gestate norms and framings that shape 
actualities, including the ongoing debate on research, implementation, and 
governance (e.g. George’s organic gardening).  As such, my interest lies 
both with imaginaries focused on geoengineering and imaginaries 
conditioned by geoengineering, and the latter points toward the specific 
challenges of confronting and contesting such assemblages.   
 Reflecting on how the discourse on climate change focuses 
primarily on the global scale, Jasanoff observes that the presencing of this 
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globalized fact contests and contradicts localized imaginings, which 
creates a rift where there is little or no “regard for the layered investments 
that societies have made in worlds as they wish them to be” (2010, 236).  
While some have championed geoengineering as a remedy for global 
climate change, it is not clear what effects such a potentiality might have 
on existent, including localized, imaginaries.  As a conceptual orientation 
and rejoinder to Jasanoff’s notion of sociotechnical imaginaries, 
geoengineered imaginaries is a means to complicate and contextualize 
the debate’s core aspects.  As such, my analysis of geoengineered 
imaginaries centers on three key areas of concern: centralization, 
corporatization, and commitment.  Centralization centers on path 
dependencies within both technological and governance spheres.  
Corporatization focuses primarily on implementation but also gestures 
toward broader dynamics related to the processes that are driving climate 
change.  Finally, commitment speaks to the multi-generational, and in 
some instances geologic, scale considerations inherent to climate 
engineering proposals. 
 While the concept of imaginaries has been used to explore a range 
of “technoscientific” and “sociotechnical” issues, no one has yet made an 
explicit link between this conceptual frame and postnormal times (PNT), 
which builds on the core assumptions of postnormal science (Marcus 
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1995; Jasanoff and Kim 2009).11  In the next section, I introduce PNT and 
setup its emergence as a movement within futures studies making an 
explicit link with how this approach encounters imaginaries.  I then situate 
how postnormal heuristics can and might be used to enliven a politics for 
geoengineering. 
Let a thousand jel lyf ish bloom 	
In late September 2013, unit three at the Oskarshamn nuclear 
power plant in Sweden was forced to shut down.  As the world's biggest 
boiling-water reactor and the largest nuclear facility in the Nordic region, 
Oskarshamn's sudden closure was not without notice.  While workers at 
Oskarshamn were quick to dispel the possibility of a meltdown on the 
Baltic, the cause of the stoppage left some scratching their heads: a 
massive bloom of moon jellyfish clogged the site's intake piping, which 
provides cool water for the 1,400 megawatt unit (Guilford 2013).  While the 
Oskarshamn incident received significant media attention, this is not the 
first time that jellyfish, which are actually not fish but rather invertebrates, 
impacted unit three's operations. 
In 2005, Oskarshamn, which provides roughly 10% of Sweden's 
power, was forced to power down for the same reason.  This phenomenon 
has not been limited to Oskarshamn, as massive blooms have created 																																																								11	From January 2014 to January 2018, I served as Deputy Director at CPPFS, which 
entailed further development of PNT. In the next section, I complicate my own 
positionality in relation to using this approach, which I see as a movement within futures.   	
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similar shutdowns at nuclear facilities in the United States, Israel, 
Scotland, and Japan (Merchant 2013).  In 1999, the meddlesome 
invertebrates led to the closure of the Sual coal-fired power plant in Luzon, 
Philippines.  The brief blackout left 40 million without power and incited 
“fears that a long-rumored military coup d’état was underway” (Tucker, 
2010).  Although the power was only off for about ten-minutes, President 
Estrada issued a statement ensuring the public that the blackout was “not 
part of an attempt to destabilise the government” (Ramos 1999).  And, no 
political justifications were provided by any of the involved jellyfish. 
President Estrada, however, failed to mention the actual cause of the 
disruption, which one can only imagine that some might have found more 
terrifying than an impromptu coup d’état.  In response to such incidents, 
scientists from the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology 
(KAIST) designed the “Jellyfish Elimination Robotic Swarm” or JEROS. 
These autonomous jellyfish terminators are programmed to seek and 
destroy coastal blooms, which in Korea alone impact local fisheries an 
estimated $300 million a year (Gray 2013).  When jellyfish are killed, 
however, they release eggs, which, as one might expect, leads to more 
jellyfish.  KAIST has yet to release any information about the available 
settings on its proposed sea-based drone/blender solution. 
While KAIST’s remedy is perhaps the most imaginative, it is 
certainly not the only one.  Scientists in the United Kingdom are working to 
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create an early warning tool to counteract potential blooms on the North 
Sea (University of Bristol 2016).  In January 2018, the GoJelly project will 
launch.  This EU-funded initiative runs for four years and aims to use 
jellyfish mucus to produce micro-plastics (Norwegian University of Science 
and Technology 2017).  While there is an increasing sense that jellyfish 
blooms are rapidly becoming a significant issue, there is actually scant 
data to support such a claim (Lamb 2017).  Part of the challenge in 
backing up the “stung” scenario has much to do with the difficulties in 
studying jellyfish and blooms (Condon et al. 2014; Gershwin 2013; 
Graham et al. 2014).   
A lack of evidence, however, has not dissuaded some from seeing 
the convergence of a variety of trends and forecasting likely scenarios.  
Overfishing leading to the loss of natural predators coupled with increasing 
oceanic and sea temperatures points toward the invertebrates enjoying a 
preferred future.  As Gershwin observes, the full realization of these 
trends, which would result in a veritable jellyfish takeover, are “socially 
unfathomable, and essentially apocalyptic” (Gershwin 2013).  Some have 
even gone so far as to suggest that a “new normal” might be one in which 
jellyfish are “the only seafood left” (Pauly et al. 2016, 10).  While some 
might find such a prospect anything but normal, others, especially in 
places where jellyfish are already on the menu, might take issue with such 
a claim.  As such, it is imperative to ask: normal for whom and in what 
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context?  As a framing for critical and reflective analysis, the “new normal” 
falls into the modernist trap and, perhaps most egregiously, ignores the 
particularities of context.  As a means of going beyond the new normal, 
Sardar introduces postnormal times (PNT) as an extension of post-normal 
science, which emphasizes uncertainty, values, and the need for new 
forms of engagement (Sardar 2010b). 
 In “Welcome to Postnormal Times,” Sardar articulates an array of 
forces that complicate how futures are imagined and how futurists 
practice.  This point is essential in understanding the origins of PNT as a 
movement centered on articulating the many and varied tensions of our 
contemporary age in order to fortify our creative capacities for imagining 
but also facilitating futures explorations (Kuzmanovic and Gaffney 2016).  
Hence, “postnormal” distinguishes itself from the concept of a “new 
normal” by focusing on both the what and how of futures as a practice with 
a particular emphasis on the “subservience of imagination to orthodoxy” 
(Sardar 2010b, 443).12  Orthodoxy and its norms do not appear out of thin 
air, and it is precisely how various entities establish, promote, and sustain 
norms, which function as processes and mechanisms of control, that PNT 
																																																								
12 Sardar’s key example is the 2008 financial crisis, and he asserts that the fundamental 
conditions and practices the led to this event were not altered in any meaningful way, 
which is to say that there is a certain degree of social/institutional amnesia that has 
become normalized, if not institutionalized within the financial system. Hence, his 
argument as to why futures ought to promote and utilize a postnormal lens.  
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aims to disturb.13  In PNT, one challenges orthodoxy via a triumvirate of 
forces that, according to Sardar, must be understood in order to “negotiate 
a viable way forward” (Sardar 2010a, 436).  These forces are complexity, 
chaos, and contradictions (3C’s).14   
Amongst futures researchers and practitioners, complexity is often 
a synonym, if not placeholder, for systems thinking approaches and 
methods.  It is important to note that Sardar employs a political lens in how 
he frames complexity, and this thread, which runs throughout his oeuvre, 
centers on calling into question the colonizing forces that disable 
possibilities for what lies ahead.  In PNT, complexity has everything to do 
with scale—challenges that are large, interconnected, and seemingly 
unresolvable.  One might be hard-pressed to devise a better description 
for global warming—the problem for which some think geoengineering is 
a, if not the, solution.  Such magical thinking—specifically relying upon a 
techno-fix—often ignores the potentiality for chaos, which is framed as 
systemic overload and/or breakdown.15  
																																																								
13 Given this trajectory, PNT very much confronts groupthink, which points toward how 
errors in decision-making arise by focusing on consensus—typically between the public 
and policy-makers.  As an artifact of norms, groupthink is well within the remit of PNT, 
although this concept is not directly employed or referenced (Janis 1982).  This 
represents a clear oversight, and I am thankful to Dr. Dick Chadwick for this insight.  
14 That Sardar calls them forces is telling, and this suggests that they are not theoretical 
constructs but rather actual and perceptual drivers of continuity and change. This 
distinction becomes critical in chapter three.  
15 Etymologically, chaos has Greek roots and refers to a void or chasm.  In physics, 
chaos centers on unpredictable conditions and/or behaviors within a complex system.  In 
his 2010 treatise, Sardar does not provide a clear or concise definition or contextualized 
usage of this term.  He does, however, make an explicit linkage to chaos theory, which 
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Mapping the radical potentialities of our postnormal age, Sardar 
invokes chaos to illuminate technological acceleration, specifically related 
to the rise of social networks and algorithmic advancements that have 
produced substantive shifts in a variety of contexts.  Within Sardar’s initial 
framework, chaos is often, but not always, fomented by contradictions.  
For Sardar, "exponential acceleration has now become the norm” (Sardar 
2010b, 439).  Initially, the examples used to make this justification are 
entirely technological, but Sardar turns to explicate a litany of socio-
economic inequities as a means of pointing toward the contradictions 
underlying such claims.  For Sardar, there are two distinct categories of 
contradictions. 
Problematizing the assumption that the long arc of progress, and 
the radical changes underlying it, are upending life as we know it, Sardar 
points out how, for many, life continues to be the same as it has been for 
centuries, which is to say plagued by a litany of colonial and neocolonial 
forces and mechanisms.  The first category of contradictions have much to 
do with neoliberalism and the disproportionate ways with which wealth is 
accumulated and shared—in short, the underlying conditions driving the 
global climate system toward calamity.  Indeed, Sardar explicitly states, 
																																																																																																																																																							
originates from mathematics and centers on the sensitivity of systems to small changes.  
He writes, “But it is rather unusual to see civilisations, whole societies or indeed the entire 
inhabitants of the globe, behaving according to the dictates of chaos theory” (2010b, 
437). 
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“the postnormal world is a world of disproportion” (2010b, 444).  The first 
category of contradiction, then, centers on the contention that for some to 
win there are those who must lose.  The second category of contradictions 
focuses more on the perceptual aspects of life in our all-too-modern world, 
specifically the epistemological challenges facing those within digital 
technospheres.  Sardar contends that while we have access to greater 
amounts of information, we do not seem to have the capacity to organize, 
analyze, and synthesize this information, which is to say that we are 
illiterate in processing this information.  Climate change deniers, some of 
whom rather hypocritically support geoengineering, embody this 
formulation.  
In PNT, the gravity of the 3C’s rests upon an assertion that “much 
of what we have taken as normal, conventional and orthodox just does not 
work anymore” (Sardar 2010b, 436).  It is in this sense that PNT is both 
descriptive and prescriptive, although it is not without its critics.  What has 
been and is “normal” has always and ever only worked for some and not 
all, and while Sardar, like many others before him, aims to problematize 
normalcy, this line of thought remains undeveloped in Sardar’s 2010 
paper, although later works pick up on this thread (Sardar 2015a; Sardar 
and Sweeney 2016).  Furthering the above contention, Kapoor argues that 
PNT embodies the restlessness of “the West,” which is losing its foothold 
as arbiter of the future (Kapoor 2011).  
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As with any theoretical construct, PNT’s accessibility, if not efficacy, 
has intended and unintended audiences.  In chapter three, I situate PNT 
more fully within the context of futures studies.  Ultimately, my invocation 
of postnormal heuristics rests on the contention that geoengineering, and 
its surrounding debate, has much to do with the failures, both actual and 
perceptual, of “normal” processes of remediating climate change.  If 
geoengineering is intended as a protraction of the systems and processes 
that produced global warming, then it feeds off of socio-economic dogma 
surrounding efficiency, progress, modernization, management, and 
control—in short, modernist sensibilities.  As artifacts of an all-too-modern 
form of “progress,” the complexities of the global climate system, 
contradictions underlying global warming, and the potentiality for further 
ecological chaos position geoengineering within the purview of PNT.  
Given this resonance, I am interested in seeing how PNT might act as a 
conduit for confronting, contesting, and complicating geoengineered 
imaginaries and, perhaps most importantly, the futures emerging from 
them.  Specifically, I am interested in applying Sardar’s concept of an 
“ethical imagination,” which serves as a means of going beyond modernist 
trappings and postmodern relativism (Sardar 2010b, 444).  As such, I limit 
my engagement with PNT to a series of concepts designed to stimulate 
critical inquiry on emerging issues, such as geoengineering.  
As a means of making the core aspects of PNT more relatable and, 
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perhaps most importantly, digestible as a methodological construct, 
Sardar and Sweeney (2016) introduced the Menagerie of Postnormal 
Potentialities (Menagerie), which combines black elephants, black swans, 
and black jellyfish—some of which are widely used concepts in the 
broader futures space.  The Menagerie was designed to reframe, or 
unframe, one of the central practices and processes of futures—emerging 
issues analysis.16  Horizon or environmental scanning is widely considered 
to be one of the foundational methods of futures studies (Aguilar 1967; 
Morrison and Mecca 1989; Petersen 1997; Bell 2003; Voros 2003; Dator 
2018).  In addition to identifying trends, scanning involves looking for wild 
cards, weak signals, and/or emerging issues.17  As things, events, and 
phenomena that might (or might not) become trends, or perhaps disrupt 
(or mutate) them, emerging issues are often analyzed using categorical 
																																																								
16 In question form, the Menagerie asks, what are most people missing or not seeing? 
(contradictions); what do people think would never happen? (complexity); and, what can 
or might lead to chaos? (chaos). This schema would not have been possible without 
incisive and insightful contributions from Dr. Wendy Schultz, who has been a generous 
supporter and thoughtful collaborator over the years.  
17 The concept of “wildcards” has been repeatedly problematized, primarily as it makes 
the implicit case for “non-wild” cards (Dator, Sweeney, & Yee 2015; Sardar & Sweeney 
2016).  Wildcards are employed herein only as a reminder of its continued, if not 
predominant, usage within the broader futures field, and rather than using this term, 
Markley (2011) has resorted to calling such phenomena “surprises.”  In PNT theory, all 
“issues” are presumed to have disruptive potentiality, and this perceptual shift is core to 
the Menagerie as a framework for engaging with emerging issues.  
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frameworks—the most popular of which is STEEP.18  As a practice, 
emerging issues analysis (EIA) stems from the seminal work of Graham 
T.T. Molitor who pioneered using the “S-curve” model for anticipating how 
trends change over time (1977).  In short, Molitor’s framework focuses on 
change over time and centers on the “take off point,” which is the moment 
at which the greatest amount of change occurs in the shortest amount of 
time.  Take the iPhone.  Released in 2007, it completely transformed the 
mobile phone market, and while other platforms and handsets have 
become more popular, it remains, for many, the standard by which all 
others are measured.  Here, the emerging issue was not smartphone, 
which had been around for some time, but rather a certain user design 
and interface—one that has come to define the space as a whole.   
In contrast to trends analysis, EIA looks beyond the obvious and instead 
sets out to discover “tiny bits of evidence that might or might not begin to 
bud as trends and blossom into full-blown problem/opportunities in the 
futures” (Dator et al. 2015, 139).  As with trends analysis, impacts and 
effects are modeled using a range of frameworks, including STEEP.  
Identifying and analyzing emerging issues always occurs within and from 
																																																								
18 Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, and Political are areas of concern 
where one looks for scan “hits.”  Again, rather than identify trends via data, emerging 
issues analysis is far more subjective and qualitative, although much of the literature 
does not emphasize the importance of positionality and trans-subjective perspectives in 
how such issues are identified, analyzed, and communicated. In recent decades, 
STEEP’s influence, although still substantial, has given way to other approaches, 
including: STEEPV, which includes values (Bezold et al. 2003) and PESTLE, which adds 
legal as a category (Morrison and Weeks 2017).  
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a particular context, but the degree to which this remains explicit has as 
much to do with the person performing the analysis as the process by 
which one analyzes, which is to say that reflexivity and positionality are 
essential, although often implicit, aspects of this practice.19  While 
perception is key to scanning, the necessity of divergent perspectives sets 
the Menagerie apart.  Individually, black elephants, black swans, and 
black jellyfish offer a means to examine phenomena and establish 
consensus—as to whether a particular emerging issue is a black swan 
versus a black elephant, etc.  As an ensemble, however, the Menagerie 
attempts to enact a new game—one premised on dissent.  The ultimate 
aim of this approach is not to frame an emerging issue from a single 
perspective but rather to enliven an unframing of subject positions from 
which to investigate, interrogate, and imagine an emerging issue’s 
postnormal potentiality.  Geoengineering meets all the characteristics of 
an emerging issue, and although small-scale efforts have been attempted, 
it lacks the notoriety typically indicative of a trend, although context and 
perspective figure prominently in such determinations.  With complex 
emerging issues such as geoengineering, which is truly global in scope 																																																								
19 Emphasizing the importance of perception in scanning processes, Voros contends, “It 
is a truism that all of our environmental scanning is undertaken through perceptual filters.  
These filters are mostly not conscious, but rather act as pre-conscious conditioners of 
what we see.  Any framework which helps to expand the range of our perceptions may 
thus help us to become more attuned to more of the world out there. […]  It is also 
necessary for scanners to become aware not only of how they perceive the world, but 
also of what types of filtering are likely in their own minds” (Voros 2003b, 38).  	
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and scale, dissent might be the only means of un-framing the politics 
underlying and driving its decidedly modernist imaginaries.  
While postnormal science champions the extended peer 
community, whose locus is the inclusion of “extended facts,” the 
Menagerie was designed to problematize such distinctions (inside versus 
outside) and, instead, emphasize divergent positionalities and dissent in 
modeling impacts and effects.  From what subject positions has this issue 
not been seen?  Whose voices have not been heard?  Why an elephant 
and not a swan?  In proliferating a divergence of sense, the Menagerie 
resonates with Rancière’s formulation of dissensus as a political construct 
that “is not a discussion between speaking people who would confront 
their interests and values.  It is a conflict about who speaks and who does 
not speak, about what has to be heard as the voice of pain and what has 
to be heard as an argument on justice” (Bowman and Stamp 2011, 2).  As 
such, I deploy the Menagerie to enliven a politics for geoengineering and, 
perhaps most importantly, to stage provocations whereby the unseen, 
unheard, and unspoken are invoked.  In this sense, the Menagerie can be 
utilized to foster a politics that goes beyond civic engagement and 
enhanced public participation—it necessitates a confrontation with the 
decidedly postnormal dynamics underlying geoengineered futures and the 
imaginaries underlying them.  
 In the next section, I begin to sketch out a methodological pathway 
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for a politics for geoengineering, which was born as much from my time 
spent as a graduate researcher at the Hawai‘i Research Center for 
Futures Studies as it was from my work as a professional futurist.  As 
such, I employ a practice-based research lens to invoke and complicate 
my own positionality. 
How I learned to stop worrying and love the workshop 
 
The omission of all that is personal makes the scientific 'self' into a 
fiction lacking any equivalent in reality.   
-Sven Lindqvist (1997) 
 
 In 2011, I participated in co-designing my first alternative futures 
workshop: Hawai‘i 2060: Visioning Hawai‘i's Adaptation to Climate Change 
(Hawai‘i Research Center for Futures Studies 2011).  Working as a 
researcher, designer, and facilitator on this project was formative in my 
professional development, especially as this was my first real opportunity 
to cut my teeth, so to speak, as a futurist.  That the event was meant to 
follow-up on the landmark Hawai‘i 2050 added to the weight of my 
involvement.  Hawai‘i 2050 featured a set of experiential alternative 
futures, which were spearheaded by Stuart Candy and Jake Dunagan—
two “Mānoa School” alumni whose depth and range of work served as a 
sort of “gold standard” for graduate students affiliated with HRCFS, which 
is where much of their previous work decorated the walls (Hawai‘i 
Research Center for Futures Studies 2006).   
 As with its precursor, Hawai‘i 2060 featured experiential 
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engagements with four alternative futures (Dator 2009).  Given the 
success of Hawai‘i 2050, I was keen to learn about how one might best 
craft immersive experiences—the focus of Candy’s dissertation, which 
was an invaluable resource while working on Hawai‘i 2060.  Of all the 
insights contained therein, one has endured.  Reflecting on the Hawai‘i 
2050 scenarios, Candy observes how the future found its way back into 
the present circa 2010.  Reflecting on the Citizens United decision, which 
is widely seen as giving corporations undue influence in the American 
electoral system, and the somewhat surprising entry of a public relations 
firm into a Maryland Congressional race that same year, Candy opines, “ 
[…] in building scenarios, it can be difficult to be outlandish enough to 
encompass the kind of surprising changes we ought to expect” (Candy 
2010, 97).  This intimation, which was actually just a mere footnote in his 
dissertation, has always stuck with me and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
shaped my own sense as to the limits and constraints of scenarios—the 
proverbial butter on a professional futurist’s bread.  
Candy’s specific usage of “scenarios” in the above passage 
underlies an important, although often implicit, distinction between 
“scenarios” and “alternative futures,” which are not synonymous 
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concepts.20  For this project, both “alternative futures” and “scenarios” are 
envisaged as tools for navigating a broader “possibility-space,” which 
centers on explorations “independently of initial views regarding probability 
and desirability” (Miller 2006).  Resonating with Candy’s emphasis on 
surprise, Miller’s “possibility-space” construct offers a bearing for how the 
future(s) gets constructed and, perhaps most importantly, how intentionally 
designed spaces of surprise, and play, might serve as both an affective, 
and by extension effective, mode of engagement.  A look at the origins of 
the futures workshop helps to put this trajectory into context.  
 Jungk and Norbert’s work in crafting a formulaic structure for 
workshops was instrumental in the development of futures studies 
(1987).21  With the arrival of their three-part formula, an explicit futures 
remedy for how to “fill a gap in existing democratic systems” was set made 																																																								
20 Recounting an exchange with Dator on this distinction, Inayatullah relays that the latter 
connotes a “far broader concept, being based on historical archetypes, deep patterns that 
reoccur through time” (2009, 78).  The difference, then, lays not so much in usage but 
rather regarding outcome.  In his overview of the “Mānoa School” approach, which uses 
“generic” futures and a set of driving forces as part of a research-driven process, Dator 
stresses the importance of visioning a preferred future as the culmination of an alternative 
futures exercise, which is to say that the intended aim of using this method is to confront 
fully and completely what one does and does not want (2009; 2014).  It is not uncommon 
to find references to “alternative futures scenarios” across futures, and this underlies the 
points of overlap between the two.  In the context of the “Mānoa School” method, which 
uses four archetypes (growth, disciplined, transform, and new beginnings), it is common 
practice to speak of “a growth scenario,” which suggests that the specificity of the content 
is also what distinguishes the two. 
21 Around the same time as Jungk and Norbert’s framework emerged, Warren Ziegler 
published “Designing and facilitating projects and workshops in futures-invention: A 
guidebook” (1987).  Outlining a five-step process, Ziegler appears to have worked 
primarily with the private sector on envisioning preferred futures, although he collaborated 
with Elise Boulding, who also created her own visioning process, on peaceful futures 
(Hicks 2004). I am thankful to Dr. Sohail Inayatullah for drawing my attention to Ziegler. 	
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public (Dator 1993, 1).  Explicating a step-by-step approach for staging a 
futures workshop, Jungk and Norbert outline a method that moves 
participants from critique to fantasy to implementation.  At the literal center 
of their design, Jungk and Norbert give the fantasy stage the most 
thorough treatment as it involves the most explicit “futures” content.  They 
explain, “In the fantasy phase, the worlds of our desire gradually emerge 
from flashes of insight as we form and test associations of images and 
ideas” (Jungk and Norbert 1987, 61).  How exactly these flashes of insight 
emerge and the means by which the worlds of our desires are brought 
forward through practice remains somewhat esoteric within the text.  I 
never read the original text in its entirety prior to the Hawai‘i 2060 event, 
but during the planning stages of that event, a critical review by Dator 
served as a guide—particularly the contention that “we cannot follow 
Jungk's future workshops method exactly”22 (Dator 1993, 3).   
 In “From Future Workshops to Envisioning Alternative Futures,” 
Dator provides his justification as to why one cannot and should not make 
the leap directly from critique to imagination or, more accurately, an 
immediate transition from analyzing the past to articulating one’s preferred 
future.  In a passage worth quoting at length, he observes: 
I think it is a serious mistake to ask people to engage in any kind of 																																																								
22 Ostensibly, Dator’s “we” refers broadly to the “Mānoa School,” which is a community of 
practice as much as a methodological framework for analyzing and creating alternative 
futures (Jones 1992; Dator 2009). 	
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a preferred futures envisioning exercise until they have been 
challenged to examine their own various ideas about [the] future 
first. This is where the futurist plays her most important role: not of 
course in predicting the future and telling the enthralled throng what 
the future Will Be, but rather in structuring the situation so that the 
participants themselves are led to express, clarify, and modify their 
own individual and consensual images of the future. One part of 
that role is for the futurist to present in some dramatic, engaging 
way some of the elements (forces, components) in the past and 
present, which might most strongly influence the future. […] People 
need to find a way directly to experience this feature of the future 
(Dator 1993, 4). 
 
Directly experiencing the tensions between continuity versus change, 
normalcy versus novelty, everyday versus weird, and present versus 
future is the proverbial “sweet spot” for a futures workshop.  And yet, such 
processes rely as much on the assumptions of the designers as the 
willingness of the participants, which is to say that there are significant 
ethico-political issues centering on privilege, power, and positionality 
inherent to the design and delivery of futures workshops.23  
While I cannot speak to the Hawai‘i 2050 event, it is certainly the 
case that predominantly non-locals and non-Native Hawaiians crafted the 																																																								
23 Capturing this sentiment succinctly, Slaughter argues that critical futures studies 
proceeds from the contention that there is “no neutral standpoint outside history upon 
which the futurist can stand” (Slaughter 1999, 220).  I could not agree more with this 
assessment, but I also do not locate this work within the specific framing of “critical 
futures studies,” if only to suggest that futures (as a shorthand for futures studies) is 
fundamentally a critical ethico-political enterprise.  Noting how such perspectives were in 
play well before Slaughter’s reification, Ramos reflects, “While Slaughter was the first to 
articulate an outline for critical futures, there were already many at work in varying 
capacities on this project. Ashis Nandy, Zia Sardar, Johan Galtung and the Manoa 
School of Futures in Hawaii, to name a few, were all in the process of developing their 
varied aspects and approaches to critical futures” (Ramos et al. 2003, 19).  In drawing 
heavily on the work of Nandy, Sardar, and many futurists from the Mānoa School, it 
would be improper, if not irresponsible, to note how this project resonates with the core 
tenets of critical futures studies.  
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Hawai’i 2060 event.  Furthermore, the Hawai‘i 2060 event could, and 
certainly would, have profited immensely from additional Native Hawaiian 
participation, which speaks to the challenges but also limits in staging 
large-scale, in-person workshops.24  As the specificity of the context(s), 
participants, and themes are integral to designing and delivering such 
experiences, there cannot (and should not) be a single means by which to 
design such gatherings.  Reflecting as a practitioner, the lessons learned 
from such events were instrumental in my journey to explore alternative 
modes and means of engagement.  Considerations about design are 
always conditioned by “practical” realities, which are often outside the 
control of the design team and/or facilitators, and my early experiences in 
the field led me to question the sometimes oblique and artificial nature of 
the workshop space.  In many instances, participants are invited and 
asked to step away from their normal routine or daily circumstances to 
“work” on a particular subject or topic for a few hours or days at a time 
alongside colleagues, peers, neighbors, and/or complete strangers.  This 
usually centers on the completion of a series of exercises, which are 
typically organized around a series of questions and queries.   
 In Dator’s alternative futures workshops, participants are typically 
put into small groups and receive textual scenarios, which forms the basis 																																																								
24 For the Hawai‘i 2060 event, participants from different islands were brought over, and 
while a team from HRCFS (myself included) led the design and delivery of the alternative 
futures portion of the project, decisions concerning who would and would not participate 
were not part of our mandate.  
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for a discussion on their “life and work if they were to find themselves in 
some different kinds of futures” (Dator 1993, 4).  How might one best 
position participants to “find themselves” in alternative futures?  How can 
one ensure that participants have an equal opportunity to express 
themselves?   How can one balance individual versus group-level outputs 
and outcomes?  Are such practices and processes implicitly geared 
toward consensus?  During the Hawai‘i 2060 project, participants were 
immersed within two contrasting alternative futures scenarios and given 
some prompts to foster a character identity.  It was during this portion of 
the event that I first considered the limits of pre-created scenario 
experiences.25  Concerns over the efficacy of scenarios are not just a 
perennial issue that each generation of practitioners must confront but 
suggest a reflexive undercurrent inherent to futures as a practice, although 
some have made critical swipes at the workshop space and pre-created 
																																																								
25 Indeed, as one of the lead designers for how the scenarios were rendered in 
experiential form, I did much to shape the look and feel of these exercises. Although I 
problematize the scenarios aspect of the Hawai‘i 2060 exercise, the event did result in 
the amendment of the State’s planning statutes and the passage of legislation, Act 286 - 
HRS §226-1 was signed into law on July 9, 2012. Specifically, the amended statutes 
make explicit reference to “future generations” (State of Hawai‘i 2018). 
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scenarios in particular.26  Part of the challenge in using scenarios centers 
on the fact that futurists, even if unwittingly, enact a politics, which is 
grounded upon the foundational assertion that the future is fundamentally 
plural (i.e. futures).  As Inayatullah argues, futures does aim to “disturb 
present power relations through challenging our categories and evoking 
other places or scenarios of the future. […] This allows spaces of reality to 
loosen and new possibilities, ideas, and structures to emerge” (Inayatullah 
2004, 7).  How might one best loosen the reality of others?  Are some 
approaches better suited to fomenting a possibility-space? 
It was with the above in mind that I agreed to join Dator and Aubrey 
Yee, a fellow graduate student and researcher at HRCFS, to respond to 
an invited grant call on how technology changes the balance of power 
within society.  In the lead up to submitting our proposal, I made what, in 
hindsight, was a rather hasty suggestion: we should create a game to 
carry out our research.  Although I had no formal training in game design, 
years spent in front of a Nintendo Entertainment System along with a 
																																																								
26 As part of a symposium on scenarios in the Journal of Futures Studies, Molitor offers a 
critical take on scenario planning and argues that scenarios exercises do little to promote 
reflective distance from the present and one’s perceptions of it. He opines, “As a 
practitioner and teacher of forecasting engaged for some 50 years in the futures field, I 
can't recall any personal experience with scenario exercises that was worth the time and 
effort spent. Among major companies, business groups, and government offices I never 
saw scenarios make any major contribution or breakthrough. […] Such efforts may 
amount to little more than a time-consuming "parlor game" in my estimation” (2009, 81). 
Although Molitor invokes the notion of a “game” as a slight against scenarios, I play with 
the games metaphor in later chapters.  
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passion for Settlers of Catan27 inspired me to take on a leading role for this 
area of our research.28  It would be misleading not to recognize the boom 
in futures-driven games that started to pick up steam just a few years 
before.29  Thus began my odyssey into uncovering and discovering how 
the modality of play—enacted via games—might transform scenarios as a 
practice and disrupt the workshop space.  Indeed, it was games that 
helped me to stop worrying and love the workshop.30  In the next section, I 
setup my turn to serious games, explore resonances between this 
approach and futures, and setup play as a modality for experimentation.  
																																																								
27 Klaus Teuber’s award-winning game altered “dramatically the perception of German 
games within the hobby and mark the coming-of-age of European game design” (Woods 
2012, p. 71). I was heavily influenced by the game’s utilization of hex-shaped cards. 
28 There should be no doubt that my pursuit of gaming was supported in large part by my 
professional and personal relationship with Dr. Aaron B. Rosa, who has served as a co-
conspirator in every sense of the word. One outcome of our collaboration was recounted 
in “Mutative Media: Communication Technologies and Power Relations in the Past, 
Present, and Futures,” which was given the “Most Significant Work Award - Methods 
Category” by the Association of Professional Futurists in 2015. Another colleague and 
friend, Dr. Zhan Li, was instrumental in making connections with game researchers and 
designers at the University of Southern California, who were gracious with their 
knowledge and time.  
29 Specifically, the Institute for the Future’s Superstruct, which attracted thousands of 
players, is seen as a watershed moment for futures games (Pescovitz 2008). One of my 
first engagements at HRCFS actually involved hanging posters for Coral Cross, which 
was an alternate-reality game designed by Candy and Dunagan for the Hawai’i 
Department of Health with support from the Center for Disease Control (Pescovitz 2009). 
Unfortunately, the latter was interrupted by reality as a real-life swine flu outbreak 
necessitated that play be altered. It is certainly the case that the future collides with the 
present in ways that even futurists cannot divine. 	
30 Referencing Stanley Kubrick’s “Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Bomb (1964) is a perhaps not so subtle way of highlighting the role of 
Herman Kahn, a Cold War-era futurist who worked at the RAND Corporation for decades 
and has been given credit for introducing the term “scenario” into the futures lexicon 
(Candy 2010; Chermack et al. 2001).  
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Why serious games? 	
“You can discover more about a person in an hour of play than in a 
year of conversation.” – (probably not) Plato 	
Although the above quote is often attributed to the canonical Greek 
thinker, its provenance has been called into question (D’Angour 2013; 
Yount 2018).31  While Plato’s dialogues exhibit varying degrees of 
playfulness, the notion of “law-abiding play” is central to his theorization of 
society in the Republic (Ardley 1967, 234).  According to Plato, one way to 
engineer a stable society would be to have all children play the same 
game with standardized rules over and over again (D’Angour 2013).  
Concerning big kids (i.e. adults), Plato appears to have thought that play 
was an “unworthy activity,” although intellectual sparring—ostensibly in a 
dialogue with Socrates—was a worthy pursuit (D’Angour 2013, 293).  For 
Plato, play was merely functional—a tool only to achieve a very specific 
end.  Based on this logic, it is unclear if he enjoyed playing games or 
spent very much time around children. 
For even the most precocious child, tic-tac-toe can be engrossing, 
at least for a little while.  Eventually, the game becomes routine, and more 
complex modalities are sought after.  For chess prodigies, however, a 
proper match is an intense contest of strategy where reputations are won 
and lost.  Every move is a calculated strike born from intense study.  It 																																																								
31 This (mis)attribution comes from McGinnis (1987). 
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perhaps goes without saying, but it is worth making explicit: games have 
been played for a variety of reasons toward a veritable cornucopia of ends 
since time immemorial.  Some play only to win.  Others play to enjoy the 
company of others, although there are perhaps just as many who prefer to 
play alone.  While spontaneous acts of play, which are not limited to our 
species, are integral to our sense of the world and our place in it, my 
specific interest in games lies in how they have been and might be used 
toward more “serious” ends (Abt 1970; Pellis and Pellis 2011; Whitebread 
et al. 2017). 
Within the social sciences, and political science in particular, 
games, simulations, and modeling approaches have been used and 
utilized for decades, in part due to advancements in data capture and 
analysis but also specifically to thwart crisis, particularly overpopulation 
and the threat of nuclear armageddon (Djaouti et al. 2011; Lasswell 1977; 
Lopez 1978; Bloomfield 1986; Chadwick 2000).32  In 1970, Abt introduced 
the concept of a “serious game,” which signals an attempt to define games 
with “an explicit and carefully thought-out educational purpose” that, 
perhaps most importantly, are “not intended to be played primarily for 
amusement” (Abt 1970).  At the time of his book’s release, Abt’s work was 																																																								
32 Notable amongst such approaches is Buckminster Fuller’s World Game (1969), which 
simulates conditions using real-world data to emphasize the necessity for collaboration 
and global awareness. Chadwick chronicles the rise of modeling tools and methods 
during the 60’s and 70’s and notes the “lack of formal study of global modeling in an 
academic environment,” which signals a major challenge in reviewing the efficacy and 
impact of such approaches (2000, 68). 
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closely aligned with war games and red-team simulations used by military, 
intelligence, and security agencies during the height of the Cold War era.  
It is still the case that these institutions—in the U.S. and elsewhere—use 
games, simulations, and modeling approaches toward a variety of ends.  
Since Abt’s introduction of the concept, however, what passes or counts 
as a serious game33 has expanded to include a host of systems, 
platforms, and tools that leverage a range of dynamics to foster creativity 
and learning (Bergeron 2006; Morris et al. 2013).  That games have found 
their way into futures should not come as a surprise, especially given the 
field’s reliance upon the possibility-space.  From overlaying gaming 
dynamics, such as role-play, onto existing methods to the creation of 
boutique platforms and systems, futurists have been using games for 
decades, although the past two decades has seen a veritable explosion of 
experiential approaches (Bok and Ruve 2007; Bontoux et al. 2014; 
Dannenberg and Fischer 2017; Dator et al. 2015; Hayward and Candy 
2017; Hayward and Voros 2004; Heinonen et al. 2015; Inayatullah 2013; 
Milojević 2017). 
																																																								
33 Some argue that the notion of a “serious game” is an oxymoron as such approaches 
have been essential aspects of human experience and learning for millennia (Djaouti et 
al. 2011).  It is also important to distinguish between “game theory,” which derives from 
mathematics and centers on how choices are made in competitive environments, and 
theories on games and gaming, which interrogate approaches to play—serious and 
otherwise.  
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 In November 2016, Tamkang University hosted a symposium 
entitled: Gaming the Future(s): Pedagogies for Emergent Futures.34  
Bringing together futurists from around the world to explore how games 
can and might advance and be advanced within the field, specifically how 
such approaches, method, practices, and tools blend “thinking-playing-
contextualising-experimenting-reflecting-sensemaking-sharing” (Milojević 
2017, 3).  Setting the tone for the event, Dator’s keynote address gave 
presence toward the efficacy of playful modalities within both political 
science and futures.  Articulating succinctly how games provides a means 
to experiment with alternatives and potentialities, he observed:   
Games are the closest we can come to actually doing politics 
repeatedly, and to pre-experiencing alternative futures so as to 
have a wider understanding of what might be viable preferred 
futures.  That is to say, games are to the social sciences what 
laboratory experiments are to the natural sciences (Dator 2017, 77-
78).   
 
Emphasizing the ways with which games can be used for reflective 
learning, Dator’s comments highlight how games operate as experiments.  
As with experiments carried out in a laboratory, definitional clarity 
regarding variables is essential.  In the next section, I situate my approach 
to games using the lens of Carse’s finite and infinite typologies. 
At their most basic level, games are structures where one must 
confront and ultimately overcome obstacles or challenges through a set of 																																																								
34 A special issue of the Journal of Futures Studies (Vol. 22, No. 2, December 2017) was 
produced based on contributions to this event, and many, if not most, articles from this 
issue are cited herein.  
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rules, limits, and/or constraints.  In some games, one encounters a 
“fictitious, whimsical or artificial situation” that requires some degree to 
skill, strategy, and sometimes luck to overcome (Sauvé et al. 2007, 253).  
Indeed, one of the most compelling aspects of contemporary gaming is the 
intense focus on world-building—the design of fictive landscapes.  No 
Man’s Sky, an adventure-driven game, boasts 18 quintillion life-size 
planets, which were created entirely by algorithms (Parkin 2015).  One 
could literally spend an entire lifetime of exploration within No Man’s Sky 
and still not exhaust all the possibilities.  Although some games rely upon 
individual journeying upon distant worlds, others promote competition 
amongst players a bit closer to home.  And, there are many games that 
necessitate collaboration toward a desirable result.  What makes 
something a game has much to do with the willingness of its players, who 
often compete in hopes of achieving victory.  Although there are many 
types of games, Carse outlines two archetypal categories—finite and 
infinite.   
Finite games are undoubtedly the most familiar as they focus on the 
achievement of a particular end, usually but not always a well-defined win 
condition (1986).  For many, if not most, this is the aim of competition, but 
playing with an individual or group whose sole purpose is winning often 
dampens the gaming experience, which is always an exercise in 
uncertainty.  Indeed, the only thing that is meant to be predictable within 
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such games is that there is an order to play and that the game will 
inevitably end.  While finite games are a common form of play experience, 
Carse presents another modality of gaming that reinforces some of the 
core axioms of futures. 
In contrast to a finite game, the purpose of an infinite game is 
“continuing play,” which is to say that such games mutate over time and 
necessitate the inclusion of new players and perhaps even new rules.  
Consequently, infinite games have a greater degree of elasticity regarding 
what constitutes play.  Comparing the rules of an infinite game to the 
“grammar of a living language,” Carse highlights how play links with 
possibility.  As with imagining the future(s), infinite games demand more 
than just a denial of the ordinary and/or looking beyond the present, they 
necessitate openness toward the possible.35  Although finite and infinite 
games differ in many ways, they ultimately require a shared beckoning of 
the unknown—an opportunity to embody anticipation and use the future as 
a resource—by encountering unfamiliar things, situations, and contexts 
(Miller 2007).  In turning to games, this dissertation invokes the infinite 
game as metaphor for enlivening a politics for geoengineering.  As a 
modality for embodying such a politics, play is positioned as pathway for 
new epistemological framings toward alternative imaginaries.  In the next 
section, I setup my turn to Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) as a method for 																																																								
35 The metaphor, as well as practice, of futures as an “infinite game” is explored more 
fully in chapter three.  
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critically analyzing the narrative foundations of geoengineered imaginaries 
and, perhaps most importantly, generate alternatives.  
In search of new metaphors 
 
 I opened this investigation with the story of George’s experiment 
upon (rather than with) the Haida Nation, which illuminates the workings of 
geoengineered imaginaries.  In turning to metaphor—organic gardening, 
not rocket science—George demonstrates the power of narrative 
(Milojević and Inayatullah 2015; Inayatullah and Milojević 2015).  George’s 
turn of phrase highlights the means by which imaginaries shape norms, 
condition future(s) potentialities, and, in the case of geoengineering, 
enliven an all-too-familiar politics.  As a means of analyzing the narrative 
dimensions of geoengineered imaginaries, I employ Causal Layered 
Analysis (CLA) as a method for deconstructing and reconstructing key 
narrative framings. 
 Drawing on poststructuralism, Indian philosophy, and futures 
studies, Inayatullah assembled CLA as a tool for deploying divergent 
modes of knowing as critical, as well as reflective, lenses (Inayatullah 
1998a; Inayatullah 2004; Inayatullah and Milojević 2015).  To mix 
metaphors, CLA is an apple/onion hybrid—one peels back layer after layer 
to reach a core myth/metaphor—the deep narratives that engender a 
certain way of understanding and knowing.  In addition to using CLA to 
excavate core narratives, the tool’s layered approach provides a means of 
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understanding how issues are viewed and understood from divergent, yet 
interrelated, perspectives.  As an analytical tool, CLA begins by looking at 
that which is most apparent—this is the litany.  In this layer, one finds the 
“black and white” of things, and the frame of “newspaper headlines,” or 
tweets as the case may by, is a common reference for this level.  Next, 
one encounters the system—a reference to the formal structures—
economic, educational, and others—predicated on quantitative analyses 
and data-driven understandings of the world.  In the context of politics, the 
system might best be understood as the “bureaucracy,” which is to say the 
day-in-and-day-out processes and processors that maintain a certain 
“system.” 
At the third level, one finds worldview, which is populated with 
cultural, spiritual, and ideological assumptions.  It is at this level where 
imaginaries comport and contort sense of self and other, and although 
Inayatullah does not deploy this specific concept, he does note that this is 
where one looks for the “deeper positions that create notions of collective 
identity” (2004, 17).  Finally, CLA analyses culminate with the myth and/or 
metaphor layer, which illuminates the power of story and narrative.36  In 
addition to working downward, one can also move up and across levels 
using CLA.  Below, I use CLA to look at how George’s phrasing gives 
																																																								
36 This layer is constituted by both myth and metaphor, but I focus on the latter as 
narrative phrasings have been regularly employed, as evidenced by George’s propensity 
for colorful language.  
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voice to geoengineered imaginaries.  
Given the “universal human receptiveness to stories and 
metaphors,” George’s turn of phrase is unsurprising, and it clearly serves 
as an attempt to downplay the radical potentialities linked to 
geoengineering  (Inayatullah and Milojević 2015, 158).  In employing the 
“organic gardening” metaphor, George intentionally negates the potentially 
harmful, and ultimately uncertain, side effects of such experiments.  
Furthermore, George’s reference to “rocket science” pokes at the 
complexities of science and, perhaps most importantly, how the public 
understands/perceives such experiments.  Using CLA, I map the layers of 
geoengineered imaginaries as expressed, and enacted, by George.37  
Metaphor 
“Organic gardening, not rocket science” 
Worldview 
 “The salmon were the best science result, right?” 
Systems 
 
Working to “restore nature”  
 
Litany 
 
"The work can be done by just 100 villages.  To become one of the 
hundred follow this link, we just need 99 more"  
 																																																								
37 As my analysis commences from George’s metaphor, I begin with this level and move 
toward the litany, which is an inversion but demonstrates the fluidity of this approach.  
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George’s invitation seems disingenuous given the fallout from the 
Planktos incident, and his salesman-like pitch (To become one of the 
hundred follow this link, we just need 99 more) downplays the ethical 
implications of such experiments, which, as he contends, are mere 
attempts to “restore nature.”  At the worldview level, George voices the 
quintessential Machiavellian perspective: the ends justify the means.  
Hence, at the deepest level, George’s metaphor pulls a lot of weight—it 
conceals/reveals an all-too-familiar politics.  
While I deploy CLA as a critical analytical tool, I also use it as a 
creative means to put forward my vision of a politics for geoengineering in 
chapter five.  In order for a new politics for geoengineering to emerge, 
“organic gardening, not rocket science” must give way to new metaphors, 
especially those that are non-dualistic and speak to the complexities, 
contradictions, and potential chaos of geoengineered futures.  My vision 
serves not only as the culmination of this investigation but also underlies 
how this dissertation works as a meta-CLA.  Each chapter emphasizes a 
different layer or level, and in the next section, I sketch out what lies 
ahead. 
Conclusion: Game on 
 
 As with my turn toward games and emphasis on play, my utilization 
of practice-based research, which includes critically reflecting on my own 
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positionality (including my own guiding metaphor as a practitioner), is 
meant to challenge the normative boundaries of disciplinary thinking as 
well as the primacy of "objective" methodologies.  In presencing an 
“interpretive” approach to (social and) political science, I align with 
Jasanoff’s call for modes of scholarship that make us “more aware, less 
comfortable, and hence more reflective about how we intervene, in word 
or deed, in the changing order of things” (2010, 249).  In working through 
my proximity to the topic at hand rather than suppressing or bracketing off 
my own privilege, power, and role as a practitioner, this dissertation offers 
an interpretive reflection on futures as an enterprise at the interstices of 
theory and praxis—one focused on holding open a possibility-space for 
but also through dissent.  At its core, however, this dissertation centers on 
the imaginaries underlying and inspiring geoengineered futures.  In 
support of this aim, I challenge the dominance of scenarios, problematize 
the “scenario modeling workshop space,” and call for new modes of 
engagement and, ultimately, experimentation.   
Employing both textual and practice-based research, this 
dissertation argues that there are more dynamic and efficacious means to 
provoke thought about radical potentialities, especially on complex issues 
such as geoengineering.  In turning to games, I argue that play is more 
than a metaphor—although new stories are also key.  Ultimately, I 
envisage games as enacting a politics that unfolds as “experimentation, 
	 53 	
groping in the dark, injection, withdrawal, advances, retreats” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 461).  Using Deleuze and Guattari’s unframing of 
politics as both theoretical bearing and methodological trajectory, I 
investigate how play can and might serve as the basis for enlivening a 
politics for geoengineering by and through collective experimentation.  In 
this way, this project serves as a provocation for those assembling and 
enacting, even if unintentionally, a politics for geoengineering.  In aiming to 
contribute toward alternative imaginaries, this dissertation attempts to play 
a new game.  
 In chapter two, I delve into geoengineering as a potentiality and 
practice deeply embedded and intertwined within the aegis of the 
Anthropocene—a complicated, yet widely-used, if not abused, concept 
that connotes the human impact upon the global climate system.  Charting 
the origin of the term as well as the recent boom in derivative concepts, 
this interrelated discourse is essential to mapping the complex politics of 
ongoing geoengineering interventions, proposals, and narratives.  While a 
great deal of attention has been paid to large-scale climate engineering 
initiatives—primarily solar radiation management (SRM) and carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS)—I also include an engagement with 
cloud seeding, a widely-used practice to enhance precipitation, in an effort 
to make the actual and perceptual potentialities of climate engineering less 
esoteric and to highlight questions concerning scale within geoengineered 
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imaginaries.  Finally, this chapter explores climate fiction (cli-fi) as a genre 
with a particular focus on geoengineered imaginaries.  Ultimately, this 
chapter emphasizes the litany level of geoengineered imaginaries, which 
is made visible through concepts such as the Anthropocene and the genre 
of cli-fi. 
 In chapter three, I look at the shift from global warming to global 
weirding, which frames my usage of heuristics from postnormal times 
(PNT).  I then map out futures as a practice for expanding dissent via a 
critical and comparative analysis of two meta-frameworks: Six Pillars 
method (6P), which is a theoretical and methodological assemblage that 
provides a comprehensive approach for envisioning and achieving 
preferred futures (Inayatullah 2008), and the Association of Professional 
Futurist’s (APF) Foresight Competency Model (APF 2016).  Using textual 
and experiential modes of research, I engage with scenarios as a practice 
and challenge the use of plausibility as a metric with particular attention to 
pre-created scenarios utilized in workshop settings.  I then turn to PNT 
and review the Three Tomorrows (3T) method, which provides a basis for 
my invocation of the Menagerie of Postnormal Potentialities (Menagerie).  
Finally, I build out further the black jellyfish concept and position the 
Menagerie as a means for enlivening divergent perspectives through the 
modality of play—what I call trans-subjective positionalities.  In this 
chapter, I frame the systems level of geoengineered imaginaries, which is 
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driven by predominance, and perils, of plausible scenarios. 
 In chapter four, I open with Latour’s distinction between “matters of 
fact” and “matters of concern” to explore the tensions underlying and 
inherent to geoengineered imaginaries.  I then turn to explore how play 
can serve as both a strategy and tactic of engagement via practice-based 
reflections.  I review two scenario-based futures projects commissioned by 
the United Nations and then look at the 2X2 Scenario Exploration System 
(2X2 SES).  These cases were selected as they reflect my development 
as a professional futurist and, perhaps most importantly, both featured 
games.  In this chapter, I further refine the concept of trans-subjective 
positionalities by looking at how such an approach can and might be 
enhanced via playful modalities.  In chapter four, the worldview level of 
geoengineered imaginaries becomes apparent via the tension between 
facts and concerns as well as the degree to which dissent comes to the 
fore. 
 In chapter five, I draw on both theoretical works, primarily object-
relation mapping (Banks 2014), experiential futures (Candy and Dunagan 
2017), as well as practice-based reflections on my own experience 
implementing games to outline a brief for an alternative futures-driven 
game designed to critique, create, and ultimately contest geoengineered 
imaginaries—in short, a game to enact an alternative politics for 
geoengineering.  In this chapter, I also return to CLA as a critical tool for 
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analyzing the Oxford Principles, which provide guidelines for research but 
also gesture toward the complexities of governance and implementation.  
My reading reveals the concealed politics of geoengineered imaginaries 
and sets up my own vision. 
 My conclusion provides an opportunity to review each chapter’s 
main arguments, further situate my own positionality as a practitioner, 
reflect on the contributions of this project, and offer some future(s) 
research trajectories. 
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Chapter 2: Geoengineered Imaginaries 	
A rose by any other name 	
 In 1873, Antonio Stoppani, an Italian geologist, used the phrase 
“Anthropozoic era” to refer to what he saw as the geologic-scale impact of 
human activity (Stoppani 2013, 36).  Employing a prescient perspectivism, 
Stoppani observed:  
How much of the earth’s surface by now disappears under the 
masses that man built as his abode, his pleasure and his defense, 
on plains, on hills, on the seashores and lakeshores, as on the 
highest peaks! By now the ancient earth disappears under the 
relics of man or of his industry. You can already count a series of 
strata, where you can read the history of human generations, as 
before you could read in the amassed bottom of the seas the 
history of ancient faunas (Stoppani 2013, 38).  
 
As one of, if not, the earliest scientific voices to note the abiding, which is 
also to say geologic, impact of human activity, Stoppani's pronouncement 
was certainly rare for its time, although he was not alone in perceiving 
large-scale change. 
 In the early 1920's, a Russian scientist, Vladimir Vernadsky, along 
with two French philosophers, Edouard Le Roy and Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin, gave birth to the concept of the noosphere, which drew on 
Darwinian notions of evolution to assert the predominance of humanity in 
shaping the earth's life systems.  Usage of the term would increase 
exponentially in the early and middle decades of the 20th century, although 
a debate concerning its progressive connotations would develop.  This 
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divide, which pitted those championing human-driven transformations 
against those weary of the implications of a truly human-centric world, 
resonates with contemporary concerns about the underlying, which is also 
to say political, dimensions of the Anthropocene, which was coined, at 
least in part, to “guide mankind towards global, sustainable, environmental 
management” (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000, 18).  Among his 
contemporaries, Vernadsky is noteworthy as he specifically observed that 
humanity has become a “planetary geological agent” (Samson and Pitt 
1999, 3).   
 Amidst the rise of environmentalism and sustainability during the 
latter half of the 20th century, many have been keen to identify conceptual 
frameworks that encompass the challenges and opportunities of life in “the 
Anthrocene,” which is the proto-term used by Andrew C. Revkin in Global 
Warming: Understanding the Forecast (1992) to denote “a geological age 
of our own making” (Revkin 2008).  By the time Crutzen “made up the 
word on the spur of the moment,” which is perhaps a bit of an 
embellishment given the term's rich conceptual history, not to mention 
Stoppani's Anthropozoic and Revkin's Anthrocene, the idea that human 
activity was having significant impacts on the planet's biosphere was 
becoming more well-established, at least in the scientific community 
(Pearce 2007, 21).    
 In response to the nearly, but not quite absolute, scientific consensus 
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that human activity is the primary driver of global warming and, by 
extension, climate change, a 2008 petition was put forth by the 
Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London to have the 
Anthropocene listed as the most recent epoch of the geological time scale 
(Zalasiewicz et. al 2008).  In 2011, the Geological Society of America 
selected a conference thematic reflective of the increasing academic 
accord that the planet has indeed entered a new age—the gathering was 
entitled: Archean to Anthropocene: The past is the key to the future.  
Crutzen and Stoermer's ubiquitous neologism has become “widely 
accepted in the global change research community,” but the 
Anthropocene's rising omnipresence within popular culture, especially 
media outlets, gestures toward the broad ethico-political, if not existential, 
implications of establishing a new geologic era (Steffen et. al 2011, 843).  
In 2016, the term made it through a serious test when it was unanimously 
passed through a working group at the International Geological Congress 
(Carrington 2016).  Now, it must clear additional scientific bodies before 
becoming institutionalized, although the term has already assumed a 
“rightful place as a focal point in the culture wars over the recognition and 
interpretation of environmental process” (Autin and Holbrook 2012, 61). 
 At the core of the Anthropocene's origins there are a series of 
contestations over the science concerning the historical impact of 
humanity on the global climate system.  On one hand, there is a strong 
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argument for the Industrial Revolution, specifically the advent of the steam 
engine (1784), which is when polar ice records an increase in 
concentrations of CO2 and methane (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 
2002).  As the starting point for the debate, Crutzen and Stoermer's 
selection of the advent of the Industrial Age would appear to make the 
most sense given the dramatic socio-environmental changes over the last 
few centuries.  On the other hand, Ruddiman makes a case that “the 
Anthropocene actually began thousands of years ago as a result of the 
discovery of agriculture and subsequent technological innovations in the 
practice of farming,” which accounts for “anomalous gas trends” found in 
ice-core records (Ruddiman 2003, 261).   
 Ruddiman's early-Anthropocene hypothesis, which pushes the start 
date back around 8,000 years, would decimate the Holocene and, as one 
might expect, has drawn many critics, some of whom argue that limiting 
the scope of analysis solely to the planet's atmospheric composition is 
highly problematic.  Contending that the “golden spikes for the 
Anthropocene” ought to be found in the ground, Certini and Scalenghe 
argue that a more prudent start date is when “much of the terrestrial 
surface of the planet was altered appreciably by organized civilizations” 
(Certini and Scalenghe 2011, 1273).  Noting changes that took place 
roughly millennia ago due to widespread agricultural activity, such as 
terracing and land-leveling, Certini and Scalenghe posit, “The 
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Anthropocene is, by definition, the period when human activity acts as a 
major driving factor, if not the dominant process, in modifying the 
landscape and the environment” (Certini and Scalenghe 2011, 1272).  It 
should perhaps not be surprising that geologists would make such a terra-
centric claim, especially as the fate of the concept, scientifically speaking, 
appears to rest firmly in their hands.  Although the Anthropocene's official 
status remains ensconced within and intimately tied to geology, the term 
has already assumed a “rightful place as a focal point in the culture wars 
over the recognition and interpretation of environmental process” (Autin 
and Holbrook 2012, 61). 
 While most of the pushback against the term and its adoption within 
the accepted vernacular centers on a cosmological aversion to science 
itself, Steffen argues strenuously for preserving the Holocene on grounds 
that the immense uncertainty that lies ahead has less to do with dynamic 
environmental changes than it does with humanity's capacity to engineer 
planetary life systems, which some see as the logical extension of the 
Anthropocene.  He reflects, “There is no human-designed set of planetary 
conditions that we know of that will suit us better.  We don’t want the 
Holocene to end: the whole point is that we want to go back to lower 
greenhouse gas concentrations in order to continue the Holocene climate 
indefinitely, as long as we possibly can” (Steffen 2012).  In rejecting the 
Anthropocene, Steffen highlights the fact that the concept merely offers a 
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diagnosis and pays little attention to the momentous changes initiated by 
humanity in the past century alone. 
 Zalasiewicz and colleagues offers a more radical means by which to 
target the start date for the Anthropocene—one that does much to account 
for the stakes of the designation and the complexities of the human impact 
on the planet's life systems.  They explain, “From a practical viewpoint, a 
globally identifiable level is provided by the global spread of radioactive 
isotopes created by the atomic bomb tests of the 1960s; however, this 
post-dates the major inflection in global human activity”  (Zalasiewicz et. al 
2008, 7).  Although not a likely candidate for the official start date, as the 
authors profess, affirming the Anthropocene's potential destructiveness on 
an appropriate scale denotes the severity of the social, environmental, and 
political challenges that lie ahead.  It is with this particular framing that one 
can begin to see how this debate is deeply interrelated to ongoing 
discourses surrounding geoengineering—the techno-fix par excellence.   
 In light of the role of technological advancements, from the advent of 
the steam engine to the more recent apotheosis of algorithms, in 
precipitating and, as some hope, assuaging the challenges of the 
Anthropocene, Berthon and Donnellan suggest that a more fitting moniker 
might be the Technopocene, which they suggest promotes “a new level of 
mindfulness on the part of humans for themselves and their technological 
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offspring” (Berthon and Donnellan 2011, 5).  The Technopocene38 
provides a more acute diagnosis, and, perhaps, prognosis of and for the 
challenges of the Anthropocene, especially as many feel that the only way 
to avert crisis may be to double-down, by engineering more prudently and 
consciously the planet's complex adaptive life systems.  While the 
Technopocene has not reached the ubiquity of its antecedent, there is 
much to be said for selecting an appropriate designation for what humans 
have done and are continuing to do to the planet, especially in light of the 
rising interest in geoengineering.  Although large-scale climate 
engineering will impact everyone and everything on the planet, not all 
humans have played an equal part in global warming. 
 Providing a more acute accounting of the inequities driving and 
underlying global warming, Grove posits an appellation centered on the 
unique milieu from which our current crisis emerged.  He argues: 
It was a European elite that developed a distinctively mechanistic 
view of matter, an oppositional relationship to nature, and an 
economic system indebted to geographical expansion. The 
resulting political orders measured success by how much wealth 
could be generated in the exploitation of peoples and resources. 
The geological record bears the mark of this European assemblage 
of hierarchies (2016). 
 
Grove's provocation re-centers colonialism at the heart of climate change, 
and, perhaps most importantly, offers a critical lens from which to examine 
																																																								
38 Just a few months after Berthon and Donnellan, Margaryan coined “the Technocene” in 
response to an editorial published in Nature that argued for the necessity of the 
Anthropocene. 
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the asymmetric affects of global warming, which will disproportionally 
impact the global South and, as such, ought to be seen as a neocolonial 
power mechanism (Field et al. 2014).  The Eurocene's hierarchies are 
most evident in the literal modes of production that have accelerated 
climate change, and the earth bears indelible scars from centuries of 
intensive resource acquisition and extraction.  As a concept, the Eurocene 
presences the imperial roots of the desire to christen a new geologic age. 
 Furthering Grove’s insight and observing the specific impacts of 
technological "development," Parikka coined the term Anthrobscene to 
mark the "various violations of environmental and human life in corporate 
practices and technological culture that are ensuring that there won’t be 
much of humans in the future scene of life" (Parikka 2014).  Parikka's 
invocation of an ethical, if not aesthetic, position—evident in his intentional 
play on words—calls attention to the "obscene" practices and systems 
facilitating techno-culture's expansive and destructive reign.  As with 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations, which models suggest could affect the 
global climate system for hundreds or thousands of years even if all 
emissions ceased tomorrow, Parikka contends that there is no way to 
undo the structural changes that techno-culture has had on the planet 
(Frölicher et al. 2013).  Indeed, geoengineering aims only to remediate the 
rise in global average temperature, which means that it can, at best, only 
be part of other solutions focused on healing planetary life systems that 
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are woefully imbalanced, which has driven a veritable explosion in critical 
responses. 
 Rather than focusing on the causes of the Anthropocene, some have 
argued that the concept does not go far enough in accounting for 
underlying roots and potential outcomes.  Indeed, there are many signs 
pointing toward an extinction-level event, which, as Chakrabarty contends, 
would make any designation "too low in the hierarchy of geological 
periods" (Chakrabarty 2016, 106).39  Critiquing the underlying assumptions 
driving the Anthropocene origin’s debate, Chakrabarty takes on history, 
freedom, and how the shadow of modernity continues to loom in framings 
and responses to climate change.  He observes: 
While there is no denying that climate change has profoundly to do 
with the history of capital, a critique that is only a critique of capital 
is not sufficient for addressing questions relating to human history 
once the crisis of climate change has been acknowledged and the 
Anthropocene has begun to loom on the horizon of our present.  
The geologic now of the Anthropocene has become entangled with 
the now of human history (Chakrabarty 2009, 212). 
 
The entanglements of the Anthropocene—which can be seen through the 
many and varied derivative concepts40 it has spawned—illuminate the 
linkages between the injustices of the past, the inequities of the present, 
																																																								
39 It is worth noting that Chakrabarty’s observation is the direct result of a personal 
communication with Zalasiewicz. 40	Beier’s accounting boasts a litany of terms: “Capitalocene, Eurocene, Anthrobscene, 
Chthulucene, Plantationocene, Plasticene, Misantanthropocene, Betacene, 
Planthropocene, Thermocene, Thanatocene, Phagocene, Phronocene, Agnotocene, 
Polemocene, Anglocene, Metropocene, Gynocene, Manthropocene, Sociocene, 
Homogenocene, Econocene, Aerocene, Growthocene, and Palaeoanthropocene” (2018, 
p. 370). Interestingly, she omits both Technopocene and Technocene.	
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and unpreferred trajectories for the future(s). 
 As a means of combating this dynamic, a multi-signatory comment 
published in Nature argues that “developing countries” should “play a 
central part in research and discussions around solar geoengineering” 
(Rahman et al. 2018, 23).  Writing from a similar perspective, some within 
the humanitarian sector have argued that the “most vulnerable” must be 
directly engaged so that they might “form an opinion and perhaps 
influence formal governance processes” (Suarez et al. 2013).  While 
additional inclusion in the establishment of governance processes for 
geoengineering sounds well and good, there are many who find the 
implicit appeal to authority of statist agents, as well as international 
agencies such as the UN, a mere extension of the colonial systems and 
imperial mechanisms that brought about our collective crises, which will 
not (and has never been) shared equally amongst all parties (Klein 2014; 
Whyte 2012a; Whyte 2012b; Whyte 2013).  This points toward one of, if 
not, the inherent biases of the ongoing Anthropocene debate—an appeal 
toward universalism (Zahara 2017).  Indeed, the very concept itself rests 
on an uneasy consensus—a tacit agreement that while we “may not 
experience ourselves as a geological agent, […] we appear to have 
become one at the level of the species” (Chakrabarty 2009, 221).  
Interestingly, Chakrabarty begins his essay with a gesture toward 
Weisman’s World Without Us, which imagines a post-human Earth.  
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Reflecting on Weisman’s provocation, Chakrabarty writes, “It is not 
surprising then that the crisis of climate change should produce anxieties 
precisely around futures that we cannot visualize” (Chakrabarty 2009, 
211).   
 While Chakrabarty cannot visualize such futures, the realities of 
climate change and radically unpreferred potentialities, including 
geoengineering, are nothing new for those who have been on the 
frontlines of ecocide for generations (Klein 2014).  Perhaps such futures 
produce anxiety not because they are unimaginable but precisely because 
they surface the truly unthought—a reckoning with the horrors of the past, 
the injustices of the present, and the uncertainties of the future(s).  As 
such, the deepest challenge at the heart of the Anthropocene lies within a 
simple query—one that has come to define futures: what’s next?41 (Dator 
2005).  In is certainly the case that geoengineered futures have become 
easier to visualize and positioned as “what’s next,” in no small part due to 
the proliferation of news coverage and a spate of media imaginings 
(Luokkanen et al. 2014).  While geoengineered imaginaries have become 
more diffused, uncertainty surrounding the effects of climate engineering 
have grown exponentially as well, particularly as numerous models show 
uncertain affects across a range of regions (Batten and Gower 2014; 
																																																								
41 In his recounting of decades as a futurist, and specifically the rapidity of change, Dator 
contends that “every good futurist” must ask this simple question, even, and perhaps 
especially, when one seems to have achieved their preferred future (Dator 2005, 381). 
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Bodle et al. 2012; Courvoisier et al. 2018; Fuentes-George 2017; IPCC 
2012; National Research Council 2015a; National Research Council 
2015b; Royal Society 2009; Williamson et al. 2012a; Williamson et al. 
2012b).  In short, such stories cannot rely solely on data extrapolation.  
This is due, at least in part, to the variability of climate models, which has 
improved greatly but continues to be imperfect, especially when simulating 
cloud formation and tropical precipitation (Edenhofer et al. 2015; Randall 
et al. 2007; Zscheischler et al. 2018). 
In light of this dynamic, geoengineered futures have been devised, 
promulgated, and accelerated, even though numerous studies clearly 
show that the public, broadly defined, has limited knowledge of climate 
engineering processes and their potential implications and impacts 
(Asayama et al. 2017; Burns et al. 2016; Burns and Strauss 2014; Cairns 
2015; Carr et al. 2013; McLaren et al. 2016; Nicholson et al. 2013; Scheer 
and Renn 2014; Sugiyama et al. 2017).  In the next section, I map the two 
major climate engineering proposals—solar radiation management (SRM) 
and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)—as well as more boutique 
ideations, such as glacial geoengineering and marine cloud brightening.  
This review furthers my investigation into the contours of geoengineered 
imaginaries.  
The Pinatubo effect 
 Mount Pinatubo sits near the western coast of central Luzon, the 
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largest island of the Philippines, and holds almost 50% of its overall 
population.  In 1991, an increase in earthquakes heralded an awakening.  
The surrounding area's geologic record shows that Pinatubo has a history 
of gargantuan eruptions, some of which lasted decades or longer (Newhall 
and Punongbayan, 1996).  On June 15, 1991, Pinatubo's grumblings 
reached a zenith with an ash plume rocketing an estimated 34 kilometers 
(21 miles) high.  When these particles entered and subsequently 
circulated the stratosphere, they blocked a sufficient amount of solar 
radiation to cool the Earth’s surface.  The effects of Pinatubo lowered the 
global average temperature by half a degree Celsius, or almost one whole 
degree Fahrenheit (Burns 2011; Hansen et al. 1992; Keith 2013).  As the 
strongest volcanic eruption since Krakatoa in 1883, Pinatubo gave 
researchers and scientists an extraordinary opportunity to study how such 
events affect the global climate system, specifically how stratospheric 
aerosols—in this instance volcanic ash—impact the Earth's albedo, or 
reflectivity.  
 James Hansen gained notoriety following testimony given before the 
U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in 1988.  At this 
meeting, he famously stated that NASA was 99% confident that an 
increase in global average temperature was anthropogenic in origin.  
Following the Pinatubo eruption, Hansen led a team of researchers to 
examine the effects of this mass injection of particulates into the 
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stratosphere.  They predicted that the cooling "[…] should even overwhelm 
global warming […]" (Hansen et al. 1992, 215).  And, they were right, as 
the cooling effects from the Pinatubo eruption were felt for years, which 
impacted a range of life systems (Trenberth and Dai 2007).   
 The hydrological cycle acts a pump whereby the Earth circulates its 
most valuable and life-giving resource: water.  Evaporation from fresh- and 
sea-water bodies moves to the skies and eventually condenses as clouds 
that produce precipitation.  There are a range of variables that effect the 
amount of water moving through the hydrological cycle, particularly air, 
oceanic, and surface temperatures (Beniston 2003; Shen et al. 2008).  
Given the dramatic and sudden impact that Pinatubo had on surface 
temperatures, some were not surprised when 1992 was recorded to have 
"a peak percentage of global land areas under drought conditions" (Dai et 
al. 2004; Trenberth and Dai 2007).  This connection is troubling as some 
have recommended mimicking “the Pinatubo effect,” although proposals to 
cool surface temperatures by “managing” solar radiation could have the 
same result with uncertain impacts on the hydrological cycle (Dai et al. 
2004; Nalam et al. 2018; Shen et al. 2008; Trenberth and Dai 2007). 
 Solar radiation management (SRM), which is also sometimes 
referred to as solar climate engineering (SCE), has been given increasing 
attention as some think large-scale engineering initiatives might be the 
only feasible means to combat global warming, although such scenarios 
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contain a range of uncertainties (Ban-Weiss and Caldeira 2010; Allenby 
2005; Budyko 1977b; Cicerone et al. 1992; Cicerone 2006; Crutzen 2006; 
Fleming 2010; Keith 2000; Keith 2001; Keith 2013; Kintisch 2010; Penner 
et al. 1984).  While Pinatubo exponentially increased interest on SRM, the 
idea of geoengineering using stratospheric aerosols to reflect solar 
radiation actually has a much longer history.  In 1977, the American 
Geophysical Union translated the work of Mikhail Budyko, a Belarussian 
climatologist, who argued “it may be feasible to modify the aerosol layer of 
the stratosphere in the near future” (1977a, 242).  In honor of his 
groundbreaking work, some have resorted to calling SRM proposals 
“Budyko’s Blanket,” and advocates for this approach often champion the 
notion that it would be “fiendishly simple” and “startlingly cheap” (Levitt 
and Dubner 2011).  An article published in 1984 in Acta Astronautica 
extended Budyko’s ideas and argued that retro-fitted commercial planes 
could deliver the payload, which would limit the need for proprietary 
deployment methods (Penner et al. 1984).  In 1992, a proposal was made 
to inject particulates, specifically ethane or propane, into the stratosphere 
above the poles as a means of combating ozone depletion42 (Cicerone et 
al. 1992).  While all of these proposals were published in scientific 																																																								
42 It should be noted that ozone depletion, particularly above Antarctica, has reversed due 
to the coordinated phasing out of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which were commonly 
used propellants for numerous aerosol-based products, such as hairspray. The Montreal 
Protocol is widely considered to be “one of the most successful and effective 
environmental treaties ever negotiated and implemented” (Rae 2012). Given its success, 
some have argued that the treaty “could be expanded to quell concerns and guide the 
relevant research” on climate engineering (Andersen 2012, 415). 
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journals, none raised the level of discourse and profile of geoengineering, 
and SRM in particular, as much a 1992 report by the Institute of Medicine, 
National Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering. 
 Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming: Mitigation, Adaptation, 
and the Science Base featured an entire section devoted to 
geoengineering with an emphasis on feasibility, particularly for SRM.  
Calling for an aggressive research agenda, one that would study 
“considerations of reversibility,” the report provided one of the most 
enduring formulations of geoengineering, and SRM in particular, as a 
practice: "the large-scale engineering of our environment in order to 
combat or counteract the effects of changes in atmospheric chemistry" 
(Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and National 
Academy of Engineering 1992, 433).  Covering a range of SRM 
deployment methods the report makes no mention of the impacts such 
proposals might have on the hydrological cycle or, perhaps even more 
alarmingly, the need for international management and cooperation.  It 
does note, however, that a potential side effect of SRM, as with volcanic 
eruptions, could be “spectacular sunsets” (Institute of Medicine, National 
Academy of Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering 1992).  
Although concerns surrounding the side effects of SRM proposals 
continue to emerge, the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of 
Sciences, and National Academy of Engineering has the honor of being 
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the first to call attention to the potentiality of spectacular sunsets, which 
speaks to the sometimes obtuse ways with which geoengineered 
imaginaries are promulgated. 
 SRM is undoubtedly the easiest target for skeptics and conspiracy 
theories, although serious research on deployment methods has not been 
thwarted.43  David Keith is one of the most vocal proponents of the need 
for further SRM research.  He currently holds a dual appointment as the 
Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Physics at the Harvard John A. 
Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences and Professor of 
Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School.  Keith, however, is quick to 
separate his academic work on SRM from his other efforts, which includes 
a position with Carbon Engineering, a Canadian firm specializing in the 
development of fuels from CO2 using direct air capture (DAC) methods.  In 
2017, Keith received approval for a small-scale SRM research 
experiment—one of the first of its kind.  
 The stratospheric controlled perturbation experiment (SCoPEx) has 
been designed to study the impacts of aerosol distribution location and 
size as a means of weighting the "risks and efficacy of SRM" (Dykema et 
al. 2014, 17).  Although SCoPEx will use standard materials, such as 																																																								
43 One of the most concerning aspects surrounding SRM is the connection made 
between research-based proposals and chemtrails, which is a conspiracy theory based 
on the idea that planes are already spraying a range of chemicals to control the weather, 
poison people, and, in general, enable a nefarious agenda whose overall aim is unclear. 
Unfortunately, recent research has shown that geoengineering has become inextricably 
linked to the chemtrail conspiracies on social media (Tingley and Wagner 2017). 
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calcium carbonate, to generate insights on optimal aerosol deployment 
distribution, Keith has published research on more technologically 
advanced interventions, specifically engineered nanoparticles, which 
would greatly improve the amount of "control" over deployment and extend 
the overall lifetime of the engagement—two of the main challenges of 
SRM (2010, 16428).  There are a number proposals for using a range 
particulates and materials, including a sunshade “near the inner Lagrange 
point (L1), in-line between the Earth and sun” (Angel 2006); glass bubbles 
(Walter 2011); and “land and space based mirrors” (Weber 2012).  Such 
methods, as with Keith's invocation of nanotechnology, raise another 
critical issue surrounding climate engineering, specifically SRM: patenting 
(Reynolds et al. 2018).  A “land grab” on geoengineering patents is 
already underway, which could stifle research, centralize deployment, and 
foment possible intellectual property rights litigation (Chavez 2015; 
Parthasarathy et al. 2010; Reynolds et al. 2018).  Interestingly, it was a 
concern over patenting that led to the cancellation of a high-profile SRM 
experiment in the United Kingdom in 2012 (Cressey 2012).   
 Most researchers are vehemently against privatization and believe 
that "commercial development cannot produce the level of transparency 
and trust the world needs to make sensible decisions about deployment" 
(Keith 2018).  Keith’s position has evolved over the years and points 
toward the ways with which geoengineered imaginaries have shaped the 
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ongoing public discourse on such futures.  In 1992, which was on the 
heels of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, and 
National Academy of Engineering report, Keith and Dowlatabadi observed 
that geoengineering “implementation requires fewer cooperating actors 
than abatement” (1992, 289).  Any sensible decision, which implies one 
achieved via cooperative means, must certainly be informed by any and all 
potential side effects and have responses to any and all critiques.  
 One of the most damning critiques of SRM has to do with potentiality 
for negative impacts on the ozone layer, which prevents a majority of 
ultraviolet radiation from making it to the surface (Crutzen 2006; House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010; Rasch et al. 2008).  
Although accelerating ozone depletion is worrisome, studies have 
revealed a far more troubling dynamic: if a large-scale initiative were to be 
undertaken, some argue that ceasing maintenance would be nothing short 
of catastrophic as “there is high confidence that global surface 
temperatures would rise very rapidly to values consistent with the 
greenhouse gas forcing” (IPCC 2013).  In simple terms, a start-and-stop 
strategy, which would produce a termination effect, could create a rapid 
(over a few decades or less) spike in surface temperatures, leading to 
disastrous impacts on a variety of life systems (Jones et al. 2013; Muri et 
al. 2018; Trisos et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2015).  Consequently, SRM 
entails a commitment unlike anything ever attempted in human history, 
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although comparisons to nuclear waste disposal and storage are 
sometimes made (Baum 2014; Burns and Strauss 2014).  As some 
models situate the necessary follow through on SRM to hundreds or 
perhaps even thousands of years, it becomes clear that some of the 
weightiest issues surrounding SRM are non-technical (Cao and Caldeira 
2008; Caldeira and Rampino 1991; Winkelmann et al. 2015).  Even the 
IPCC, which makes notoriously conservative estimates, argues, "proposed 
methods will need to consider timescales extending at least up to, and 
likely well beyond, 2100’’ (Edenhofer et al. 2015, 4).   
 Although the challenges of SRM are plentiful in both scope and 
scale, its low cost and minimal deployment barriers have raised concerns 
that unilateral deployment is a potentiality worth taking seriously.  As 
Brand writes, “As soon as climatic conditions become frightening and 
urgent, geoengineering schemes will suddenly jump from 'plausible but 
dangerous' to 'dangerous but we have no choice.'  The cost is low enough 
that a single nation or even a wealthy individual could set in motion a 
geoengineering project that would affect everyone on Earth” (Brand 2010).  
Echoing Brand, Cascio observes, “[…] it is a near-certainty that someone 
(nation or wealthy non-state actor) will attempt to engage in 
geoengineering to head off utter disaster, allowing sufficient time for 
slower preventative solutions to take hold” (Cascio 2009, 21).  Similarly, 
Deudney and Grove contend, “[…] actors could unilaterally select 
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geoengineering projects for their distributional advantages, thus turning 
climate change into a realm of zero-sum competition” (2009).  Parson and 
Keith reflect,  “Geoengineering is not arms control, at least for now.  But if 
states fail to build cooperation and transparency now when stakes are low, 
it could become as difficult and fraught as arms control, or more so, in 
some future of severe climate change” (2013, 1279).  Explicating the 
ramifications on a softer scale, Rabitz argues that unilateral action “could 
take the form of directional leadership” or even “grant an actor significant 
leverage in international negotiations” (2016, 106).  As the above array of 
insights suggest, SRM could serve as a tactical and strategic maneuver to 
serve a variety of ends, even though some believe that the potential 
political costs would be severe and likely prohibit implementation 
(Bodansky 1996; Bodansky 2011; Hanafi and Hamburg 2013; Horton 
2011; Millard-Ball 2012; Larson 2016). 
 While unilateral SRM might not be palatable, the inability of any and 
all contemporary governance structures to cope with climate engineering, 
and SRM in particular, is a concern that many have noted (Banerjee 2011; 
Bipartisan Policy Centre Task Force on Climate Remediation Research 
2011; Bodansky 1996; Bodansky 2011; Brent et al. 2018; Cicerone 2006; 
Cicerone et al. 1992; Hamilton 2013; Hanafi and Hamburg 2013; House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010; Larson 2016; 
Millard-Ball 2012; Reynolds 2016; Royal Society 2009; Stilgoe 2015; 
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Stilgoe 2016; Szerszynski et al. 2013).  A lack of appropriate governance, 
however, has not stopped advocates from seeing the sunny side of things, 
so to speak.  As Schelling opines, “One thing that can be said for 
geoengineering is that it immensely reduces the complicatedness of what 
nations have to do internally to cope with greenhouse problems and what 
nations have to do internationally to cope with greenhouse problems” 
(1996, 307).  Balancing internal versus international and local versus 
global interests is essential to executing any meaningful climate 
engineering initiative and developing potential governance mechanisms to 
oversee research and potential deployment.  While large-scale 
environmental treaties, such as the aforementioned Montreal Protocol, 
have been successfully forged and properly policed, governance for 
geoengineering would certainly require thoughtful and continuous cross-
scale policy experimentation (Reynolds 2018; Stilgoe 2015; Stilgoe 2016).  
At present, there are no global institutions that have come out in full 
support of climate engineering, although the United Nations Framework on 
Convention on Climate Change has called for "sinks and reservoirs of 
greenhouse gases," which harkens back to one of the earliest mentions of 
climate engineering in a scientific journal (UNFCCC 2015).  
 In 1977, Marchetti published "On geoengineering and the CO2 
problem" in the first issue of Climate Change.  In this seminal article, 
Marchetti calls for a process whereby "CO2 is partially or totally collected 
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at certain transformation points and properly disposed” (1977).  Proposing 
the utilization of currents to "carry and spread [CO2] into the deep ocean," 
he notes how ground storage may also be an option, specifically 
reclaiming "exhausted gas fields" for sequestration (Marchetti 1977).  In 
stark contrast to SRM, proposals for carbon capture and sequestration 
(CCS) are widely considered to be a necessity alongside concerted efforts 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially to meet current targets 
(Anderson 2015; Courvoisier et al. 2018; National Research Council 2015; 
Neslen 2015; UNFCCC 2015).  CCS has also gotten a boost from recent 
studies that show the overall cost to be much lower than previously 
estimated (Keith et al. 2018). 
 Carbon Engineering's DAC pilot project, which has been operational 
since 2015, halved previous cost estimates, which gestures toward 
commercial viability, although the researchers contextualize their findings 
as "a low-risk starting point rather than a fully optimized least-cost design" 
(Keith et al. 2018, 20).  A breakthrough in negative emission technology 
(NET) could bring geoengineering to the fore of future climate 
negotiations.  Given the vast differences in overall scope and impact, 
some have argued that NET should not be classified as geoengineering 
but rather as an integral part of an "overall mitigation strategy" (Lomax et 
al. 2015, 128).  Disaggregating NET from SRM is also a calculated move 
aimed at better distinguishing between the uncertainties, regulatory 
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implications, and policy demands between the two (Heyward 2013).  
Although SRM and CCS remain the two primary proposals, a handful of 
other approaches have come to the fore.   
 Forestalling glacial retreat is essential to diffusing sea-level rise, and 
studies suggest, "the costs of such projects appear comparable to those of 
other large energy and civil-engineering works" (Moore et al. 2018, 305).  
From blocking warm waters and artificially supporting ice shelves in 
Antarctica, glacial geoengineering could have “fewer global environmental 
impacts” than other approaches, although this method does nothing to 
stop increased warming (Moore et al. 2018, 304).  As with other 
approaches, glacial geoengineering would necessitate substantial front-
end investment with limited effect, which has led some to consider 
methods that piggyback on existing processes.  Container transport 
vessels, which revolutionized trade and dramatically accelerated 
globalization, emit a range of particulates, including sulfur dioxide (SO2 ) 
(Bernhofen et al. 2016).  Given that SO2 that supports cloud formation and, 
as such, increased albedo, some have argued that such vessels engage 
in "inadvertent geoengineering” (Fuglestvedt et al. 2009, 9060).  In order 
to be effective, marine cloud brightening (MCB) would take no less than a 
doubling of clouds in specific regions to offset atmospheric CO2 
concentrations (Cao et al. 2015; Rissman et al. 2004; Salter et al. 2008).  
Models, however, suggest that MCB would decrease global average 
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rainfall, even though precipitation over land could increase (Bala et al. 
2010; Latham et al. 2012).  As with all climate engineering methods, there 
are risks and uncertainties beyond any and all means of calculation.  The 
limits of modeling are apparent to those working in the field, but how this 
uncertainty will factor into decision-making on further research and 
possible deployment remains to be seen.  Geoengineered imaginaries 
already reflect varying degrees of uncertainty, even if implicitly, and one 
need only look at cloud seeding—a widely used practice for manipulating 
precipitation—to see that efficacy is not a requisite condition for proposed 
implementation.  In the next section, I examine historic and contemporary 
cloud seeding practices to delimit the contours of geoengineered 
imaginaries at both local and national scales. 
What’s worse…dropping bombs or rain? 	
 During a 1997 conference on Terrorism, Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, and U.S. Strategy, then U.S. Secretary of Defense William 
Cohen joined Senators Nunn (D-Georgia) and Lugar (R-Indiana) to answer 
a few audience questions.  This is when things got interesting.  In the 
wake of a fake biological agent attack on B’nai B’rith—an international 
Jewish service organization headquartered in Washington, D.C.—that 
occurred just a few days earlier, an audience member asked Secretary 
Cohen about preparations for future threats.  In a surprisingly stark, and 
somewhat meandering, riposte, Cohen opined, ‘‘Others are engaging even 
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in an eco-type of terrorism whereby they can alter the climate, set off 
earthquakes, volcanoes remotely through the use of electromagnetic 
waves’’ (U.S. Department of Defense 2013).  Cohen’s off-the-cuff 
comments rose more than a few eyebrows and highlighted the long-
standing interest of statist, military, and intelligence agents—U.S. and 
otherwise—in environmental modification and/or weather manipulation 
(House et al. 1996; Fleming 2010).   
 Dispersing lead and silver iodide to support increased cloud 
production, the U.S. military worked with the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) to coordinate thousands of individual missions over five years aimed 
at extending the monsoon season to “increase rainfall in carefully selected 
areas to deny the enemy use of roads by: (1) softening road surfaces; (2) 
causing landslides along roadways; (3) washing out river crossings; and 
(4) maintaining saturated soil conditions beyond the normal time span” 
(Doolin 1974).  Operation names varied (Popeye, Intermediary, and 
Compatriot), but extensive media coverage—first from the Washington 
Post in 1971 and then front page coverage in the New York Times in 
1972—led to the abandonment of the project accompanied by a sharp turn 
in position, hastening the adoption of the Weather Modification Regulation 
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Act in 1974 by the U.S. Congress44 (Haskell 1974).  Following wider 
revelations, the U.N. ‘Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any 
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques or 
Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) came into force in 
October 1978 (United Nations 1978).  At present, ENMOD has been 
ratified by only 20 countries with another 48 countries as signatories and 
78 as official party to the treaty (United Nations 1978; Hamblin 2013).  
Although the State Department never publicly declared that any such 
operation was successful, an official speaking off the record opined, 
“What’s worse…dropping bombs or rain?” (Hersh 1972).  It’s hard to argue 
with that kind of logic, although ENMOD did little to quell interest in 
weather modification.  Quite the contrary, the practice has grown 
exponentially since.  
 When Beijing was awarded the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, 
many were concerned that poor weather, as well as the city's rampant air 
pollution, might dampen the festivities.  To prevent international 																																																								
44 Interestingly, although perhaps not surprisingly, there are direct connections between 
weather modification and the University of Hawai‘i. Harlan Cleveland, who served as 
President of the University of Hawai‘i system from 1969 to 1974, was appointed as Chair 
of the Weather Modification Advisory Board, which was created by the Department of 
Commerce. Cleveland played a central role in overseeing cloud seeding experiments, 
which were outlined in the 1978 report: Weather Modification: Programs, Problems, 
Policy, and Potential (Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 1978). The 
report also states that, under Cleveland’s direction, the Board was tasked with “examining 
the potential problems of liability of the United States for damage done by official U.S. 
weather modification activities (1978, 448). Cleveland was also active in the World 
Futures Studies Federation and attended the group’s 1988 conference in Beijing, China. 
Jim Dator deserves full credit for highlighting this linkage and furnishing personal insights 
on Cleveland. 
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embarrassment, the Beijing Weather Modification Office (BWMO), was 
tasked with ensuring a dry August, which constitutes the tail end of the 
Summer rainy season.  While the BWMO was formed within the Beijing 
Meteorological Bureau (BMB) in 1973 to combat hailstorms, the project 
grew immensely in scope and scale in the years leading up to the 
Olympics.  Chronicling the expansion of the BMB, Jinxia reports, "The 
weather engineering office wove a defensive web from adjacent provinces 
to the Beijing suburbs, and 26 control stations were deployed to fend off 
clouds or delay their movement" (Jinxia 2010, 2808).  In total, China is 
thought to have spent over $100 million dollars to limit rainfall during the 
2008 Summer games, and the BMB reported that over 1000 rain dispersal 
rockets were fired to keep the opening ceremonies dry (Xinhua 2008).  
While the weather modification efforts of the BMWO during the 2008 
Summer Olympics garnered substantial media attention, China has since 
embarked on an even more aggressive cloud seeding agenda—one 
aimed at producing more rain across the country.  According to the best 
available information, over 85% of China's 2900 counties have active 
cloud seeding programs (Liu 2012; Guilford 2013).  As Qiu and Cressey 
report, “Official figures from the China Meteorological Administration say 
that the country created 250 billion tonnes of rain between 1999 and 2006, 
an annual production of more than 30 billion tonnes” (2008, 970).  China, 
however, is not alone in seeking to bend the sky’s will to earthly needs, 
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and it is difficult to imagine that such substantial investments would be 
made if cloud seeding did not produce results.  
 According to the report from the Expert Team on Weather 
Modification Research for 2012/2013 from the World Meteorological 
Association (hereafter WMA) there were ‘‘42 countries with active weather 
modification projects’’ in 2011 (Bruintjes 2013).  This increased to 52 by 
2015 with China, India, Thailand, and the U.S. making substantial 
investments in both direct projects and research (Bruintjes 2015).  Since 
the WMA relies on self-reporting from member nations, it is believed that 
the number of actual projects is much higher.  Given the lack of clear and 
transparent information about ongoing initiatives, it is difficult, daresay 
impossible, to measure, and consequently understand, the potential 
affects of this widespread practice on the hydrological cycle45 as well as 
other life systems.  In addition to uncertainties arising from large-scale 
cloud seeding initiatives, tactical interventions provide little clarity, 
especially when the circumstances are intentionally obscured.  
 In April 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded.  A 
range of failures, including safety sub-systems, led to a full-scale 
meltdown, which catapulted radioactive materials into the atmosphere for 																																																								
45 An interesting point to consider here is the degree to which the hydrological cycle ought 
to be seen as an open versus closed system. Given that all the water on Earth moves 
continuously through this cycle and that there is only a slight variance in the overall 
amount of water on the planet, some believe that it should be considered a closed system 
(Dooge 1968). On the other hand, others argue the interconnections between various life 
systems and the overall complexity of the global climate system preclude such a 
classification (de Assis Matos de Abreu et al. 2005). 
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days.  Through research undertaken by a British scientist and testimonials 
by both local residents and then-Soviet pilots, it has come to light that a 
cloud seeding operation was undertaken as a means to prevent impacts 
on population centers, predominantly Moscow (Fleming 2010; Gray 2007; 
Sparks 2004).  In support of this claim, unexpectedly high levels of fallout 
were recorded “in the Gomel area of Belarus, some 60 miles north of the 
power plant” (Fleming 2010, 162).  Noting the effects of this purported 
intervention, Sparks reports, “In some contaminated areas of Belarus, 
thyroid cancers have increased by up to 1,925% and the World Health 
Organisation says many of those exposed to radiation as children will 
develop the disease” (2004).  While there has never been, and likely never 
will be, an official admission on the part of either the Russian or Belarusian 
governments, Major Alexsei Grushin, a former Soviet pilot, has been 
candid about his participation and even told the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) that he was “proud” of his involvement in the operation 
(BBC 2007).46  Although this event remains clouded in mystery, some 
argue that cloud seeding during the 1980 Olympic games, which were 
held in Moscow, shows that the Soviets possessed the requisite resources 
and experience to carry out such an operation (Ioffe 2007, 355).   
 While the Chernobyl incident raises a litany of issues surrounding 																																																								
46 My wife was born in southeastern Belarus and remembers the Chernobyl event. In our 
first discussion of my dissertation research, she suggested that I investigate cloud 
seeding and specifically look into Chernobyl. As a little girl, she recalls seeing nothing but 
black skies for days on end.  
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the utilization of cloud seeding, the invocation of a utilitarian calculus to 
justify such an operation coupled with the overall lack of transparency, 
including a conscious choice not to alert the local population, is certainly 
the most troubling.  Consequently, it appears as though the challenges of 
cloud seeding are inverse to large-scale geoengineering, which is to say 
that highly localized effects compounded by national-scale dynamics drive 
most, if not all, of contemporary weather manipulation practices.  Such 
themes are also teased out through fiction. 
 The BBC’s Superstorm (2007) was a miniseries about the use of 
cloud seeding to alter hurricanes.  Infusing real science and historical 
references, such as Project Stormfury—a U.S. government-backed project 
to divert tropical storms using cloud seeding, the series ran in three parts, 
each of which was followed by a short documentary on meteorological 
science, specifically forecasting extreme weather events.  In the first 
episode, the team’s research on cloud seeding is used to deflect a 
hurricane from hitting Miami, but the storm gains strength out at sea and 
then redirects toward New York City.  Footage from 2005’s Hurricane 
Katrina, which decimated New Orleans, is used to imagine the impacts of 
a category three storm striking New York City.  In fictionalizing the affects 
of such a scenario, which ended up playing out just a few years later, 
Superstorm encapsulates the ethico-political provocations and, at times, 
prescience of geoengineered imaginaries.  In the next section, I explore a 
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selection of texts from the growing genre of climate fiction (cli-fi), which 
promulgates a range of geoengineered imaginaries. 
When truth is stranger than f ict ion 	
 In the wake of Hurricane Sandy's destructive path across the 
Northeastern United States in late 2012, climate change quickly became 
one of the central issues of that year's election.  As then New York City 
Mayor, Mike Bloomberg, opined, “Our climate is changing.  And while the 
increase in extreme weather we have experienced in New York City and 
around the world may or may not be the result of it, the risk that it might 
be—given this week's devastation—should compel all elected leaders to 
take immediate action” (Bloomberg 2012).  While Bloomberg was cautious 
not to make a direct causal link, his invocation of the immense risks of 
inaction was telling and pointed toward the growing public consensus of 
the correlation between global warming and extreme weather events 
(Gillis 2012; IPCC 2012).  Noting the difference between the two major 
party candidates on the issue, Bloomberg continued, “One sees climate 
change as an urgent problem that threatens our planet; one does not.  I 
want our president to place scientific evidence and risk management 
above electoral politics” (Bloomberg 2012).  With the re-election of 
Obama, many were optimistic that efforts to mitigate global warming would 
move to center stage, and when the President gave a highly publicized 
speech on the issue in June 2013, it seemed as though such hopes were 
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not audacious.  
 In what many consider to be one of the landmark policy addresses 
of the Obama's second term, he exclaimed, “I refuse to condemn your 
generation and future generations to a planet that’s beyond fixing.  And 
that’s why, today, I'm announcing a new national climate action plan, and 
I'm here to enlist your generation's help in keeping the United States of 
America a leader—a global leader—in the fight against climate change 
(Obama 2013).  While many remain highly skeptical of the notion that the 
planet can be fixed through emission mitigation, Obama's impassioned 
remarks suggest, as one might expect to hear from an American politician, 
that the battle against global warming is something that can be fought and 
won.  These sentiments differed markedly from a more somber speech 
given by another American President on climate change.   
 Explaining just how high the stakes concerning climate change 
have become, Joe Benton, the 48th President of the United States, 
intimates: 
Over the past months since I became your president, I have 
received information that shows the changes we have created in 
our global climate are more sever, more accelerated, and more far-
reaching them we have understood before. […] We have all come 
to understand that there will be relocations from threatened areas of 
our coastal states. […] The hardest truth, the saddest truth that I 
must tell you is that for the last ten, twenty, thirty years, you were 
told lies. […] My fellow Americans, when you gave me your trust 
last November I told you that I would dedicate myself to creating a 
new foundation for our country […]. But before we can lay the new 
foundation for our country, we must deal once and for all with the 
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monster of emissions that terrorizes our world (Glass 2009). 
 
Given the increasing severity of forecast models, many were hoping that 
Obama's tone was more along the lines of the protagonist from Matthew 
Glass's 2009 novel, Ultimatum, which takes place in the globally warmed 
world of 2032.  Imagining sea-level rise, wildfires, drought, and a tense 
geopolitical climate, the novel sketches a life-world not too dissimilar from 
our own—except perhaps for the candor of its elected officials.  In 
following the efforts of President Benton to salvage the remnants of 
America, and, as it were, save the world, by staunchly enforcing a 
restrictive Carbon Plan, Ultimatum takes a decidedly dystopic turn in 
suggesting that the threat of catastrophe—specifically the precipice of 
global thermonuclear war—is the requisite and sole catalyst for 
substantive change.  Although many have come to believe that climate 
change will act not just as a force multiplier but also as a catalyst for 
conflict, such scenarios continue primarily to be the domain of fiction47, 
which is not meant in any way as a slight against its efficacy (Dyer 2011; 
Ward 2014).  
 Explicating the ways with which science fiction interacts with and 
within contemporary imaginaries, Weldes agrues, “[sci-fi] is not just a 																																																								
47 Over the past few years, the U.S. military has made substantial investments in 
strategic foresight and science fiction aimed at illuminating future threats, technological 
impacts on the future of warfare, and future areas of conflict. The Army’s Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) runs a “Mad Scientist Initiative” that focuses on “the future 
operational environment and its military implications” (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command 2018). 
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'window' onto an already pre-existing world.  Rather, [sci-fi] texts are part 
of the processes of world politics themselves: they are implicated in 
producing and reproducing the phenomena that [many] assume they 
merely reflect” (Weldes 12, 2003).  As with the other texts in the evolving 
genre of climate fiction, or cli-fi, Ultimatum charts the many and varied 
impacts of global warming in a world that is at once familiar, but not quite.  
Cli-fi's recurrent thematics and historicity certainly draws heavily from 
contemporary research as well science fiction, which is a broad genre that 
encompasses a range of typologies (James 1994; Weldes 2003; Rieder 
2008; Rintoul et al. 2018; Tuhus-Dubrow 2013; Whiteley et al. 2016).  As a 
genre, cli-fi has immense utility for thinking the political of geoengineered 
imaginaries (Shapiro 2010).  Over the past century, climate engineering 
and weather modification have become popular tropes, and ethico-political 
dynamics often take center stage in these narratives.  My reading of three 
texts, The Weather Man (1962), Extinction (2005), The Collapse of 
Western Civilization: A View from the Future (2014) centers on specific 
encounters that stir ethico-political provocations around the core themes of 
the geoengineering debate: centralization, corporatization, and 
commitment.  These areas of concern are then used to enliven critical 
questions of analysis in subsequent chapters.  
 The Weather Man (1962) chronicles the exploits of the Weather 
Congress, an entity with complete power over the global climate system, 
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including the capacity to enact dramatic changes in weather in highly 
localized ways.  As Thomas explains: 
The Weather Congress was the supreme body of Earth, able to 
bend states, nations, continents, and hemispheres to its will.  What 
dictator, what country, could survive when no drop of rain fell for a 
year? Or what dictator, what country could survive when blanketed 
by fifty feet of snow and ice?  The Weather Congress could freeze 
the Congo River or dry up the Amazon.  It could flood the Sahara or 
Tierra del Fuego.  It could thaw the tundra, and raise and lower the 
levels of the ocean at will.  And here, in this chamber, all the 
political decisions had been made, and the chamber seemed to 
acquire some of the feeling that had been expressed over the last 
half century, from the stormy early days, to the more settled and 
reflective present.  It was a powerful chamber, and it made its 
power felt by those who sat in it (Thomas 1992, 148). 
 
The Congress uses a representative system based on population density 
within fifteen-degree squared tracts.  This construct enables just 200 
“Councilmen” to put forward requests and vote on a variety of weather 
manipulation proposals.  That these are the two primary storylines that 
drive the overall narrative arc is quite compelling.  The Congress ultimately 
votes to punish parts of Australia with drought as their actions, which are 
never outlined, present a clear “challenge to the supreme authority of the 
Weather Congress over the peoples of the world” (Thomas 1962, 144).  
Juxtaposing this action with the protagonist’s plan to fulfill a seemingly 
outlandish request—snow in Southern California in July—by one of the 
inventors of weather manipulation technology, The Weather Man 
illuminates how centralization—both technological and within the context 
of governance—showcases geoengineering's complicated politics.  How 
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can governance and deployment systems and mechanisms be designed 
to overcome the pitfalls of centralization?  Can geoengineering ever be 
truly egalitarian?  What governance paradigms and models can and might 
be utilized to support participatory research and, if deemed necessary, 
deployment?  How might others, such as corporations, interface with 
geoengineering governance structures?   
 Extinction (2005) chronicles the rise and fall of the ERGIA 
Corporation, who have the power to control the global climate system from 
space using a network of satellites.  Global warming, however, is still a 
concern for many as the services of ERGIA are only available at a steep 
price, and as much of the developing world was unable to fund alternative 
adaptation strategies, “multitudes of environmental refugees” have made 
their home on retrofitted ships in the Southern Ocean (Hammond 2005).  
When Michael Fairfax, the novel's primary protagonist, sets out to 
represent the world's climate refugees in international litigation against 
those responsible for climate change, he gets embroiled in a conspiracy 
over the truth about ERGIA's weather control system, which is weakening 
the planet's magnetic field and fostering an unimaginable geo-seismic 
catastrophe48.  As ERGIA goes to extreme measures to hide the truth, 
																																																								
48 Geostorm (2017) has a similar plot, although it quickly dissolves into CGI-driven 
disaster porn. Although the film treads familiar ground, it was the first wide-release major 
motion picture to employ geoengineering as more than just a minor plot point. Indeed, 
satellite-based climate engineering, which is broadened to include highly-localized 
weather manipulation, forms the foundation for the storyline. 
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Fairfax teams with Dr. Emilia Knight, a Senior Risk Assessment 
Seismologist at Geohazard Laboratories—a publicly traded company in 
the business of predicting earthquakes.  The sudden increase in 
unexpected earthquakes causes Geohazard's stock to crash.  
Accompanying the expansion of the weather derivatives market, which 
spiked to “$45.24 billion in 2006” following Hurricane Katrina the year 
before, Extinction, depicts a future in which corporations have immense 
influence, receive little governmental oversight, and have found creatively 
destructive ways of financializing disaster (Dunning 2011; Grove 2012; 
Klein 2014). 
 Expressing his frustration with ERGIA's monopoly, Fairfax 
exclaims, “'It's as if, after causing global warming in the first place, they're 
now charging the whole world millions of dollars every day for managing 
away its effects'” (Hammond 2005).  Although the novel takes a familiar 
turn in championing the-return-of-the-repressed trope, Extinction stages a 
provocative encounter concerning the potentiality for geoengineering and 
weather-financialization to become an automated function entirely under 
the control of corporate actants—the neoliberal fantasy par excellence.  As 
Hanoch Biran, ERGIA's Director of Corporate Communications explains to 
visitors at the space station where weather operations are undertaken: 
“Our perception consultants advised us that tourists don't really want to 
look at computers, they want to see real people.  So we hire actors to play 
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the parts.  All weather trades on the daily spot market have been 
automated for over twenty years” (Hammond 2005).  Given the 
aforementioned “land grab” for geoengineering patents and the well-
documented mega-trend of increasing automation, Extinction elucidates 
the actual and perceptual uncertainties surrounding corporatization.  What 
role will corporate actants play in promoting and sustaining 
geoengineering proposals?  How will other trends, such as automation, 
impact geoengineered imaginaries?  How can the varying motives—public 
good versus profits—and timelines—financial versus generational—
between different actants be remediated? 
The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View from the Future 
(Collapse) emerged out of a request to write a piece on “why we 
(collectively) were failing to respond adequately” to climate change 
(Oreskes and Conway 2014, 63).  Taking the perspective of a future 
historian, Collapse’s narrator provides an overview of the political and 
environmental crises of the late 20th and early 21st centuries with an 
emphasis on “Western Civilization.”  In sharp contrast too much of the 
genre, the text wastes little time and effort on narrative and instead 
focuses on the failures of the past, which are meant to be read as the 
failures of the present.  Recounting the emergence of the International 
Climate Cooling Engineering Project in 2052 (IAICEP), the narrator 
explains: 
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Sometimes called the Crutzen project after the scientist who first 
suggested the idea in 2006, projects like this engendered heated 
public opposition when first proposed in the early twenty-first 
century but had widespread support by mid-century—from wealthy 
nations anxious to preserve some semblance of order, from poor 
nations desperate to see the world do something to address their 
plight, and from frantic low-lying Pacific Island nations at risk of 
being submerged by rising sea levels (Oreskes and Conway 2014, 
27). 
 
As with other texts in the genre, Collapse fictionalizes a serious 
potentiality: decisions to implement climate engineering might be made 
under less than ideal conditions, if not duress.  In contrast with other cli-fi 
narratives, Collapse relies solely on real-world science to showcase the 
risks of climate engineering.  Following the cessation of IAICEP in 2063 at 
the request of India due to a disruption of the monsoon cycle, the narrator 
recounts a litany of horrific impacts brought about by a dramatic and swift 
increase in global temperatures (IPCC 2013).  As previously noted, 
termination effect, or termination shock as it is sometimes called, reveals 
the most pressing concern underlying climate engineering: commitment 
(Jones et al. 2013).  What measures can and must be taken to ensure that 
termination shock will be avoided?  Could geoengineering act as a unifier 
to coalesce divergent actants?  Will geoengineering, and specifically SRM, 
deployment necessitate substantive changes to our contemporary political 
order?   
 In illuminating the ethico-political provocations of centralization, 
corporatization, and commitment, cli-fi speaks to how we might live (and 
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die) in worlds ravaged by immense climatic change.  Although the genre's 
increasing popularity signifies a perceptual awareness of what might lie 
ahead, actualizing alternative futures remains the quintessential challenge 
of life in the Anthropocene.  Encapsulating the problem succinctly, 
Scranton observes, "[…] Civilizations have throughout history marched 
blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that 
tomorrow will be much like today—it is unnatural for us to think that this 
way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and 
permanent" (2013).  Sounding an awful lot like a futurist, Scranton's 
impassioned plea resonates with Toffler's call to overcome "presentism" 
(1990), Dator's "crackpot realism of the present" (2009), and the "tyranny 
of the present."49  Clearly, such an undertaking is easier said than done, 
although cli-fi certainly aids in imagining ethico-political provocations 
toward alternative possibilities.  What might be done to thwart genuine 
civilizational collapse, however, remains beyond the purview of cli-fi as a 
genre, although it is always the case that life endures.  Truth, as the 
saying goes, is often far stranger than fiction, especially if geoengineering 
enthusiasts have anything to say about it. 
Conclusion: A l i tany of imaginaries 
 I began this chapter by exploring the history of the Anthropocene, 
																																																								
49 While this aphorism has grown in popularity over the years, it was Cicero, the Roman 
politician, poet, and orator, who first used this turn of phrase: “The purpose of education 
is to free the student from the tyranny of the present” (Greene and Lidinsky 2012, 424). 
	 98 	
and its related concepts, as a means of complicating the imaginaries 
surrounding and underlying geoengineering.  I then mapped the two major 
climate engineering proposals—solar radiation management (SRM) and 
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)—as well as more boutique 
ideations, such as glacial geoengineering and marine cloud brightening, to 
identify the contours of geoengineered imaginaries.  As a means of 
emphasizing issues of scale, I then looked at the practice of cloud 
seeding, which is widely used but often not included as part of the primary 
geoengineering debate.  This opened up a space to explore a variety of 
geoengineered imaginaries, including those born from fictive sources.  I 
then used the genre of climate fiction to isolate three dominant themes 
within the geoengineering debate: centralization, corporatization, and 
commitment.  Returning to the concept of the Anthropocene, it became 
clear that imagining truly alternative futures is the most difficult but also 
most necessary act of our historical moment.  What might actually be done 
to thwart collapse, however, remains beyond the purview of cli-fi.  Indeed, 
the Anthropocene debate, scientific discourse and scenarios on SRM and 
CCS, and cli-fi constitute the litany of geoengineered imaginaries.  
Although this litany provides a point of entry for geoengineered 
imaginaries, few, if any, alternatives are suggested—indeed, if there is 
one thing that unites the aforementioned discourses, it is an air of 
inevitability.  
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 This leads, then, to the question: what can and might be done to 
enable alternative imaginaries?  Is futures as a discipline and practice 
equipped to confront such radical potentialities?  If it is not, then how might 
we change it?  In this regard, Scranton, who clearly has alliances with the 
fundamental premises of futures, is again instructive.  He reflects: 
We must practice suspending stress-semantic chains of social 
excitation through critical thought, contemplation, philosophical 
debate, and posing impertinent questions. […] We must keep 
renovating and innovating perceptual, affective, and conceptual 
fields through recombination, remixing, translation, transformation, 
and play (Scranton 2015, 138). 
 
That Scranton never invokes futures directly has perhaps more to do with 
academic training than intellectual sympathies, which come to the fore in 
his writing.  Whatever one chooses to call the pull of the now, Scranton's 
point is quite clear: normal is the problem. 
 As a means of working toward a play-driven approach for 
enlivening a politics for geoengineering, I use the next chapter to engage 
with postnormal times (PNT) to flesh out how futures studies has both 
succeeded and failed to engender the type of thinking and action needed 
to navigate the uncertainties surrounding geoengineered imaginaries and 
futures.   							
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Chapter 3: Postnormal Futures 	
From global warming to global weirding 	
 Computer modeling of the global climate system has improved 
greatly over the past few decades, but the map, as the saying goes, is 
never the territory.  The creation of various forecasts and models is the 
result of a expansive “climate knowledge infrastructure” that was built 
upon centuries of development within theoretical meteorology, dramatic 
advancements in computing, and the formation of standards for recording 
and reporting climatic phenomena (Edwards 2010).  This assemblage is 
embodied, quite literally, in the IPCC, which is a global network of 
scientists co-created by the World Meteorological Organization and the 
United Nations.  The IPCC’s creates a series of reports that outline new 
understandings of the historic conditions, current data and trends, and 
forecasts for the future of the global climate system, including scenarios.  
These scenarios are almost exclusively quantitative and only rarely 
provide substantive explication.  In the past, the IPCC has been accused 
of being “too conservative” as perceived and recorded changes have 
outpaced its forecasts (Scherer 2012).  Consequently, when IPCC 
scenarios gesture toward radical potentialities, it is worth noting, especially 
when such findings are rated “very high confidence.”  In the IPCC’s 2007 
report on coastal systems and low-lying regions, one scenario states that 
an increase in both the frequency and magnitude of extreme weather 
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could, and very likely will, severely impact the projected “1.8 to 5.2 billion” 
people living predominantly in East Asia and Africa “by the 2080s” 
(Nicholls et. al 2007, 317).  Should such a potentiality come to pass, it 
would not be an understatement to say that things, broadly speaking, 
would get…weird.  
 When one considers the complex dynamics and radical 
potentialities of global warming, it has been suggested that global weirding 
is perhaps a more fitting, if not striking, moniker for what is happening and 
what might lie ahead.  In order to account for the actual and perceptual 
impacts of climate change, Hunter Lovins, who co-founded the Rocky 
Mountain Institute, coined the term, which has subsequently popularized 
by Thomas Friedman, the impetuous New York Times reporter (Friedman 
2007).  Citing his preference for Lovins' neologism, Friedman explains, “I 
prefer the term 'global weirding,' because that is what actually happens as 
global temperatures rise and the climate changes.  The weather gets 
weird.  The hots are expected to get hotter, the wets wetter, the dries drier 
and the most violent storms more numerous” (Friedman 2010).  While 
Friedman is often, and rightly, chided for mixing metaphors and supporting 
imperial ambitions, Lovins's concept is useful for exploring the dynamics of 
actual and perceptual change relative to global warming, although global 
weirding is not without its detractors (Fernández 2011). 
 As Joseph Romm, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American 
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Progress, argues, global weirding “simply isn't a serious enough term—it 
could just as easily be used to describe the world's growing fascination 
with reality TV (or videos of piano-playing cats or skateboarding dogs)” 
(Romm 2007).  Given the absurdities that have come to define U.S. 
politics, perhaps Romm might wish to reconsider.  Global weirding seems 
perfectly suited as an imaginary for our current trajectory, and a high-
profile climate scientist has turned to the concept as a means of engaging 
the public.  In 2015, Dr. Katherine Hayhoe, an atmospheric scientist at 
Texas Tech University where she also directs the Climate Science Center, 
co-created a webseries on YouTube, Global Weirding: Climate, Politics, 
and Religion, with PBS Digital Studios.  In the second episode, “Welcome 
to Global Weirding,” Hayhoe lays out a case for believing in climate 
change, which gives a sense as to her intended audience, although she 
never provides a clear definition or justification for her employment of the 
concept.  This omission highlights the most impactful aspects of global 
weirding—it is decidedly nebulous, strikingly intuitive, and, yet, 
necessitates contextual explication.  
 As more than just a play on words, global weirding is both a 
diagnosis and prognosis—a concept at the interstices of the perceptual 
(ignorance still abounds amongst climate change deniers) and actual 
(uncertainty about what can and might happen and what the worst could 
be).  There is no grandiose truth claim at the heart of global weirding just 
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as there is no totalistic framework or metrics for constituting what passes 
for weird—such an idea can only be understood within a particular context.  
As a concept intertwined with both actual and perceptual changes, global 
weirding speaks to an evolving assemblage that, in Deleuzian terms, 
requires "being attentive to the unknown knocking at the door" (Deleuze 
and Lapoujade 2007, 346).  The inherent uncertainties and ignorance that 
underlie global weirding are vast, but three stand out in relation to 
geoengineered imaginaries: (1) increasing technological advancement, 
dependence, and ubiquity, (2) impending climatic crises accelerated by an 
overall lack of foresight, and (3) the transnational drive and reach of 
enthusiasts, such as George.  As a concept distinguished from global 
warming, global weirding speaks directly to the concept of postnormal 
times—indeed, it points toward the value of the postnormal as a heuristic 
for contesting and confronting norms, which is essential to futures as a 
practice.  
 In this chapter, I situate postnormal times (PNT) as a movement 
within futures that furthers and expands dissent (Nandy 1996; Sardar 
1999a).  In the next section, I define futures as “infinite game” whereby a 
continuous possibility-space is held to intentionally and consciously 
pluralize the future, which relies on practices and approaches that expand 
dissent. 
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Futures: playing a different game 	
 There have been many attempts to define futures studies, which 
has been couched as an interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, 
transdisciplinary, and even un-disciplinary field of inquiry (Bell 1996; Bell 
2003; Inayatullah 2003; Moll 2005; Sardar 2006; Sardar 2010a; Sardar 
2015b; Gidley 2017).  Unsurprisingly, it was Sardar who invoked the 
notion of futures as un-disciplinary, which he contends has to do with how 
it “consciously rejects the status and state of a discipline while being a fully 
fledged systematic mode of critical inquiry” (Sardar 2010a, 183).  As a 
practice, futures is actualized by a spectrum of researchers and 
practitioners, which is to say that it has both struggled with and benefitted 
from its relative proximity to mainstream academic disciplines, which 
varies widely according to context50 (Slaughter 1998; Selin 2014).  Such 
“disciplinary” challenges are due, at least in part, to the imbroglio at the 
very core of futures: its object of study remains perpetually out of reach (in 
the literal sense) and continuously actualized in the here and now (in the 
perceptual sense).  For futures to operate effectively amidst and 																																																								
50 Arguably, futures has had much greater success integrating with other academic 
disciplines and mainstreaming itself within higher education in Australia, Finland, Korea, 
Taiwan, and across parts of Western Europe, although “futures” in each of these localities 
reflects the personalities and professional allegiances of the teachers, practitioners, and 
researchers within each “habitus.” In recent years, “futures” has become widely used 
across critical theory, philosophy, political theory, and other disciplines as a sort of 
placeholder for thinking about multiple possibilities and potentialities, although much, if 
not most, of these approaches are completely divorced from and seemingly oblivious to 
futures studies.  This is unfortunate as a great deal of the futures literature focuses on 
practice, specifically what does and does not work in a range of contexts with a diverse 
array of participants.  
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perpetuate this tension, it must presence objections to the customary, 
normal, and projected—in short, futures aims to contest imaginaries in part 
by deepening, as well as expanding, our sense of self and world.   
As Inayatullah contends, “Futures methods […] decolonize the 
world we think we may want – they challenge our basic concepts.  They 
deconstruct […] as the safety of having others make decisions for one is 
taken away” (Inayatullah 2008, 6).51  As Inayatullah proposes, this 
deconstruction is ingrained within a variety of futures methods and 
approaches, which serve as analytical and exploratory tools aimed at 
exploring and complicating our collective possibility-space.  In staging 
provocations toward challenging normative constructs, futures enacts a 
distinctly political, if not dangerous, game.52  As encapsulated brilliantly by 
Nandy, futures is thus best understood as “a game of dissenting visions” 
(1996, 637).  Positing that futures necessitates “dissent from the existing 
ideas of normality, sanity and objectivity,” Nandy emphasizes an 
otherness toward predominant imaginaries—a form of resistance not 
predicated on opposition toward a particular future but rather “the” future 
as singular (1996, 637).  As long as possibility endures, Nandy’s game, as 																																																								
51 Dator appears to have introduced the metaphor of de-colonizing the future (1975).  
“Decolonization” as a metaphor has been problematized as it merely gestures toward 
actually processes and practices of liberation from colonial and settler forces and 
mechanisms. Within the context of futures, Tuck and Yang argue that this phrasing 
“makes possible a set of evasions, or ‘settler moves to innocence’, that problematically 
attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity” (Tuck and 
Yang 2012, 1).  Given this critique, I have ceased using this turn of phrase.  
52 It was Alfred North Whitehead who famously quipped, “It is the business of the future to 
be dangerous” (1997, 207).   
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with the future(s) itself, continues to unfold, and in maintaining a 
possibility-space in perpetuity, futures plays “the” infinite game par 
excellence.53  As Carse explains, "the purpose of [an infinite] game is to 
keep it from coming to an end, to keep everyone in play" (Carse 1986, 6-
7).  This points to why the "s" in futures is of the utmost importance—it 
signifies an insistence on continuous possibility.54  Pairing Nandy and 
Carse, futures continuously plays in and with spaces of possibility by 
continuously unframing the singular future, which continues to be a 
prevalent imaginary and haunt futures as a practice.55  Offering a thorough 
indictment of how futures continues to be dominated by Euro-American 
																																																								
53 As a theoretical and methodological bearing, this project uses Nandy’s game as both 
metaphor and tactic, and others have taken note of this resonance as well.  As Park 
observes, futures is "an infinite game for it is an ongoing process" (Park 2013).   
54 Andersson’s relays a fascinating history of how tensions over futures (with the s) came 
to the fore during the formation of the World Futures Studies Federation at the Third 
World Future Research Congress in 1972.  At this meeting, Andersson suggests that it 
was the event’s Romanian hosts who pushed back against using the “s,” which was due 
in no small part to the official future enshrined within “party doctrine” (Andersson 2011, 
1428).  As Dator, who was present at the meeting, recounts: “The participants were an 
impressively diverse group of futurists from Eastern and Western Europe, the US, and 
Asia. But the people we knew as futurists in the USSR were somehow not in attendance. 
Instead, sitting in silence in the corner, smoking endlessly and in general acting as 
though he were ‘The Communist From Hollywood’s Central Casting,’ was someone from 
the Soviet Union. He spoke not a word during our meetings. But on the last day of the 
Conference, when the draft WFSF constitution was being presented to the participants in 
a plenary session, the Communist From Central Casting jumped to his feet, raced down 
the parquet-squeaking floor, mounted the stage and (without actually taking his shoes off) 
did his best imitation of Khrushchev Haranguing the Capitalists: ‘Why do you call this 
organization the ‘World Futures Studies Federation?’ It is Future, not FutureS. There is 
only one future: Ours. There are no alternative futures! You must erase the ‘S’ from World 
Futures Studies Federation and make it properly the World Future Studies Federation, or 
no socialist country will become a member’” (Dator 2005, 373).  Although the “S” became 
enshrined a short time later, the contentious history of pluralizing futures points toward 
the primary role of dissent in how the field and its practitioners position what it is that they 
do and how it is that they do it.  
55 Sardar argues that Western-born forces, namely neoliberal capitalism, project a 
singular future—one in which it endures ad infinitum. 
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sensibilities, Sardar argues, “The future […] is already an occupied 
territory whose liberation is the most pressing challenge for the peoples of 
the non-West if they are to inherit a future made in their own likeness” 
(Sardar 1999b, 9).56  Given this tension, it has been suggested that futures 
should (and perhaps can) not achieve “house-broken respectability” 
(Nandy 1996, 639).  By dissecting, contesting, and enlivening alternative 
imaginaries, futures is as much, if not more so, an enterprise centered on 
perceptual versus actual change, although the latter often garners more of 
the limelight. 
Offering a concise formula as to how this game is actualized, 
Sardar reflects,  "In so far as theory and research in futures studies is 
about ‘unthinkable thoughts’, about new departures and new destinations, 
it is about dissent" (Sardar 1999a, 139).57  For Sardar, the unthinkable is 
not merely that which is taboo but precisely that which is beyond 
imagining, which points toward the necessity of unframing, which is both 																																																								
56 Given the dynamics surrounding the Planktos incident, the deconstruction of 
geoengineered imaginaries and their subsequent futures is paramount. While the broader 
futures space continues to reflect, if not reverberate, a variety of forms of privilege, 
indigenous scholars and practitioners have been and continue to enliven truly decolonial 
futures.  In response to the many and varied challenges of climate change, indigenous 
futurists have collaborated to put forward futures that “are mutually beneficial and not 
rooted in racism or competition for dwindling resources” (Goodyear-Kaʻōpua et al.). 
Within the context of geoengineering, Whyte argues that prospective governance for 
solar radiation management (SRM) must “articulate Indigenous peoples as sovereign 
peoples in relation to NGOs, private companies, scientific advisory committees, 
supranational organizations, as well as federal or state agencies of nation states (2012b, 
184). 
57 This passage comes from an Editorial written by Sardar that prefaces a special issue of 
Futures on dissent.  Covering a wide range of geographies and imaginaries, this issue 
features research articles and essays that support the critical role of dissent within the 
practice of futures.  
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an art and science.  Articulating the contours of this hybridity, Sardar 
explains:  
In as far as futures studies involves systematic and disciplined, 
empirical and rational exploration of future possibilities, futures 
studies is a science.  But experimentation is not a possibility in 
futures studies; so, in that sense, futures studies is not a science.  
In as far as future studies involves foresight, prospective analysis, 
creation of visions and images, future studies is an art.  It is the art 
of anticipation based on the science of exploration (Sardar and 
Masood 2006, 63-64). 
 
It is worth pushing back on Sardar’s contention about the impossibility of 
experimentation.58  If one highlights the recalcitrant temporality of the 
future (as a time and place that has yet to come), then such an 
assessment goes without saying.  If, however, one takes seriously the 
premise that futures is also very much concerned with perceptual 
change—how the world in its past, present, and future(s) states has been 
and continues to be imagined—then things become much more 
complex.59 
Sardar actually gestures toward experimentation by invoking the 
infinite game metaphor.  Making an explicit connection between futures 																																																								
58 It is worth recalling Dator’s point about the function of games within and across the 
social sciences.  
59 Clearly, Sardar knows this.  Indeed, he writes elsewhere: “All futures activities, from 
forecasts to visioning, causal layered analysis to the Millennium Project, have a direct 
impact on the present: they can change peoples’ perceptions, make them aware of 
dangers and opportunities ahead, motivate them to do specific things, force them to 
invent or innovate, encourage them to change and adjust, galvanise them into collective 
social action, paralyse them with fear, empower them, marginalise them, or tell them they 
and their cultures and belief systems are important or unimportant. So ultimately what 
really matters is the impact futures studies has now; and its value and quality can only be 
judged in the present” (2010a, 184). 
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and Carse’s formulation, Sardar argues, “In infinite games there are no set 
rules; if there are any, their transgression is encouraged. […] The plurality 
of futures can only be ensured by plurality of dissent […] (Sardar 1999a, 
146).  Dissent not only comes to the fore through a continuous possibility-
space; it is dissent that makes such a space possible.60  While this dissent 
cannot be a-political, it is not inherently tied to any ideology—rather, it is 
centered on unframing.  As Inayatullah argues, dissent in futures is about 
“unofficial knowledge, as truth outside the margins, as truth that cannot be 
easily comprehended within the gaze of modernity (Inayatullah 1998b, 58).  
In unframing modernity, which continues to be a predominant imaginary, 
futures and dissent are symbiotic—and, depending on the context, one 
may serve as the host for the other.  Sardar observes that dissent has 
become postnormal, which is to say that it is now subject to the forces of 
complexity, chaos, and contradictions (2010a).  Championing a 
postnormal outlook on all things, Sardar contends, “Everything from 
economics to international relations, markets to products in local shops, 
politics to dissent has become postnormal” (2010a, 436).  Sardar’s 
bombastic claims about PNT are certainly designed to raise eyebrows, 
and even he would admit that not everything has become postnormal—
indeed, it is precisely the tension between normal systems and processes 
																																																								
60 Presencing critical futures studies, Slaughter observes that dissent is “one of the 
responsibilities of a futurist,” although he also notes how such a perspectivism might be 
difficult for practitioners seeking financial stability and disciplinary collegiality (1999, 150).   
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and postnormal dynamics.  
As with other frameworks, PNT requires contextualization and 
qualification.  In the introduction, I invoked Kapoor’s observation that PNT 
conceals a certain Euro-American bias—one that reflects a dis-ease with 
its loss of power and privilege.  This critique raises questions about the 
scope and scale of PNT, and it is worth considering how (and why) PNT 
does (and does not) situate itself amongst theories of social change.  
Although Sardar invokes both Khaldun and Toynbee, who theorized the 
rise and fall of civilizations, they are treated as foibles.61  In Sardar’s 2010 
work, there is no substantive engagement with macrohistory, which 
studies social systems as a means to identify patterns, laws, and the 
constitutive dynamics of social change (Galtung and Inayatullah 1997; 
Inayatullah 2017).  In a special issue of Futures dedicated to critiquing 
PNT, Gary writes, “Sardar is in good company with macrohistorians who 
identify transitions by naming eras” (Gary 2011, 148).  Given Sardar’s 
emphasis on the necessity of looking back to learn from the past as part of 
a larger process for imaginings the future(s), his lack of engagement with 
this school of thought is quite curious.  In his 2015 “PNT revisited” article—																																																								
61 Without citing specific arguments or passages of their writings, Sardar does argue that 
both Khaldun and Toynbee fail to account for the ways with which orthodoxy re-emerges 
after times of change.  Again using the 2008 financial crisis as his point of reference, 
Sardar agues, “Notice how quickly the financial markets have returned to bad old ways: 
the recession is nearly over, green shoots are appearing in many locations, and, we are 
told, we can return to business as usual, shaken but unstirred” (Sardar 2010, 444). 
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one in which he responds to Kapoor and Gary—he, again, fails to engage 
with macrohistorical perspectives.  This is unfortunate as macrohistorical 
thinkers, such as Sorokin, would enhance PNT’s reach and could help to 
position it as a fully-fledged theory of social change rather than a disparate 
collection of concepts, which is how it comes across at present.62  
Although PNT is not a fully developed theoretical framework, I do 
find value in its framings, or rather unframings, of certain aspects of key 
futures concepts and practices.  Realizing the limits of PNT as a 
theoretical construct, I want to situate it within the context of two futures 
meta-frameworks: Inayatullah’s Six Pillars (2008) and the Association of 
Professional Futurist’s Foresight Competency Model (2016).  These two 
approaches were selected as they signify attempts to develop 
comprehensive and theory-driven frameworks that emphasize practice.   
Internal, External, and Ethical 	
 Offering “a new approach to the study of the future,” Inayatullah’s 
Six Pillars (6P) offers a comprehensive and critical pathway for enlivening 
agency toward creating “the world we wish to live in” (Inayatullah 2008).  
As an assemblage of foundational concepts, 6P presences the used 
future; the disowned future; alternative futures; alignment with strategy; 																																																								
62 Given my former proximity to PNT, I can attest to its nascent state.  Sardar and I 
actually suggest that its development is ongoing in a co-authored paper that introduces 
the Three Tomorrows method (2016).  Sorokin is especially interesting in relation to PNT 
as he discusses systems in “abnormal” states and emphasizes the inevitability of chaotic 
collapse at societal scales, which results from fluctuations of various systems, processes, 
and phenomena (Simpson 1953; Isajiw 1956; Inayatullah 2017).   
	 112 	
models of social change; and uses of the future.  Interestingly, Inayatullah 
introduces the idea of a “seventh concept” that is meant make one 
“present to changing sensitive conditions, allowing futures to emerge” 
(Inayatullah 2008, 6).  These concepts are synthesized into six basic 
futures questions: 
1. What do you think the future will be like? What is your prediction? 
More and more progress and wealth? Wealth for the view? A 
dramatic technological revolution? Environmental catastrophe? 
Why?   
2. Which future are you afraid of? Random acts of violence? Do you 
think you can transform this future to a desired future? Why or why 
not?   
3. What are the hidden assumptions of your predicted future? Are 
there some taken-for-granted assumptions (about gender, or nature 
or technology or culture, or . . .)?   
4. What are some alternatives to your predicted or feared future? If 
you change some of your assumptions, what alternatives emerge?   
5. What is your preferred future? Which future do you wish to 
become reality for yourself or your organization?   
6. And finally, how might you get there? What steps can you take to 
move in toward your preferred future? As it says in ancient Buddhist 
texts, much of the solution to the challenge of life is simply in being 
pointed in the right direction (Inayatullah 2008, 7). 
 
With the concepts as a theoretical foundation, and using the six questions 
as “one way to create the future you may desire,” the 6P unfolds as a 
series of activities/practices: mapping, anticipating, timing, deepening, 
creating alternatives, and transforming (2008, 6).  Inayatullah notes that 
this framework can be used as “theory or in a futures workshop setting” 
(2008, 7).  Enacting this meta-framework can be done using a range of 
tools and methods, and Inayatullah invokes shared history, the futures 
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triangle, the futures landscape, emerging issues analysis, the futures 
wheel, CLA, four-quadrant mapping, “nuts and bolts,” various scenario 
methods, visioning, backcasting, and Galtung’s transcend method.  
Providing examples and even figures to situate how these methods 
operate within the context of a particular pillar, Inayatullah showcases the 
importance of practice within the field.  Indeed, 6P is fundamentally “a 
theory of futures thinking that is linked to methods and tools, and 
developed through praxis” (Inayatullah 2007, 7). 
While the aforementioned methods are introduced as operative, there 
is no discussion of their limits, constraints, and/or their efficacy in relation 
to specific topics and/or amongst various audiences.63  In explicating how 
one might choose to facilitate creating alternatives, Inayatullah contends, 
“Scenarios are the tool par excellence of futures studies.  They open up 
the present, contour the range of uncertainty, offer alternatives, and even, 
better predict” (2008, 15).  Why scenarios as predictions would be better is 
unclear, although it is sometimes the case that they are designed as 
forecasts.64  Given the emphasis on practice, it is curious that there is no 
specific mention of ethics, which is to say that it is not clear how this 
framework deals with the positionality and, if applicable, the privilege 																																																								
63 Take the example of scenarios created with the Australian Government Pharmaceutical 
Industry Alliance using Schwartz’s GBN approach. Given the extensive work of some 
futurists, including Schwartz, in the private sector, should they be held liable for helping 
certain organizations engineer futures that sustain a variety of environmental, economic, 
social, and political injustices? I am extremely thankful to Dr. Sohail Inayatullah for this 
critical insight.   
64 A more in-depth exploration of scenarios comes later in this chapter.  
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and/or power of the facilitator (Inayatullah 2008, 6).65  While Inayatullah’s 
earlier work (1998b) highlights the importance of dissent, there is no direct 
articulation of this concept within 6P, and this is perhaps due to this 
framework’s explicit focus on preferred futures, which necessitates a 
modicum of consensus to generate and subsequently act upon.   
One thing that stands out about 6P is its decidedly internal focus, and 
while emerging issues analysis (EIA) is mentioned in the anticipation 
phase, there is no formal reference to horizon and/or environmental 
scanning, which makes it unclear where one finds and/or accesses the 
emerging issues under analysis.  If used within a workshop space, how is 
external content introduced?  Inayatullah does argue that EIA “may merely 
be identifying new technologies that succumb to the hype cycle,” which 
necessitates a “deeper understanding” (Inayatullah 2017, 28).  Indeed, the 
six questions have a decidedly personal feel (What do you think the future 
will be like? Which future are you afraid of?), which is to say that they 
focus on the internal—one’s percepts about the future(s).  Given the 
centrality of using 6P to “help people recover their agency,” this emphasis 
makes sense (Inayatullah 2008, 4). 
Next, I offer a critical reading of the Association of Professional 
Futurist’s (APF) Foresight Competency Model, which presences a more 																																																								
65 Inayatullah does invoke the notion of a “no-concept,” which is meant to create an 
awareness of anything that “limits creativity” (2008, 6).  This suggests that one might 
want, or perhaps even need, to mutate, adapt, and/or shift methods, although this is not 
discussed. 
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outward focus (actual versus perceptual).  Mapping the distinctions 
between these two meta-frameworks helps to situate further my argument 
for the utility of postnormal heuristics, specifically with regards to ethics 
and expanding dissent.  The APF was created in 2002 to support the 
professional development of futurists by focusing on professional 
excellence.  In 2016, the APF released a Foresight Competency Model 
(FCM), which was constructed by a Professionalization Task Force 
charged with mapping practices, competencies, and central aspects of 
foresight.66  Situated into five tiers, the FCM outlines personal, academic, 
workplace, technical, and sectoral competencies.  Personal focuses on 
“soft skills” and has much to do with how one approaches foresight as a 
practice, and this tier includes a mention of abiding by a “professional 
code of ethics,” although no further detail is given and, ostensibly, this has 
to do with “how” one facilitates such processes and client interactions 
(APF 2016).  As my specific interest lies with how this framework situates 
the practice of futures, the remainder of my analysis will focus primarily on 
the technical tier.  
 Resonating with 6P, the FCM provides a six-step process for 
practicing foresight: framing, scanning, futuring, visioning, designing, and 
																																																								
66 Foresight is often used interchangeably with futures, and these terms are not always 
used synonymously. Sardar argues that foresight implies a singular outcome and remains 
“most commonly associated with business and bureaucracies” (2010a, 180). This usage 
reflects a clear bias within the organization, which continues to be dominated by 
members from Euro-American contexts.  
	 116 	
adapting.  As one might expect, framing centers on defining, scoping, and 
contextualizing one’s topic or area of focus.  It is here that worldview and 
assumptions are explored, and the APF positions this stage as diagnosing 
the audience/client.  In the scanning phase, one seeks, collects, and 
analyzes “signals of change,” which is tantamount to horizon scanning.  In 
the futuring tier, a “likely” scenario is used as a baseline for crafting 
“alternative futures or scenarios based on wildcards, ideas, systematically 
derived alternative projections and images built around key drivers and 
uncertainties, challenges, opportunities and aspirations” (APF 2016, 13).  
Given the aforementioned issues of using “wildcards” as a metaphor for 
emerging issues and the lack of specific methods and/or outcomes for this 
phase, this tier clearly needs further explication.  With that said, futuring is 
described as “letting go” and “suspending pre-conceived notions” in order 
to “see the future with fresh eyes” (APF 2016, 13).   
 In the visioning phase, one moves to craft a preferred future, which, 
from the APF’s view, centers on “goal-setting” and committing to a 
“strategic direction” (APF 2016, 13).  In the designing tier, the process 
focuses on making the future(s) tangible via prototypes and/or artifacts 
that make the vision and goals digestible and understandable.  Finally, this 
process concludes with adapting, which is centered not only on 
communicating but also on building appropriate systems and processes to 
monitor progress and, if needed, make adjustments to the vision.  As with 
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6P, the APF’s FCM provides a comprehensive meta-framework for 
practicing futurists, but the focus on external factors, which is made 
explicit in the prominence of the scanning phase, clearly separates the 
two.  That the APF makes mention of an audience/client is also worth 
noting, although there is no specific reference to priviliege or positionality.   
Although both 6P and FCM provide a thorough accounting for how 
one might construct and carry out a futures and/or foresight process, 
critical questions concerning practice, specifically surrounding ethics, 
endure.  Clearly, ethical considerations are meant to arise during various 
parts of both processes, and I do not claim that either approach is a-
ethical.  In sharp contrast from 6P and FCM, PNT commences from an 
explicit ethical position, but this is also what problematizes its claim as a 
fully-fledged “theory.”67  This is not to say that PNT is didactic, quite the 
contrary; Sardar continuously references “our” (futures, humanity, planet), 
which presumes commensality—one that might be wishful but remains a 
constant refrain pointing toward the need for communal processes and 
practices.  In support of this aim, Sardar calls for an “ethical imagination,” 
one that “acknowledges the uncertainty and risks we face and work 
through complexity and diversity cherishing the virtues we are most in 
																																																								
67 At the beginning of the next chapter, I invoke Latour’s distinction between matters of 
fact and matters of concern to highlight the limits of objective and fact-driven social 
science. Furthermore, this explicit ethical positionality is an intentional and conscious 
affront to the relativism of postmodern approaches and sensibilities.  
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need of: humility, modesty and accountability” (Sardar 2010b, 444).68  
Aligning with Jasanoff’s concept of “technologies of humility,” PNT holds a 
position of dissent not only in relation to “the” future but also within futures 
itself, and this is perhaps as much a product of Sardar’s critical 
comportment toward the broader futures field as it is his penchant for, and 
utter delight in, being iconoclastic.  In response to his critics and calling 
attention to PNT’s positionality within the field, Sardar reflects: 
On the whole, futurists have avoided big questions (normally seen 
as the subject of philosophy) and concentrated on analysing trends, 
horizon scanning, building global models and creating scenarios, 
visions, images of alternative futures […]. But in postnormal times, 
when what constitutes economic activity is being questioned, when 
the body is itself being reshaped, when social relations are being 
reconfigured, and the very idea of what it means to be human is 
being transformed, big questions cannot be ignored in futures work 
(Sardar 2015a, 36).69 
 
Geoengineering is certainly a big question—one that not only raises a 
range of ethico-political considerations but also necessitates an ethical 
unframing.  This, perhaps more than any other reason, is what spurred 
my interest in applying postnormal heuristics, which is limited to the 
Menagerie.  As with climate change, geoengineering lies at the 
interstices of actual and perceptual change, and contesting and 
																																																								
68 As part of the tier on workplace competencies, the APF notes the importance of 
creative thinking, specifically exhibiting the “capacity for imagination […],” but it makes no 
mention as to what end (APF 2016, 10). 
69 In specific relation to geoengineering, Sardar is right.  In the years following the 
release of the Royal Society’s landmark 2009 report, Few futurists (Cascio 2009; 
Deudney and Grove 2009; Brand 2010; Hines 2012) took heed of this emerging 
issue, although weather manipulation and control remained, and remains, a popular 
imaginary across the broader futures field.  
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critiquing geoengineered imaginaries requires internal, external, and 
ethical positionalities.  In using postnormal heuristics as one of my 
theoretical frames, this project commences from an ethical position—
one born from a deep-seated dissatisfaction with our collective 
trajectory and the imaginaries working to obfuscate and diminish a 
plurality of dissent.70  As a further means of contextualizing and 
situating my usage of PNT, I work through the concepts of uncertainty 
and ignorance, which serve as the forces that shape how futures are 
envisaged and envisioned. 
Uncertainty and Ignorance 	
 For four years, I had a hands-on role in shaping the evolution of 
PNT and its corresponding method, The Three Tomorrows (3T).  Most, if 
not all, of PNT is explained through examples, which has much to do with 
Sardar’s influence upon CPPFS, its clients, and outputs.  One of my 
earliest engagements with CPPFS was a somewhat impromptu trip to 
Chicago in May 2013 where Sardar and I began reimagining the futures 
cone, which graphically renders archetypal futures—or more accurately, 
maps futures imaginaries.  While there have been many versions of the 
cone, Voros provides one of, if not, the most thoughtful and complete 
frameworks, as seen in Figure 1 below (2017).  
																																																								
70 I have always liked the 2004 title of the Howard Zinn documentary: “You can’t be 
neutral on a moving train.”  I have found the same to be true about objectivity on planets 
undergoing dramatic climate change.   
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Figure 1: Voros's futures cone 
Building on the “standard” cone, which typically includes projected, 
plausible, probable, and possible, and preferable futures, Voros adds in 
the preposterous, which, given the dynamics of PNT, is quite apt.71  Noting 
the necessity of its inclusion, Voros introduces the concept of the "Dator-
Clarke Discontinuity," which emphasizes the importance of identifying and 
articulating "ridiculous" and "impossible" potentialities (Voros 2017).  In 
moving someone to explore beyond the possible, Voros illuminates the 
importance of thinking the unthought—hallmarks of Arthur C. Clarke and 
Jim Dator's collective oeuvre.  In moving one to think beyond the 																																																								
71 Voros offers a brief history of the cone and specifically mentions the contributions of 
Amara 1974; Hancock and Bezold 1994; Henchey 1978; and Taylor 1990. Although he 
adds preposterous, he does not include preventable, which is sometimes included in 
listing categories (Tiberius 2011; Bell 2017b).  
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everyday, Voros makes an explicit link between perceptual and actual 
change.  He explains, each category (projected, probable, etc.) signifies 
“subjective judgments about ideas about the future that are based in the 
present moment” (Voros 2017).  According to Voros, it is only within the 
“projected” future that the past makes itself felt, although he does note that 
once something becomes possible—the Apollo moon landing is the 
example used—then migration across categories (i.e. from preposterous 
to plausible) is inevitable.  The normalization of formerly preposterous 
things and events is something that both Sardar and I found quite 
compelling, and perhaps this is the greatest contribution of Voros's cone.  
When Sardar and I began to conceptualize a new futures cone as part of 
crafting a futures method, we felt an overall lack of attentiveness toward 
the “fuzzy” spaces where normalization occurs.  Although it was perhaps 
never the remit of the futures cone to account for this dynamic, we 
believed that this process is essential to making sense of how future(s) 
imaginaries are created, critiqued, and communicated.  What is it exactly 
that happens inside our thinking bodies when we imagine possibilities for 
the future? 
 Clearly, the past plays a significant role in how we understand the 
present and imagine the future(s).  Only Taylor’s cone takes into 
consideration the full weight and plasticity of the past, which is critical as 
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memory literally shapes our ability to imagine what might lay ahead.72  As 
Schacter et al. postulate, the parts of our brain associated with episodic 
memory is “crucially involved in our ability to imagine non-existent events 
and simulate future happenings” (Schacter et al. 2007, 657).  If such a 
process is a feature rather than a bug of perception/cognition, then any 
and all futures cones ought to start with the past(s) and present(s)—used 
in the singular/plural to denote the individual/contextual means by which 
we sense and subsequently imagine.  Here, one can draw a clear 
resonance with Bergson’s notion that our grounding in the present comes 
from one foot in the past and another in the future (Bergson et al. 2011).  
 In our cone, contested histories, novel archaeologies, and/or minor 
narratives are always-already prescenced through the concept of the 
"manufactured normalcy field" (MNF) (Rao 2012).  In situating both the 
past and present as the starting point of cognition/imagining, we highlight 
how imaginaries normalize and, by extension, frame our capacity to 
envision futures, which are further conditioned by uncertainty (clarity or 
lack thereof about what is and can be known) and ignorance (the 
universality of imperfect knowledge).  As Rao explains, "There is an 
unexplained cognitive dissonance between changing-reality-as-
																																																								
72 Dr. Jake Dunagan’s unpublished dissertation contains a rich array of resources on 
neurofutures, which complicates the technologies and processes used to analyze our 
thinking bodies, cognition, and the complex processes by which we imagine past, 
present, and futures (2011). It was through his work and via personal correspondence 
with Dr. Dunagan that I first encountered research in this area. 
	 123 	
experienced and change as imagined, and I don’t mean specifics of failed 
and successful predictions" (Rao 2012).   
 Rao's seemingly obvious insight is quite compelling and operates 
as a sort of anti-future shock.  Even our sense as to what might be 
possible, however fantastical, is mediated by what we can conceive, 
which, in some way, is affected by our MNF.  Acting as a sort of 
membrane—an imaginary sustaining, making, and crafting assemblage—
the MNF is the primary means by which past and present shape our sense 
of what is projected, plausible, probable, possible, preferable, and 
preposterous.  Agreeing that the MNF was a sensible, if not the only 
honest, point of origin for our cone, we sought to represent both 
uncertainty and ignorance, which emerge from the MNF but also constrain 
it, as the main forces that shape our capacity to imagine the future(s).  
Figure 2 (below) renders this by demonstrating the conditioned 
perspective from which alternative futures can be imagined.   
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Figure 2: CPPFS basic cone 	
 In PNT, exploring futures is further complicated by the diffuse 
affects of complexity, chaos, and contradictions, which engenders a 
feeling that we live in a “time without the confidence that we can return to 
any past we have known and with no confidence in any path to a 
desirable, attainable or sustainable future” (Sardar 2010b, 435).  In the 
wake of such ambiguity, it should come as no surprise that nostalgia and 
xenophobia have come to define electoral politics in a range of contexts—
certainty at all costs, as it were.  Compounded by the “crackpot realism” 
and (in many cases literal) “tyranny” of the present, predominant 
imaginaries (particularly growth-based imaginaries) forge a keyhole from 
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which to envisage possibilities for what might lie ahead (Dator 2006).  
Hence, the many and varied challenges of utilizing pre-made scenarios, 
particularly if they are not part of a broader process of learning and, 
perhaps most importantly, intentionally combating the constraints of 
uncertainty and ignorance.  How might such a process unfold?  In his 
2010 provocation, Sardar provides only a trajectory.  He explains:  
The kind of futures we imagine beyond postnormal times would 
depend on the quality of our imagination.  Given that our 
imagination is embedded and limited to our own culture, we will 
have to unleash a broad spectrum of imaginations from the rich 
diversity of human cultures and multiple ways of imagining 
alternatives to conventional, orthodox ways of being and doing 
(Sardar 2010b, 443).   
 
How might “a broad spectrum of imaginations” explore futures critically 
and collaboratively?  Are there means by which to enhance the quality of 
our (ethical) imagination?  In responding to the above queries, I turn to 
look at scenarios, which are undoubtedly the futures field’s most widely 
used method for imagining alternatives. 
Told you so 	
 In Inevitable Surprises, Peter Schwartz, who co-founded the Global 
Business Network, recounts his participation leading the scenarios team 
on the Hart-Rudman Commission, which was tasked with forging a new 
national security strategy for the United States at the dawn of the new 
millennium.  A few months after President George W. Bush's inauguration, 
the Commission released its report, which identified terrorism as the 
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greatest threat facing the country.  Schwartz recounts, "In one scenario we 
anticipated terrorists destroying the World Trade Center by crashing 
airliners into it.  Our most urgent recommendation was that the U.S. 
needed new levels of capability in homeland defense" (Schwartz 2001, 4).  
To some, such an admission represents the veritable holy grail of 
foresight, and while having the occasion to say "I told you so" is perhaps 
the secret delight of many within the broader futures space, the most 
telling, and important, aspect of Schwartz's anecdote comes in the next 
paragraph.73  He explains, "The Commission’s work, and other similar 
efforts by various critical agencies, did not prevent the attacks, but they did 
contribute to the decisive speed and competence with which the U.S. 
responded, especially in the first few months" (Schwartz 2001, 4).  
Schwartz’s story highlights what scenarios can (and cannot) do and, 
perhaps most importantly, how they can be used (and abused).74   
 As the mainstay, if not defining, practice of futures, I employ 
“scenarios” herein as an umbrella term to encompass tools and methods 
related to practices of modeling, analysis, and planning (Bishop et al. 
2007; Chermack 2004; Masini and Vasquez 2000; Van der Heijden 1996).  
																																																								
73 Futures and foresight are not synonymous terms, and my invocation of the latter above 
is intentional. As a practitioner working predominantly with humanitarian and 
development agencies and organizations, I found foresight to have a wider currency 
across a range of contexts, which perhaps speaks to the dearth of academically trained 
futurists working within this space.  
74 This anecdote also raises a critical question about the ethics of futures and its 
practitioners, and I return to this question when looking at Shell’s longstanding scenario 
practice. 
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As noted in the Millennium Project’s research methodology guide, 
scenario is “[…] probably the most abused term in futures […]” (Glenn et 
al. 2009, 2).  Chermack argues that this is due to a deficit of theory, 
although his analysis centers more on practices and approaches from 
business and management spheres rather than futures studies (2004b).  
How and why are scenarios used (and abused)?  Can scenarios deliver on 
the larger mandate of futures as envisioned by Nandy?   
 There are few organizations more closely associated with scenarios 
than Royal Dutch Shell.  As part of an in-depth review of how scenarios 
(did and did not) work at the multinational oil giant, Wilkinson and Kupers, 
who both spent time inside the organization, provide a critical point of 
entry for thinking through the functionality of scenarios.  While the book 
winds its way through the decades-long history behind Shell’s scenarios 
practice, there is a rather telling passage toward the end of the text.  They 
reflect, “There are no solid examples of Shell anticipating future 
developments better than other companies, notwithstanding the mythology 
around the anticipation of the oil crisis in the 1970s—but there are plenty 
of anecdotes of Shell catching on quickly to changes in market or in 
culture” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2014).  Aligning with Schwartz’s sentiment, 
this intimation captures how scenarios work in a variety of contexts—as 
part of a broader organizational learning paradigm and, perhaps most 
importantly, as a means for contesting dominant imaginaries, which 
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always and only occurs within a particular context.75 
 As a product, scenarios are often targeted at leaders, and Shell is 
notorious for generating “plausible” scenarios for its leadership team.  
Pierre Wack, who led the scenarios team from 1971-1981, is credited with 
creating this emphasis, as well as being the catalyst that drove further 
adoption of scenarios across the private sector (Chermack 2017).  
Emphasizing the actual/perceptual divide inherent to Shell’s approach, he 
argues, "Scenarios deal with two worlds.  The world of facts and the world 
of perceptions.  They explore for facts but they aim at perceptions inside 
the heads of decision makers" (Wack 1985).  Echoing Wack, Wilkinson 
and Kupers contend that scenarios have much more to do with the 
present, specifically “drawing attention to the role of the future in shaping 
current priorities and facing immediate challenges” (Wilkinson and Kupers 
2014).  If scenarios have just as much to do with the present as with the 
future, is plausibility an appropriate metric?  What assumptions underlie 
the need for plausibility?  How do scenarios confront and contest 
imaginaries? 
 As a process, some believe that scenarios must focus on 
“relevance, coherence, likelihood and transparency" (Godet and Roubelat 
1996, 169), but others envisage scenarios as “a kind of collectively 																																																								
75 Indeed, it is not at all clear that Shell’s scenarios, and the learning that they 
engendered, was fruitful for the many and varied spaces and place where oil and gas 
were (and continue to be) extracted—it is likely the case that the opposite it true.  Some 
futures have blood on them.  
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practiced existentialism" (Ogilvy 1996, 32).  Clearly, the latter suggest 
imaginaries are being questioned.  It is perhaps best to think of this 
spectrum in terms of the amount of future shock that an individual or 
organization can and might be willing to absorb, which has certainly been 
complicated by PNT (Toffler 1990).  Indeed, Ogilvy’s framing resonates 
with how some have responded to the meteoric rise of Trump, who might 
actually be the best argument for and living embodiment of PNT.  In a New 
York Times editorial that reads more as a confessional, Douthat opines, 
“But one of the vows I took after Trump's stunning political ascent was to 
refuse to be that surprised again, to refuse to simply laugh at scenarios 
that seem outlandish or unlikely—because, as they say, that kind of 
reflexive laughter is how you got Trump” (Douthat 2018).76  Clearly, it was 
much more than laughter that ushered in the aegis of Trump, but Douthat's 
point about the limits of plausibility is duly noted.  
 There is perhaps no greater affront to the need for plausibility in 
creating alternative futures scenarios than our all-too-postnormal present, 
and Trump is merely the latest, although very much a perverse, 
embodiment of Dator’s 2nd Law of the Future, which has become axiomatic 
within (as well as beyond) the futures field.  An updated and expanded 
																																																								
76 A serendipitous tweet by Dr. Stuart Candy enlightened me to Douthat’s piece. 
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version of Dator’s 2nd Law77, which is worth quoting in full, reads as 
follows: 
2. Any useful idea about the futures should appear to be ridiculous.  
 
(a) Because new technologies permit new behaviors and values, 
challenging old beliefs and values that are based on prior 
technologies, much that will be characteristic of the futures is 
initially seen as novel and challenging. It typically seems at first 
obscene, impossible, stupid, “science fiction,” ridiculous. Eventually 
it may become familiar and then utterly normal and “obvious.” 
However, it is unfortunately the case that not all ridiculous ideas are 
useful—many are indeed ridiculous. Determining beforehand the 
difference between the two is what makes futures an art as much 
as a science.  
 
(b) Thus, what is popularly, or even sometimes professionally, 
considered to be “the most likely future” is often one of the least 
likely actual futures.  
 
(c) If futurists expect to be useful, they should expect to be ridiculed 
and for their ideas often to be rejected. Some of their ideas may 
deserve ridicule and rejection, but even their useful ideas about the 
futures may also be rejected because they run counter to the 
“crackpot realism” of the present.  
 
(d) Thus, decision-makers, and the general public, if they wish to 
consider useful information about the future, should expect it to be 
unconventional and often shocking, offensive, and seemingly 
ridiculous. Futurists, however, have the additional burden of making 
the initially ridiculous idea plausible and actionable by marshaling 
appropriate evidence and weaving together alternative scenarios of 
its possible developments (Dator et al. 2015, 135).    
 
Although noted by Dator for decades, the addition of “not all ridiculous 
ideas are useful” speaks to how scenarios confront both actual and 
perceptual change.  If the primary aim of a futurist is to make an “initially 																																																								
77 Additions were made during the writing and editing process for Mutative Media: 
Communication Technologies and Power Relations in the Past, Present, and Futures 
(Dator et al. 2015). 
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ridiculous idea plausible,” then scenarios must link present and futures in a 
digestible and concrete way—and this is often, but not always, a contest of 
believability.  Can plausibility be reconciled with Nandy’s “game of 
dissenting visions” and Sardar’s “unthinkable thoughts?”  Can (and ought) 
pre-created scenarios carry the full weight of these contentions?   
 The above queries are what allow futures to position itself within the 
(social) sciences, but this is also where scenarios can (and sometimes do) 
fail to contest dominant imaginaries and productively foster dissent.  A 
practice-based example from my participation in the Hawai‘i 2060 project 
encapsulates this point.  As part of research process leading up to the 
event, data on sea-level rise was collected and used to forecast our 
alternative futures, which were created using the Mānoa School modeling 
method (Dator 2009).  In one scenario, dramatic sea-level rise pushed the 
islands to adapt radically leading to a sea-based livelihood and economic 
paradigm.  This transformational imagining of the future appeared to 
receive a positive response from attendees, but a prominent member of 
the University of Hawai‘i's School of Oceanic and Earth Science 
Technology called into question the efficacy of the approach and overall 
validity of the exercise.  From his perspective, the scenarios were not 
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merely unthinkable—they were nothing short of irresponsible.78  If the 
scenarios were seen as preposterous, this likely says more about the 
audience—and their perceptions—than the actual scenarios, and others 
have noted that plausibility is a rather nebulous metric (Ramírez and Selin 
2014; Star et al. 2016).   
 Fast forward to 2014.  A follow-up exercise for the Hawai‘i 2060 
project was organized, and the prominent participant who was previously 
flustered by the scenarios dramatically altered his tune.  Indeed, the expert 
in question made a point of apologizing for his earlier response as updated 
forecast models made it clear that what was previously seen as an outlier 
(i.e. an extreme scenario) was now an expected or projected future.79  
Perceptually speaking, plausibility is a moving target, and one can never 
know with complete certainty if participants will go along with, and/or truly 
inhabit, the worlds that have been created for them. In the scenario 
experience that I facilitated as part of the same event, one of the 
participants got up and walked out without warning, although his departure 
was immediately after I began reviewing bio-neurological enhancements 
for fetuses and babies.  Later that day, I actually had a chance to chat with 																																																								
78 A recent report, which was actually co-authored by researchers at the University of 
Hawai‘i's School of Oceanic and Earth Science Technology, found that by 2050 the 
islands could see a dramatic increase in coastal flooding and extreme weather events.  
Furthermore, the report states that the land area vulnerable to sea-level rise could be 
double previous estimates (Anderson et al. 2018).  Unthinkable indeed.  
79 This shift was relayed to during a conversation with Jim Dator, who attended the 2014 
event.  As a contributor to the 2011 gathering, I recall a range of reactions to the 
scenarios, although the prominence of the expert in question made his comments hard to 
forget.  
	 133 	
this participant and found out that one of his children was born with a 
genetic disorder.  I learned two valuable lessons from this project.  First 
and foremost, experience matters just as much as content.  If participants 
cannot, or will not, engage, then the exercise has failed.  As such, there 
must be multiple points of entry, as well as potential exits, to 
accommodate a range of biases, assumptions, prejudices, and 
worldviews.  Second, be careful what you wish for.  Producing an affect via 
a scenario is (or ought to be) an ethical experiment—one that, regardless 
of the whether or not the participants read the fine print, can transgress 
into an affront to one's life in the here and now.  Of course, there is no way 
to design for every possible contingency, so the lesson here harkens to 
something more dramatic. 
 As a scenarios practitioner, I have resigned myself not to create 
scenarios as a product for anyone unless they actively participate in the 
process.  As the Hawai‘i 2060 examples suggest, when pre-created 
scenarios are presented, even if via experiential means, there is always a 
possibility that they can and might be rejected for a variety of reasons.  In 
the above context, play was impossible, especially as some of the 
“experts” would (or rather could) not engage with the possibility space.  
Clearly, this has much to do with how scenarios can (and cannot) stifle 
dominant imaginaries but also with the means by which content and form 
are blended.  Finding the proverbial sweet spot is what makes scenarios 
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an art as much a practice, and this is precisely where experimentation—as 
a process of engaged, embodied, and collaborative learning—becomes 
instrumental.  This is also where scenario approaches benefit from a 
range of epistemological frames—inductive, deductive, and abductive. 
 Given the dynamics of PNT, however, there has never been a more 
difficult time to undertake such processes, which is perhaps why scenarios 
have skyrocketed in popularity over the past few decades (Bishop et al. 
2007).  As a practice for organizational learning, scenarios have become 
all-too-normal, which speaks to the dynamics of our all-too-postnormal 
present.  Living in an age where complexity, chaos, and contradictions 
have come to shape daily life has made imagining scenarios more 
complicated, and not just because “the future” arrives sooner than 
expected.  As Sardar and I argue: 
Traditionally, Futures Studies deals with plurality of alternative 
futures by differentiating between plausible, probable, possible, and 
preferable futures […]. But what is probable in a world where 
uncertainty and chaos is the norm?  What is plausible in futures 
dominated by contradictions? […]  Do existing scenario modeling 
methods adequately allow for the requisite pluralism and 
polylogues, including amongst humans, non- and, un-humans, 
needed to confront PNT? (Sardar and Sweeney 2016, 2). 
 
In some ways, it seems inevitable that PNT generated a scenario 
modeling method, particularly one emphasizing the complex interrelations 
between actual and perceptual change and, perhaps most importantly, the 
necessity of dissent.   
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The Three Tomorrows 	
 The 3T scenario modeling method uses a multi-step approach for 
applying PNT in a workshop setting, specifically a gathering of diverse 
participants over at least two to three days.  A full-length article on 3T was 
published in 2016, and my overview offers a critical examination about 
some of the decisions made prior to publication as well as reflections on 
how this approach was received and used by participants.80  Typically, 
participants are provided with a daylong introduction to futures studies on 
the first day, which culminates in a short primer on PNT.  On the morning 
of day two, participants are run through introductory exercises on the 3C’s 
(contradictions, complexity, and chaos).  Analyzing the postnormal 
dynamics of a specific issue, which participants select, participants work in 
small groups (between four and six people).  During my time at CPPFS, 
our primary “client” was the International Institute for Islamic Thought 
(IIIT), so a great deal, if not a complete majority, of the development on 3T 
was in relation to exploring Muslim (or Islamic) Futures—a topic that 
Sardar pioneered some thirty years ago (Sardar 1985; Sardar 1987).  I 
believe this is important to note as both Sardar and the participants’ 
																																																								80	Given Sardar's history in the field and lengthy tenure as the Editor-in-Chief of Futures, 
our dialogue was heavily influenced by his experiences.  Over numerous face-to-face 
meetings, Sardar and I began to sketch a framework for making PNT operational within a 
workshop setting. Ultimately, 3T aims to generate alternative futures scenarios that 
illuminate postnormal potentialities and scenarios beyond PNT. Eventually, Jordi Serra 
del Pino, a Hawaii alumnus, joined CPPFS and provided essential feedback.  
Consequently, 3T is itself the product of a broad spectrum of imaginations.	
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familiarity with the topic, particularly its past and present, allowed for a 
deeper level of engagement, which is not always the case in workshop 
settings, especially when technical content is a necessary aspect of the 
engagement.  As one of the main aims of 3T is to promote nonlinear 
thinking and analysis, it might seem counter-intuitive to have groups utilize 
a formulaic method, but 3T was designed to have participants critically re-
examine and complicate their earlier work, which occurs in later stages of 
the overall process, which begins by looking at the extended present. 
 When asked about “the” future, many, if not most, revert to an 
"extended present" (Valciukas and Bell 2003).  Popularized by Elise 
Boulding, this concept was crafted to emphasize a more embodied, inter-
relational, and intergenerational awareness of the connections amongst 
past, present, and future(s) (Boulding 1990; Inayatullah 1997).  In many 
ways, the extended present functions as an imaginary, which is to say that 
it is very much contextualized by cultural dynamics, specifically world 
views concerning time and change.  In employing this heuristic, the main 
challenge becomes moving across, contesting, and complicating 
perceptual and actuals scales of inquiry—local, national, regional, and 
global.  While each culture may have its own version of an extended 
present, the legacy of modernity’s extended present cannot (and should 
not) be underestimated, which is to say that geoengineering as a response 
to climate change is an artifact of a globalized extended present 
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imaginary. 
Focusing on how to get projections out into the open and as a 
starting point for a conversation about assumptions and biases about “the” 
future, the first formal 3T session brings to light assumptions, biases, and 
projections about one’s extended present.  In relation to PNT, participants 
are asked to focus especially on the contradictions that arise during their 
analysis.  As with any group-based workshop activity, each develops its 
own metabolism, and some require hands-on facilitation while others work 
independently.  In my experience, groups quickly grasped the concept of 
the "extended present" and began producing content within minutes.  After 
an hour or so, each group has the opportunity to share their findings with 
everyone else and answer questions from other participants—a common 
feature of workshop settings.  Depending on the size and duration of the 
workshop, groups might be asked to synthesize results. 
 Aside from dealing with the neuro-cognitive challenges of moving 
participants to think beyond an "extended present," there is another major 
obstacle, but also requisite step, to engendering futures thinking: images 
of the future (Polak and Boulding 1973; Dator 1998).  From blockbuster 
Summer movies to science fiction stories to IPCC scenarios, we are 
inundated by imaginings (Sweeney 2013).  Although “images of the future” 
is a standard within the field, I prefer the more complicated imaginings as 
it points toward the imaginaries underlying, inspiring, and ultimately 
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shaping how futures are conceived, perceived, and received.  Indeed, the 
concept of imaginings emphasizes how futures are always-already 
conditioned.  Furthermore, visual metaphors are widely, if not overly, 
emphasized within futures—none being more obvious or ever-present 
than the futures, or foresight, cone.  Imaginings, on the contrary, opens 
one up to complex and embodied dynamics by which past, present, and 
future(s) are framed and unframed.  
 As a means of confronting, contesting, and complicating various 
imaginings of the future, the next part of 3T centers on the familiar 
future(s), which also harkens to Inayatullah's concept of the "used" future 
(2008, 5).  Although used futures are relationally transactional, it is not 
always the case that the nature of this exchange is equitable, which is to 
say that the colonization of futures—by direct and indirect means—is 
perhaps the strongest strain of used futures.  From this perspective, 
choosing the term "familiar" for this horizon points toward a range of 
meanings.  At one level, this horizon centers on common and ever-present 
imaginaries—from Hollywood films to social media.  At another level, 
familiarity has much to do with our individual perspective and relational 
context.  In a group of mixed participants, one might expect that there 
exists a wide range of familiar future(s), and the primary aim of this 
session is to surface and discuss such imaginaries.  At another level, a 
"familiar" refers to a servant spirit or demon who supports the efforts of a 
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witch/warlock in carrying out his/her magical agenda (Wilby 2005).  As 
such, a "familiar" future is one that operates in the service of some greater 
force with the express purpose of enhancing certain imaginaries.  In this 
way, the familiar future(s), which is intentionally doubled as a 
singular/plural concept, speaks to the core tenets of futures studies.  
Outlining futures as a "broadly participative inquiry into the future," Dator 
argues that this undertaking centers on "identifying and understanding the 
many different images of the future which exist, understanding why certain 
people have certain images rather than others, how their different images 
of the future lead to specific actions, or inactions, in the present […]" 
(Dator 1998, 302-303).  Linking back to PNT, participants are asked to 
focus on complexity during their analysis, which, again, goes on for at 
least an hour.  
 While it is certainly the case that images of the future can (and 
must) be found within the extended present, separating the familiar 
future(s) into its own horizon, and placing an analysis of images of the 
future after the extended present, creates a space where participants 
naturally build on their earlier work—simultaneously broadening and 
deepening their analysis.  Again, each group shares their work and takes 
questions from other participants.  Finally, having gone through both the 
extended present and familiar future(s), participants are asked to imagine 
unthought futures.  As Sardar and I explain, this horizon is "not 
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unthinkable but rather […] where something always remains unthought, 
which is to say that it is populated with seemingly infinite alternative 
futures […]" (Sardar and Sweeney 2016, 6).  In working to identify 
unthought futures, participants generate provocations, postnormal 
potentialities, and radical possibilities for what might lie ahead—easier 
said than done, of course.  In over four years, it was a rarity for even an 
advanced group to produce a full-fledged scenario, and while this is 
perhaps due to time constraints, I also feel confident in stating that this is 
due to the limits of this approach.  In this horizon, participants are guided 
to focus on what can or might lead to chaos, broadly defined.   
 Emphasizing chaos invariably, but not always, led to dystopic 
scenarios, which were common amongst many of the workshops with 
which I facilitated/participated.  This points toward a significant challenge 
for such methods: how to move from critique or analysis to creativity that 
goes beyond expected impacts or results in polar (either utopic or 
dystopia) imaginings—a cycle that only new forms of imagination might 
break (Montuori 2011).  As much of CPPFS's work centered on Muslim 
Futures, it was often the case that "chaos" was defined in relation to Islam, 
specifically the dissolution or degradation of key Islamic beliefs, principles, 
and practices.  In short, chaos often became equivalent with loss—a 
breakdown of systemic order.  However, chaos is a “natural” feature of 
various systems—from the global climate system to one’s morning 
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commute.  The value of chaos as a concept lies in how it blends the actual 
and perceptual—to be blunt, chaos is felt.  It is an affect of one’s position 
within a particular context—an attentiveness toward dynamics that are 
unfolding in unexpected ways.  As a means of representing this dynamic, 
Sardar and I chose to visualize the unthought future(s) as a sort of 
shockwave, and when seen amidst the other tomorrows on our futures 
cone, one can easily see how this approach uses a layered analysis to 
move participants toward creative imaginings.  Figure 3 renders all three 
tomorrows on our futures cone.  
	
Figure 3: CPPFS cone with 3T 
 
One question that repeatedly came up after participants were 
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shown this graphic during our workshops was time: does each horizon 
have a particular timescale or horizon?  This issue was a serious point of 
contention in my exchanges with Sardar, and I eventually agreed to have 
periods put into the final version of our paper.  I was, however, successful 
in adding in the qualification: “temporal particularities are elastic in relation 
to the thematic context” (Sardar and Sweeney 2016, 5).  This, however, is 
an understatement, especially when analyzing issues with multi-century 
and millennia timescales, such as Islam and, as the case may be, 
geoengineering.  Although such considerations are important, especially if 
one focuses on “actual” change, the means by which 3T operates as a tool 
for engaging percepts about ongoing, emerging, and potential change is, 
from my perspective, more significant.  This is evident in the final stage of 
the 3T method.   
 While Image 3 demonstrates the step-by-step process by which 
participants move through 3T, it is also a complete facade.  Again, the 
language used is instructive.  Selecting “tomorrows” was a conscious 
decision to emphasize how even phenomena from a seemingly unthought 
future(s) can emerge swiftly and impact our lives in the here and now, or 
tomorrow as the case may be.  Indeed, a significant aspect of PNT 
emphasizes the rapidity and unpredictability of change.  Furthermore, the 
theoretical framework underlying 3T, essentially PNT, rejects linear 
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moving to trigonometry, exploring each of the tomorrows individually 
creates a basic structure from which to complicate and re-examine one’s 
analysis.  In short, 3T becomes an exercise in contradictions, complexity, 
and chaos itself as participants often go back and illuminate these 
dynamics within their previous analysis.  Figure 4 (below) renders 3T in its 
native form, and while it is often the case that some participants anticipate 
something more, its concealment and subsequent revelation provides a 
powerful moment that, without question, is often the crux of the workshop.  
If participants produce nothing tangibly different during the next phase, 
which involves dissolving the boundaries between the extended present, 
familiar future(s), and unthought future(s), then the entire process was for 
naught.   
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Figure 4: CPPFS cone with nonlinear 3T 
 
While a 3T workshop owes much to its predecessors, especially Jungk 
and Norbert, Sardar has been consistent in stating that futures in PNT 
requires something more.  In his 2015 update, which also serves as a 
response piece to PNT critics, he argues:  
[…] Futures must now incorporate postnormal landscapes in its 
purview, methods and analysis. […] It is no longer enough to simply 
explore a variety of possible futures; we also need to give serious 
attention to how we are going to navigate the postnormal condition 
[…] (Sardar 2015a, 37). 
 
Clearly, PNT aims to strengthen futures, and Sardar’s call to arms ought 
signals that this approach stems from his analysis of the present as much 
as the futures field.  To date, 3T has been used primarily, although not 
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exclusively, by students, researchers, and academics with a particular 
focus on Muslim Futures.  Although PNT remains “in development” and 
given that it was born from postnormal science, it was natural to explore 
how this approach might be used to engage with geoengineering.   
 As a practitioner, I take Sardar’s above provocation to heart: futures 
must do more to account for the postnormal dynamics of the present and 
how this shapes what futures seem plausible, probable, possible, 
preferable, and even preposterous.  But, I have also seen the limits of 
PNT, and, as with any method, there will always be constraints to what it 
can and cannot do.  Primarily, my concerns are as follows: do participants 
need a requisite level of technical and/or experiential knowledge to 
complete the 3T exercises?  Are traditional workshop exercises the most 
democratic, or even efficacious, spaces for such explorations?  In the next 
section, I take up these queries as a means of commencing my overview 
and critical analysis of the Menagerie, which culminates in my introduction 
of the concept of trans-subjective positionalities.   
The Menagerie of Postnormal Potential i t ies 	
 In May 2013, the Mauna Loa Observatory reported that atmospheric 
carbon dioxide reached 400 parts-per-million for the first time in “more 
than 2.5 million years” (Biello 2013).  Putting this disturbingly symbolic, 
and extreme, milestone into perspective, scientists note that the last time 
atmospheric carbon levels were this high “the globe's temperature 
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averaged about 3 degrees C warmer, and sea level lapped coasts 5 
meters or more higher,” which is to say that the world was a radically 
different place—one, as it were, absent of humanity (Biello 2013).  In a 
“Hothouse Earth” scenario, however, runaway warming might not be able 
to be “reversed, steered, or substantially slowed,” even by climate 
engineering (Steffen et al. 2018, 6).  Given the radical possibilities 
enlivened by global weirding, some have proposed interventions that 
make geoengineering look somewhat tame by comparison.  In 2012, a 
triumvirate composed of bioethicists and philosophers published an article, 
“Human Engineering and Climate Change,” in Ethics, Policy, & 
Environment to much fanfare—academically speaking, as media outlets 
picked up on its provocative thought experiment.  Arguing that “the 
biomedical modification of humans” should be considered as a means to 
confront the many and varied challenges of climate change, the authors 
suggest that enhancing empathy, fostering a pharmacological intolerance 
to carbon-intensive products like red meat, and/or engineering shorter 
humans are reasonable and, perhaps, less risky than large-scale climate 
engineering initiatives (Liao et al. 2012, 207).   
 Although the authors make it abundantly clear that involuntary 
human engineering as a course of action is unethical, they believe that 
willful bioengineering initiatives should be “considered and explored 
further,” especially as this “could make behavioural and market solutions 
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more likely to succeed” (Liao et al. 2012, 211).  If such proposals were 
ever needed to be considered in any meaningful way, would it be prudent, 
if not even conscionable, to talk about success?  Although this article was 
intended to raise questions, it leaves some of the most pressing unasked: 
how can one be attentive to scales (global, regional, national, and local) 
when considering such thought experiments?  How might 
intergenerational affects be considered?  What conditions of possibility 
could enhance acceptance of such proposals?  Are there social and 
cultural dynamics that might make such potentialities more achievable or 
even less desirable?   
 Unfortunately, the authors never discuss how values might shape 
and/or limit such initiatives, and, perhaps most importantly, how context—
specifically the MNF—shapes past, present, and futures imaginaries.  
Does it not seem contradictory to think that intentionally changing biology 
would be more palatable to those whose behaviors have already been 
altered by the threat of climate change?  Is it not the case that proposing 
to create smaller and meat-intolerant humans would be unthinkable to 
many?  Could these types of initiatives produce chaotic results?  Chaotic 
for whom?  In this section, I frame my usage of the Menagerie, situate its 
comportment as a tool for unframing dissent, expand the black jellyfish 
concept, and flesh out the concept of trans-subjective positionalities.  
 To great fanfare, Oxford Dictionaries announced that their Word of 
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the Year for 2016 was post-truth (Oxford Dictionaries 2016).   Seeking not 
to be outdone by their bitter rivals, Merriam-Webster chose surreal as its 
word of the year since “it was looked up significantly more frequently by 
users in 2016 than it was in previous years, and because there were 
multiple occasions on which this word was the one clearly driving people 
to their dictionary” (Merriam Webster 2016).  From Brexit to the worsening 
of the conflict in Syria to the rejection of a landmark peace deal in 
Colombia to the election of Donald Trump in the United States, it should 
come as no surprise that such terms were both misunderstood and, yet, 
ubiquitous in public discourse.  That many found the above events—as 
well as many others—to be surreal and emanating post-truth is 
demonstrable evidence that PNT, and the disproportions driving it, are not 
just proliferating but also accelerating.  In 2016, such contradictions came 
home to roost, and chaos made its presence felt.  A mere day or two after 
the Brexit vote Internet search results showed a surge in phrases such as 
“what is the EU?” suggesting that more than a few people casted ballots 
without knowing the exact conditions of their choice (Selyukh 2016).  
When the Director of the FBI, James Comey, announced a new 
investigation into Hillary Clinton just a few days before the election, the 
entire narrative—if not the outcome—seemed to change.  With the 
election of Donald Trump as President of the United States of America, a 
truly postnormal precipice faces the world, especially as references to 
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climate change were “scrubbed” from the White House website within his 
first few days in office (McGrath 2017).   
 For many, if not most, the shocking events unfolding around us are 
black elephants: things not unexpected, although they were viewed as 
unlikely or even implausible by the many (Gupta 2009).  For most, 
however, 2016—and its fallout—was a time of black swans: events and 
phenomena that seemed highly improbable, at least in part, because they 
were beyond our perceptual capacity (Taleb 2007).  While black elephants 
are literally “in the room,” black swans are always beyond our purview, 
until, that is, they arrive and change how we see and understand the 
world.  Both concepts are popular across the broader futures space, and 
both were integral aspects of PNT’s development.   
 The aim of differentiating between black elephants and black swans 
has little to do with getting the “right” answer; rather, it has everything to 
do with reflecting on how one normalizes and perceives such phenomena.  
Our individual (and collective) MNF filters our view of the world and often 
leaves us with shallow justifications for complex events and phenomena.  
As such, one person’s black elephant can and might be another’s black 
swan; and yet, neither concept provides a means to explain the bursts of 
awareness and chaos that characterize our experience of PNT.  To bridge 
this gap, I originally crafted the concept of the black jellyfish—a metaphor 
to describe the sensational weirding of our complex world; the accelerating 
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chaos of disparate forces coming together to disrupt various systems; the 
escalating events and phenomena that thrive off positive feedback to 
become inescapable facets of our daily life.  Were it not for my time in 
Hawai‘i, I am not sure that such examples and this specific metaphor 
would have come to mind, and at one point, there were serious 
discussions about using puffins as a substitute, but I digress.81  
 One need only look to the recent past to see that black jellyfish are 
now constitutive of life in PNT.  The genesis of the black jellyfish concept 
comes, at least in part, from the recalcitrant nature of these mindless 
invertebrates.  As Gershwin explains, "Jellyfish are among the world’s 
most successful organisms, having survived freezes, thaws, superheated 
conditions, shifting and rearranging of continents, mass extinctions, 
meteor strikes, predators, competitors, and even man" (Gershwin 2013).  
In sum, they are far better suited to a globally warmed world.  As noted in 
chapter one, jellyfish blooms have wreaked havoc on sporting events, 
energy facilities, naval vessels, and fishing economies around the world.   
Blooms, as it were, are difficult, but not impossible, to forecast, and as 
they have the potential to create chaos, they seemed like an apt metaphor 
to capture this aspect of PNT.  While the negative aspects of jellyfish 
blooms have been highly publicized, it is perhaps the case that not 
																																																								
81 In California and elsewhere, puffins began dying off in droves due to the effects of 
climate change (Graham 2016). While this example points toward feedback loops, it 
ultimately fails to capture the intended scope and scale of chaos within PNT. 
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everyone looks at proliferating blooms with distaste, literally speaking.  In 
East and Southeast Asia, jellyfish have been a staple part of various 
cuisines, and some have suggested that other contexts, specifically those 
with tastes for carbon-intensive products, should reorient their palates 
(Duggins 2017; Lutrario 2017).  Deemed "the perfect snack for the 
anthropocene," some European chefs are beginning to take notice of the 
invertebrates and create new offerings for their patrons (Vincent 2017).   
 Sensing and anticipating social, cultural, political, economic, and 
even ecological black jellyfish lies at the heart of PNT and practice.  In 
order to comprehend these phenomena, one must first come to 
understand the two attributes of black jellyfish—escalation and sensation.  
The Arab Spring. Occupy. Black Lives Matter. What do all of these 
phenomena have in common?  They began as small, localized events and 
rapidly escalated into much more.  Futures has long postulated that 
prediction is a fool’s gambit and ultimately anathema to the ethos of 
foresight as a practice for generating insights by imagining alternative and 
preferred possibilities.  In PNT, the urge to predict is even more prominent 
as the interconnected forces of uncertainty and ignorance escalate a 
desire for simple answers (often from the past) to complex issues 
(including those that lie ahead).  Trump's "Make America Great Again" 
mantra encapsulates this dynamic.  In a world of complexity, chaos, and 
contradictions, it is natural to seek black and white answers to questions 
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firmly within the greyness of our contemporary age.  In many cases, 
seemingly “simple” solutions increasingly do not work, and they often 
exacerbate the problem and produce a host of new threats, shocks, and 
disruptions—geoengineering enthusiasts take note.  Take the proposals 
by lawmakers in five states in America to limit the public’s capacity to 
protest peacefully (Woodman 2017).  Clearly, these initiatives are highly 
politicized, which is also to say polarized, actions meant to dissuade 
organized movements such as Black Lives Matters and those seeking to 
thwart the Dakota Access oil pipeline from voicing opposition.  Although it 
is certainly possible that they might limit direct actions in the short term, 
their efficacy for stemming resistance—as well as dealing with the root 
causes of political opposition—is, at best, miniscule.  Indeed, what these 
measures point toward is the second aspect of black jellyfish: sensation.   
 On Friday, January 27, 2017, Trump penned an executive order that 
banned all refugees for 120 days (a direct violation of the Geneva 
Convention), halted entry for anyone from Syria, and barred anyone from 
six other countries: Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen 
(Sherlock 2017).   What is clear about Trump’s (unconstitutional) order is 
that it was meant to be an exercise in sensation—a tactic meant to stun.  
Although Trump campaigned on a platform proffering a complete ban on 
Muslims entering the US, this modified proposal, albeit equally as horrific, 
seems to have been generated solely to appease his base.  In a lengthy, 
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and widely shared, post on Facebook, Dr. Heather Richardson, a 
Professor of History at Boston College, called the Muslim Ban a “shock 
event” and noted that such phenomena “depends on speed and chaos 
because it requires knee-jerk reactions so that people divide along 
established lines" (Richardson 2017).  Although the ban was upheld by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor and Ginsberg's dissent provides 
further insight into the intent of this tactic.  They observe that "Trump’s 
failure to correct the reasonable perception of his apparent hostility toward 
the Islamic faith," which was evident in numerous statements made during 
his campaign, suggests that the ban has more to do with a "discriminatory 
animus against Islam and its followers" than national security (Sotomayor 
and Ginsburg 2018).  The weaponization of this affect has been a 
convenient, but not entirely effective, distraction from Trump's various (and 
ongoing) legal woes, which some believe might result in his 
impeachment—a potential black jellyfish whose effects are certain to 
delight as well as perhaps disgust portions of the American electorate.  
Could understanding such a potentiality from divergent perspectives shed 
any additional light on potential impacts?  Seeing and understanding a 
black jellyfish from divergent perspectives, which might actually entail 
thinking about it as a black elephant or black swan, is where the 
Menagerie excels can and, perhaps most importantly, is what gives rise to 
its most enduring attribute.   
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 As more than just an exercise in exploring potentialities, the 
Menagerie can (and might) function, in resonance with Nandy's 
formulation, as a game for dissenting visions.  In this game, there is 
always an outside, or rather inside, which is to say that there is no (and 
can never be any) such thing as a universal black elephant, black swan, or 
black jellyfish—each only makes sense within a particular context and 
from a particular subject position.  In short, the Menagerie is an exercise in 
unframing dissent.  As an experimental mode of inquiry, the Menagerie is 
trans-subjective.  As much an ontological axiom as epistemological 
unframing, the Menagerie enacted by and through play facilitates an 
empathic and speculative engagement with unseen, unheard, and 
unspoken positionalities.82  In this way, the Menagerie calls attention to an 
ethics that is increasingly becoming necessary in our all-too-postnormal 
age.  Writing about possibilities beyond the Anthropocene, Zylinska 
argues that an "ethics of expanded obligations becomes a way of taking 
responsibility, by the human, for various sorts of thickenings of the 
universe, across different scales, and of responding to the tangled mesh 
																																																								
82 This formulation leans heavily on the work of Spivak, whose groundbreaking work in 
subaltern studies confronts the “epistemic violence” in representationalist politics and 
discourse (1988, 24).  Indeed, this schema eschews representation in favor of 
experimental unframings.  The Menagerie is not meant as a substitute for balanced 
engagements that take into consideration gender, ethnicity, and other ways of supporting 
and facilitating diversity, quite the opposite. The Menagerie is a means to explore what 
subject positions must be understood and sought out.  
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of everyday connections and relations” (2014, 17).83  Mandating an 
openness toward alternative imaginings driven by disparate ethico-political 
framings, the Menagerie becomes a means to realize Sardar’s call for an 
“ethical imagination” (Sardar 2010b, 444). 
 In seeking to conceptualize what I find most efficacious about the 
Menagerie as a tool for shared exploration, there are clear resonances 
with both "action research" (Inayatullah 2002; Ramos 2006) and "collective 
intelligence," which are processes of collaborative exploration (Facer 
2011; Miller 2007).  Indeed, the sentiments underlying my preference for 
the Menagerie stems from a practice-based bias toward participatory and 
engaging processes by which learning, and futures in particular, can and 
must be undertaken toward critical and reflective engagement with truly 
postnormal potentialities.  It is certainly the case that such approaches 
have become more commonplace across the broader futures space, and a 
new generation of scholars and practitioners are doing their utmost to shift 
how futurists unframe what might lie ahead.  As Candy and Dunagan 
observe, "a central challenge, perhaps indeed the central challenge, for 
the next generation of foresight practitioners will have less to do with 
generating and broadcasting ideas about the future, than it will have to do 																																																								
83 This framing resonates with neohumanism, which emphasizes “love and devotion for 
all, inanimate and animate, beings of the universe” (Inayatullah et al. 3).  Whereas 
neohumanism embraces spiritual traditions, Zylinska’s ethics is based on a staunchly 
materialist perspectivism, which is born from a reaction against modernist and 
postmodern sensibilities about scientific inquiry and practice. I am thankful to Dr. Sohail 
Inayatullah for recommending this connection and distinction.  
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with designing circumstances or situations in which the collective 
intelligence and imagination of a community can come forth" (2016, 15).  
Futurists must play a new game—one where form is as important as 
content.  Supporting Candy and Dunagan’s contention, Love observes that 
the very future of futures depends on taking into consideration the affect of 
generations who have “grown up playing with scenarios in the various 
shared worlds of computer, video and online games” (Love 2009, 153).  
From this perspective, playful modalities ought to be seen as a necessity.  
Having witnessed firsthand how participants use the Menagerie as 
an essential part of their analysis, I saw this framework produce a similar, 
yet not always constant, affect.  In discussing, and in many cases hotly 
debating, a particular issue or impact as an elephant, swan, or jellyfish, 
participants necessarily revealed contextual particularities and articulated 
divergent subject positions.  In simple terms, this was often vocalized as 
follows: I see "X" as a black elephant for "Y" because of "Z."  If black 
elephants signify contradictions, black swans represent complexity, and 
black jellyfish symbolize chaos, then an absolutely critical query is implicit 
within each: for whom?  Contradictions, complexity, and chaos for whom?  
Contradictions, complexity, and chaos in what context?  In creating a 
space for continuous discontinuity, the Menagerie enacts one of the core 
tenets of futures.  As Sardar observes, “Futures studies need to be 
sceptical of simple, one-dimensional solutions to wicked problems as well 
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as of dominant ideas, projections, predictions, forecasts and notions of 
truth to ensure that the future is not foreclosed and colonised by a single 
culture” (Sardar 2010a, 183).  In expanding dissent, the Menagerie aims to 
create a space for the unseen, the unheard, and the unspoken, and in the 
next chapter I show how this dynamic is heightened and enhanced further 
through the modality of play.  
Conclusion: Normal versus postnormal worldviews 	
 I began this chapter by looking at the shift from global warming to 
global weirding, which setup my usage of postnormal heuristics.  I then 
defined futures as a practice for expanding dissent and engaged with two 
meta-frameworks to contextualize my usage of PNT as an approach for 
expanding dissent.  I then looked at scenarios as an art and practice.  
Using the both textual and experiential research, I explored the challenges 
in using plausibility as a metric for crafting and communicating scenarios 
as well as the limits of pre-created scenarios in a workshop setting.  I then 
turned to PNT and relayed the creation narrative of the Three Tomorrows 
method, which provided a basis for my invocation of the Menagerie.  
Finally, I fleshed out the black jellyfish concept and positioned the 
Menagerie as a conduit for invoking divergent perspectives through the 
modality of play—what I call trans-subjective positionalities.  
 Ultimately, the shift from global warming to global weirding highlights 
the difference in worldview between those championing “plausible” 
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scenarios and imaginings enlivened via postnormal heuristics.  
Furthermore, a postnormal worldview stakes out an explicit ethical 
positionality—one that critically engages with complexity, contradictions, 
and the potentiality for chaos.  In the next chapter, I extend this distinction 
by engaging with Latour's distinction between matters of fact and matters 
of concern, which shapes how I envisage games as a means of play-
based experimentation.  I then setup my specific take on games before 
presenting two “case studies.”  Finally, I think through how play-driven 
approaches can be used to further enhance the efficacy of the Menagerie. 
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Chapter 4: Practicing Play 
Facts and concerns  
 
Philosophy must be realist because its mandate is to unlock the 
structure of the world itself; it must be weird because reality is 
weird. - Graham Harman (2008, 4).  
    
 Ioane Teitiota is the world's first official climate refugee, at least he 
was supposed to be.  The High Court of New Zealand's rejected his 
petition for asylum, and he was actually deported for overstaying his visa 
in late 2015.  Teitiota's family, including his three children born in New 
Zealand, have roots in Kiribati, which is the proverbial canary-in-the-coal-
mine for sea-level rise.  According to some forecasts, Kiribati will be 
mostly consumed by the Pacific Ocean by the end of the century (or 
perhaps even sooner) (Wyett 2014).  In anticipation of this seeming 
inevitability, the government of Kiribati purchased land on Fiji in 
preparation for when the waters rise, which some argue was just a 
publicity stunt to raise awareness, although the court did note that 
Teitiota's government was taking steps to ensure that its citizens were 
shielded from the effects of climate change (Ho 2016).  While nearly 
everyone involved in this landmark case claimed to be sympathetic to 
Teitiota's plight, the ruling sheds light on both the facts and concerns of 
our life in an age of global weirding.   
 Using the U.N.'s Refugee Convention, which was passed in 1951 
and amended in 1967, as a guide, the High Court decided, “'Persecution' 
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is not defined in the Refugee Convention but clearly encompasses well 
founded fears to life or freedom on a convention ground, some form of 
serious harm, or serious violations of civil or human rights” (Priestley 
2013).  Although Teitiota's petition specifically cited the pressures of over-
population and sea-level-rise, the High Court ultimately did not see fit to 
alter the scope of the Refugee Convention, which is to say that perhaps 
the court did not want to set a legal precedent that might open the 
floodgates, so to speak, for those wanting refuge from both the actual 
effects of global warming and the perceptual affects of global weirding.  
Indeed, it is not clear that the court was equipped even to make such a 
distinction.  Simply put, Teitiota's concerns were not "factual" enough to 
change the conditions of possibility for what does and does not merit 
refugee status, at least from the court's view.  Rejecting the specific claim 
that a "general worldwide human agency" was sufficient for altering the 
refugee convention, the High Court observed, “this requirement of some 
form of human agency does not mean that environmental degradation, 
whether associated with climate change or not, can never create pathways 
into the Refugee Convention or protected person jurisdiction” (Priestley 
2013).  In denying Teitiota's petition, the court actually admitted to the dire 
consequences of global warming, an undeniable fact, but saw perceptual, 
particularly generational, concerns as insufficient—in short, the court 
denied global weirding.  In PNT, however, both facts and concerns can 
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change swiftly—imaginaries too.  With the election of a new Prime Minister 
and governing party who appear to be more sympathetic to the plight of 
climate refugees, discussions about special visas are now underway 
(Anderson 2017).  In the High Court’s ruling, they coined a new term, 
"sociological refugee," to refer to Teitiota since he was seeking only to 
"better his or her life by escaping the perceived results of climate change" 
(Priestley 2013).  In deeming Teitiota a “sociological refugee,” the court 
was both realist and weird in using a term not found in any legal lexicon.  
What led the court to use such an odd turn of phrase in handing down its 
high-profile ruling?   
 Offering a means to understand and complicate the court’s decision, 
Latour's distinction between matters of fact and matters of concern 
provides a point of entry for thinking through the imaginaries underlying 
such events, which are only likely to proliferate in PNT.  Channeling 
Whitehead, whose work has been highly influential within the materialist 
turn, Latour explains, "A matter of concern is what happens to a matter of 
fact when you add to it its whole scenography, much like you would do by 
shifting your attention from the stage to the whole machinery of a theatre" 
(Latour 2008, 39).  The court certainly did not shift its focus to the field, 
and some have noted that “climate refugee” is a category for which the 
1967 Convention actually provides no legal standing (Apap 2018; Jefferies 
et al. 2018).  Although prediction is a fool’s game, it is safe to say that this 
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will change in the very near future.   
 Latour’s thought has been quite prescient, and it must be noted that 
his 2004 opus, Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact 
to Matters of Concern, was born during the tenure of George W. Bush, 
whose plain-spoken and purported matter-of-fact style befuddled many.84  
Confronting the harsh realities about what a certain type of critical 
perspectivism has accomplished, Latour offers a confession—or, perhaps 
more accurately, a mea culpa.  He intimates: 
My argument is that a certain form of critical spirit has sent us down 
the wrong path, encouraging us to fight the wrong enemies and, 
worst of all, to be considered as friends by the wrong sort of allies 
because of a little mistake in the definition of its main target. […]  
The mistake we made, the mistake I made, was to believe that 
there was no efficient way to criticize matters of fact except by 
moving away from them and directing one’s attention toward the 
conditions that made them possible. […] Reality is not defined by 
matters of fact.  Matters of fact are not all that is given in 
experience (2004, 231-232).   
 
For the High Court of New Zealand, Teitiota’s case points toward a new 
normal—one that few seem willing and prepared to confront.  In PNT, it is 
certainly the case that values are often in dispute and facts are uncertain, 
but Teitiota’s case points toward something more.  In targeting the 
interstices of ignorance and uncertainty, Latour's object-oriented ontology 
(OOO) confronts and contests critical theory itself. 
 Under the aegis of postmodernity, Truth (intentionally with a capital 																																																								
84 Interestingly, it was W. Bush’s father, former President George H. W. Bush, who 
famously declared on the 1988 campaign trail, “I’ll never apologize for the United States 
of America. Ever! I don’t care what the facts are” (CSpanClassics 2010).   
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T) was torn asunder (Nietzsche).  Narratives of various scope and scale 
were critically and thoughtfully deconstructed (Lyotard).  All things were 
texts whose meanings require excavation (Derrida).  While this 
undertaking shed light on innumerable ideological apparatuses 
(Althusser), power mechanisms (Foucault), and assemblages (Deleuze 
and Guattari), the intellectual tools of our liberation seem to have made 
their way into the wrong hands.  Indeed, some have recently argued that 
Trump, who seems to delight, if not outright flourish, in the rotting corpse 
of Truth (again, intentionally with a capital T), owes a debt to the 
postmodern condition (Heer 2017; Kakutani 2018).  While Trump is 
certainly an embodiment of Latour’s worst fears, it is essential to 
distinguish between the banal, yet overtly fascistic, relativism of the “Make 
America Great Again” crowd and the trans-subjective positionalities 
inherent within new materialist approaches (Bennett 2010; Coole and 
Frost 2010; Ennis 2012).  In this reinvigorated realist metaphysics, objects 
are constellations, things are networks, and criticism creates.  As Latour 
opines: 
The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. 
The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of the 
naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in 
which to gather. […] The practical problem we face, if we try to go 
that new route, is to associate the word criticism with a whole set of 
new positive metaphors, gestures, attitudes, knee-jerk reactions, 
habits of thoughts (Latour 2004, 246-247).  
 
Ultimately, the transition from matters of fact to matters of concern is an 
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ontological shift that beckons engagement with both actual (realist) and 
perceptual (speculative) contexts.  Extending this insight to futures 
studies, critical approaches can, and must, explore the diffuse matters of 
concerns that constrict, contest, and create future(s) imaginaries.85   
 Proffering an “actor-network theory” (ANT) whereby all things are 
interconnected, Latour’s propositions rest on an absolute empiricism—an 
axiomatic strategy for engaging the sociality of things within our all-too-
postnormal world.  As one might expect, Latour is not without his critics.  
Harman argues that Latour’s radical sociality simply goes too far, as he 
reduces an object only to its effects—in short, whatever it “modifies, 
transforms, perturbs, or creates” (Harman 2011).  There is certainly a 
danger in making objects, including humans, purely transactional, and 
within ANT, it makes little sense to speak of “agency,” at least in the 
traditional sense.  From this purview, one must speak of actants rather 
than actors—processes of becoming rather than static beings.   
 My specific interest in this line of thought stems from a desire to 
foster trans-subjective positionalities, which must include a range of 
human and non-human subject positions, and later in this chapter I begin 
to explore how such a proposition might be actualized and integrated in a 
game designed to explore geoengineered futures.  Clearly, the High Court 																																																								
85 Arguably, this insight lies at the heart of work of Inayatullah and others who presence 
the necessity to deepen and expand one’s understanding of the future(s) using narrative, 
myth, and metaphor, and as such practitioners assemble arenas where new stories can 
and might emerge, they are critically creative, in the Latourian sense.  
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of New Zealand appealed to a radically different, albeit all-too-familiar, 
ontology in reaching its decision.  Teitiota's claim, then, ought to be seen 
as more than just a legal case—it was nothing short of a metaphysical 
showdown.  How might such a rift be mediated?  How does such a 
dynamic affect geoengineered imaginaries?  Speculative, materialist, and 
realist approaches raise some interesting potentialities, specifically to 
expand ethico-political horizons, which can inform, if not shape, how we 
might begin to govern geoengineering, as well as how ignorance and 
uncertainties surrounding centralization, corporatization, and commitment 
might be productively navigated.   
 In the next section, I provide a brief overview of how my employment 
of the modality of play syncs with the charge of Latour's critic.  I then 
reflect on two engagements that I designed and facilitated using futures 
games.  Finally, I close this chapter by thinking through how the 
Menagerie might be enhanced through play. 
Play as modality   	
Play is preparation for the future. 
- Karl Groos, The Play of Man (2015) 
 
 As the constitutive feature of games, play is a rather complex 
modality to distill, although many attempts have been made.  Foremost 
amongst theories of play is Huizinga’s concept of homo ludens.  Arguing 
that homo sapiens—humans as thinkers—is too modernist and 
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overemphasizes our rational faculties, Huizinga contends that play is 
constitutive to our very being-in-the-world.  Situating play as a cultural 
phenomenon, Huizinga presences play as freedom incarnate—an activity 
derived from our inherent sociality.  The concept of homo ludens—humans 
as players—positions play as a universal, yet socially constructed, 
enterprise.86  Cutting across contexts and cultures, Huizinga presences 
play as that which always exists beyond the normal.  Play, then, is a 
“stepping out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity with a 
disposition all of its own,” Huizinga invokes the importance of possibility 
(Huizinga 1949, 8).  As such, play becomes a modality of pure 
possibility—a means to realize the infinite game that lies beyond the 
normal. 
Centuries before Huizinga, Kant noted that beauty arises from the “free 
play” of the imagination—a state of cognitive possibility whereby 
subjective judgments (i.e. what is and is not beautiful) are enacted 
(Rundell 2016).  Although Kant’s usage of “play” is decidedly metaphoric, 
his observation points toward the mercurial nature of the epistemological 
process that play out, so to speak, in forming aesthetic judgments.  Might 
the same insight be extended to play?  Why is it that we like some games 																																																								
86 Interestingly, Huizinga makes an explicit linkage between politics and play, if only to 
reinforce how the latter underlies and permeates many, if not most, of our social 
institutions.  He argues, “Politics are and have always been something of a game of 
chance; we have only to think of the challenges, the provocations, the threats and 
denunciations to realize that war and the policies leading up to it are always, in the nature 
of things, a gamble […]” (Huizinga 1949, 210).   	
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and not others?  What is it that entices play?  Explicating the 
epistemological as well as ontological aspects of play from a Deleuzian 
perspective, Colman contends: 
Play is productive and destructive of existing categories of 
normativity; play messes with epistemologies.  Play is essential for 
healthful mental and physical life, providing as it does an intensive 
concentration upon singular, and not routine task, requiring team as 
well as individual participation (Colman 2012, 251). 
 
As Colman argues, play unframes our sense of things.  For the purposes 
of this project, play is a deployed as a modality for un-framing—a 
reconfiguring of one’s sense and positionality toward present and future(s) 
potentialities.  
Picking up on Huizinga’s framing of play as a primordial activity 
beyond one’s normal existence, Caillois provides a more nuanced take—
one that introduces a six-part definition.  First, play is free; it is not 
obligatory.  Second, play is defined by agreed upon limits or rules.  Third, 
play is uncertain—one cannot know the result beforehand, and any pre-
knowledge of outcomes constitutes “foul play.”  Fourth, play is 
immaterial—it offers nothing but the act itself.  Fifth, play must have 
rules—some semblance of order and/or structure.  Sixth, play centers on 
make-believe—a creative act of imagining that extends beyond the 
everyday.  As with Huizinga, Caillois aims to essentialize play, although 
the latter is far more attentive to its various forms and manifestations, 
which is to say that play has divergent modalities.  For Caillois, play has 
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forms that cut across cultures and contexts: competition, chance, mimicry, 
and vertigo.  With the last two framings, Caillois differentiates himself from 
Huizinga and illuminates how play can foment a liminal space—a 
possibility-space par excellence.  For Caillois, these forms of play 
necessitate an imagining of one’s self as other whereby one might 
“escape the tyranny of […] ordinary perception” (Caillois and Barash 2001, 
44).  Play as eternally outside—as freedom from the normal—dominates 
much of the theoretical terrain, although there are those who push back on 
this contention. 
 Rather than associating play with absolute freedom and flights of 
fancy, Bogost contends, "Play is the act of manipulating something that 
doesn’t dictate all of its capacities in advance, but that limits its capacities 
through focus and exclusion” (Bogost 2016, 92).  For Bogost, play is that 
which tests the borders and boundaries of a designed structure, and this 
points toward its enduring draw.  Sounding as if play is merely making the 
most out of a bad situation, Bogost makes an explicit link between novelty 
and the myriad complexities associated with playing something.  
Highlighting the primary affect of play as an activity, he explains, "Fun is 
not only delight in success, but also the panic of uncertainty, the agony of 
failure. […]  There facing the world's stark truth, we either throw up our 
hands in disgust or dread—or we persist and discover something new" 
(Bogost 2016, 81).  Here Bogost makes an interesting observation:  the 
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joy of play comes not from the product (i.e. winning) but from the process.  
Within the possibility-space, then, play finds its truest expression, and 
while there is certainly more than one way to have fun, this affect cannot 
exist without possibility.  
 In any situation and context in which I have had to defend my 
employment of playful approaches, and there have been a few, I have 
always found in interesting, albeit unsurprising, that there exists a 
common, although not universal, sense that enjoyment might act to 
diminish the robustness and validity of the overall enterprise.  While 
research suggests that increased levels of dopamine and endorphins, 
which result from positive and joyful experiences, promote learning, 
enjoyment is often a tertiary, if that, outcome (Willis 2006).  If the aim of 
the critic, as Latour argues, is to convene arenas for participants to gather, 
can and might a game be such a space?  In what comes across as a 
moment of sanguine reflexivity, Latour intimates, “[…] the resource of 
fiction can bring—through the use of counterfactual history, thought 
experiments, and ‘scientifiction’—the solid objects of today into the fluid 
states where their connections with humans may make sense.  Here 
again, sociologists have a lot to learn from artists” (Latour 2005, 82).  This 
is perhaps also where futurists have a lot to learn from gamers.  While 
games are fictional in the sense that they are artifacts of imagination, it 
has already been established that such approaches can (and do) have 
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serious aims and outcomes.  Within the context of futures, Inayatullah has 
shown how play (via gaming) “allows not just for an understanding of the 
deep structures of power, but creates the possibility of new forms of 
leadership, of a transformation of history and self” (2013, 10).  As a 
modality, play can illicit not just learning and self-understanding but also 
critical reflection on the form and content of such processes (Milojević and 
Inayatullah 2015).  In this way, play can be used to engender an 
alternative ontological comportment—a being-in-the-world where one 
enacts a new game.  From this purview, I use games to assemble a 
Latourian arena for play-based experimentation.  In the sections that 
follow, I critically reflect on my journey as a futures practitioner using 
games and play.  While the two projects are presented as "case studies," 
it is best, or perhaps even more fruitful, to engage them as the 
excogitations of a Latourian critic experimenting with and learning how to 
assemble efficacious arenas.   
A practical choice 	
 In June 2014, I was excited to confirm my participation in the Climate 
Engineering Conference 2014: Critical Global Discussions, which was 
organized by the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies in Berlin, 
Germany.  I was keen to learn from leading scholars in the field and share 
a bit about my research trajectory, and I must admit that I thought Berlin in 
late summer sounded quite nice.  Aside from having a paper accepted as 
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part of the "Climate Engineering & Social Engineering: Social and 
Technological Challenges in the Anthropocene" track, I proposed running 
a hands-on session using futures methods, which, at that time, were just 
gaining momentum and notoriety as a means of exploring potentialities for 
geoengineering.  I was delighted to hear that my workshop proposal, 
Postcards from the Future: Consensual and Contested Visions of Climate 
Engineering, was welcomed, and the conference organizers actually 
offered travel funding.  As fate would have it, I never made it to Berlin. 
 Around the same time, I had my first official engagement as a 
“foresight consultant” with UNDP, which took place during a regional 
innovation hub meeting in Istanbul, Turkey.  Working with the UN was a 
professional opportunity and personal achievement that I simply could not 
pass up, and it was at this event that I was approached about taking on a 
project.  The Tonga foresightXchange took place just two months later, 
and I began a professional relationship with the UN that continues to this 
day.  While I did not know it at the time, my choice had as much to do with 
embracing practice as it did with being a practical choice. 
 Since 2014, I have worked as a “foresight consultant” with the UN in 
nine countries, predominantly across Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia.  
Many, if not most, of these engagements have involved direct and lengthy 
interactions with local residents.  My own positionality as an “expert” paid 
by the UN to deliver a series of outcomes does much to shape how the 
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aforementioned engagements—most of which involved some type of 
futures game—have unfolded.  Indeed, the notion that I am an “expert” is 
something that I consciously problematize.  If given the opportunity to 
present either to UN staff or participants as part of the engagement, and 
this is not always the case, I often include the proviso: ‘the’ future does not 
exist, so no one is an expert.87  Accounting for my own privilege and the 
means by which I have directly and indirectly shaped outcomes through a 
range of design choices has led me to emphasize the necessity of co-
designing.  In theory, this creates attentiveness toward the immediate 
context, but, in practice, this also complicates the overall process as some 
decisions, especially those made by UN staff, have a host of unstated and 
implicit motives.  Indeed, working through and under the auspices of the 
UN raises a litany of issues, especially within communities where 
atrocities have unfolded under the aegis of the statist paradigm.  
Consequently, my relationship with the UN as a practitioner is complex 
and beset by a range of contradictions.  In the next two sections, I map 
how two engagements shaped my approach to games while providing 
additional reflection on my development as a practitioner.  
																																																								
87 This riffs of Dator’s 1st Law of the Future, which states that “the” future cannot be 
predicted because “the” future does not exist. I have often followed up with an aphorism 
attributed to Foucault: “I’m no prophet. My job is making windows where there were once 
walls.” Interestingly, Foucault also said, “In the struggle of men, nothing important ever 
passes through windows but always through the triumphant collapse of walls” (Tanke 
2009, 90). To date, I have never invoked the latter in a professional engagement.  
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Playing with the UN: Tonga 	
  In recent years, the United Nations (UN) system has implemented an 
aggressive effort to deploy futures, although foresight is often their 
preferred term, as part of its overall innovation agenda.  One of the groups 
leading on this approach within the UN system was the United Nation 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) Global Centre for Public Service 
Excellence (GCPSE), which was a jointly funded initiative with the 
Singapore government focusing on innovation within the civil service.  In 
June 2014, I was contracted by GCPSE to lead the Tonga 
foresightXchange—a joint venture between the Prime Minister’s Office, 
Government of the Kingdom of Tonga, and UNDP with logistical and 
financial support from UNDP in Tonga, the UNDP Pacific Centre, and 
UNDP’s Innovation Facility.  The 2014 Tonga foresightXchange was made 
up of three connected events:  
1. Public event held on 19 Aug 2014 in Nuku’alofa featuring an 
introduction to strategic foresight, futures literacy and an array of 
foresight tools; 
 
2. Private event for the Government of Tonga held on August 22, 
2014 in Nuku’alofa providing an overview of the results from the 
public event; and  
 
3. A side event at the Third United Nations Conference on Small 
Island Developing States (1 September 2014 - Apia, Sāmoa) with 
presentations from His Excellency the Prime Minister, Lord 
Tu’ivakano; Helen Clark, UNDP Administrator; Masagos Zulkifli, 
Senior Minister of State (Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs), 
Singapore; and Dr. Jim Dator, Emeritus Director, Hawai‘i Research 
Center for Futures Studies. 
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On Tuesday, 19 August 2014, the first, and largest, event of the 2014 
Tonga foresightXchange took place in Nuku’alofa—a workshop for 100 
citizens to imagine their preferred future for Tonga.  Once word spread 
about the event, attendance ballooned to somewhere between 110-130 
participants.  The theme for the event, which was set by GCPSE staff, 
focused on shifting the governing narrative: “From Small Island 
Vulnerability to Big Ocean Prosperity.”  In preparation for our mission, 
which was the first time in country for almost everyone, our team was put 
into contact with a local facilitator whose primary task was to offer insights 
as to how we might best engage participants and localize our processes.     
 During one of our team calls, we were told that the Planning Ministry 
often conducts consultations with rural villages and remote island 
communities, but this process is often informal and limited in scope.  In 
short, a representative from the government speaks to the oldest male in 
the village for 45 minutes and then leaves.  Seeking to disrupt this 
dynamic while also fostering an engaging space for cultural and traditional 
content to emerge, the foresight eXplorer was designed to help 
participants imagine their preferred values, behaviors, and structures for 
Tonga’s future, specifically in light of the narrative shift from “From Small 
Island Vulnerability to Big Ocean Prosperity.”  Functioning as a simple 
game using pre-defined and blank cards, the foresight eXplorer uses a 
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hex-based design to emphasize interrelations while also providing a clear 
constraint—as it is only possible to make six connections per card.  
 Participants could either select predefined cards or create their own 
content in each category, and many, if not most, groups generated content 
in Tongan using blank cards.  Participant-generated content was integral 
to localizing the overall process, especially as all of the game cards were 
printed in English only—an extraordinarily unfortunate result of the 
project’s rather short lead-time.  If there is one aspect of this project that 
continues to haunt me, it is this.  As a practitioner who has worked in a 
range of contexts, I find it unconscionable that participants were presented 
only with English-language content, although it was certainly the case that 
a majority of the dialogue at each table actually happened in Tongan.  In 
spite of the event being dual-language, the imposition of language, and by 
extension meaning, points toward the implicit and all-too-explicit 
challenges in the consultant-driven model often used for such events.88  In 
Figure 5 (below), one can see how participants used the foresight 
eXplorer, which also included a board to guide play.   
 
																																																								
88 Indeed, if given the opportunity, it is my preference to work with local practitioners and 
employ a “train the trainer’s” model. While this approach has been adopted for some of 
my engagements with the UN system, it continues to rely on the external consultant 
model for many, if not most, of these types of projects.  
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Figure 5: Tonga foresight eXplorer f inal outcome 
 
After connecting values, behaviors, and structures, participants added 
both challenges and opportunities to provide more depth and complexity.  
Additionally, participants were asked to generate emerging issues as a 
way of concluding the game and as a setup for the next exercise, which 
focused on narrative development through a persona.  Overall, feedback 
from participants and observers indicate that the public workshop was well 
received, and this likely has as much to do with the open nature of play.  In 
short, players build our scenarios as a collaborative mosaic—one where 
complex relationships and interconnections are realized through the 
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placement of cards.   
 Pre-created content for the game was developed in consultation with 
UNDP and its government partners, and one of the key questions that 
arose during this process was whether or not to include Tonga’s four core 
values: Fefaka’apa’apa’aki (mutual respect); Feveitokai’aki (sharing, 
cooperating, and fulfillment of mutual obligations); Lototoo 
(humility/generosity); and Tauhi vaha’a (loyalty/commitment).  These are 
closely associated with the nobility, and although Tonga has made great 
strides to democratize, it continues to be a highly striated society.  The 
decision to omit these values was predicated on the hypothesis that such 
an interjection might lead to performative responses, which is to say that 
we did not want participants to choose values they thought should part of 
Tonga’s future but rather those they wanted to define a preferred vision.  
The top three values used during the event were prosperity, family, and 
health.  In hindsight, it appears as though our decision not to include the 
core values was justified, and this speaks directly to the often complicated 
and contentious means by which such processes are designed.  As a 
practitioner, one must make choices that condition outcomes but also 
exchanges between participants, although it is impossible to anticipate 
every possibility.  In order to contain play within a certain time, each group 
was assigned a minimum of one facilitator, and many groups had two—
one proficient in Tongan and another with experience facilitating such 
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exercises.  All groups worked at their own pace during the 90-minute 
session, but only three created and placed wildcards, which was the final 
stage of play.  One of the primary challenges related to using the foresight 
eXplorer is data capture.  Unfortunately, high-quality images of each board 
were not taken, which means that some details were invariably missed.  
This highlights another key learning: the process is the product.  Indeed, it 
would be impossible to provide anyone who was not in the room with a 
snapshot of the affective dynamics that surrounded the creation of 
particular content, and this learning has shaped how I see games as a tool 
for not only producing alternative results but also staging engagements 
between participants.  
 While I have intentionally focused on the foresight eXplorer, it was 
only one part of a series of exercises and engagements that created the 
event.   As one of the aims of the overall gathering was to reimagine how 
a new narrative for Tonga might be realized, it felt important, if not 
necessary, to involve artists.  This further supported the event’s implicit 
aim to change not only what was being discussed but also how 
discussions were held.  Rather than use a "visual recorder," who draws a 
cartoon version of the meeting, we engaged a local artist collective who 
literally wandered in and out of various groups during the public event.  
They "absorbed" content by listening as the tables completed the day's 
exercises, including the foresight eXplorer, which was the centerpiece 
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activity.  In my conversations leading up to the event with Tevita Latu, who 
heads the collective and produced Island Ethics at the event, he 
expressed surprise that the UN would "use games and art" for "these 
types of things."   
 In addition to produce an original piece, each artist was asked to 
provide a short reflection.  Latu's "description" is quite powerful in how it 
articulates the complex and even contradictory imaginaries underlying 
Tongan society, which the foresight eXplorer helped to surface.  He 
reflects: 
The noble paramount parents of Tonga are the church and state. 
On the left is the mother – or the church – with the obligation to 
establish the flag of morale (which is the Christian morale), peace 
and the spirit of unification in the society. On the right is the father – 
or the state – who governs and takes care of the economy. The 
constitution was drawn from Godly facts with the hope that they will 
not be separated from the impact of development. Inside is a 
Tongan who wears a sisi lousi, which indicates our culture. The 
Tongan’s identity is formed while being raised at home, but includes 
the influence of other sectors of society on the upbringing. The 
black cloak at the back is the church, which is a refuge and 
protector. On it are new designs which is the outcome of the 
combination of ideas with our relatives abroad. Slow change is what 
we prefer and this applies also to our language, which is displayed 
by the new Tongan words. The fish represents our export of live 
ocean organisms abroad like pearl and sea cucumber. Export can 
be sustainable if we are to utilise it reasonably today. It is possible 
to find oil in the ocean floor in the future with improved research 
equipment. I have drawn the fish meat as a machine which 
represents the idea of high technology, which brings the light of 
education and new innovations that will ease the way forward. At 
the top is a light representing education, which is required for sharp 
increase in research and knowledge for new ideas and trading with 
overseas markets (Appendix 1). 
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Results from the public event were collected and reported directly to the 
government during a private session with the Prime Minister and his 
cabinet, who were a bit surprised to see a game accompanied by artwork 
produced by local artists.  My report, which was made publicly available, is 
available as Appendix 1 and provides more detail on specific outcomes as 
well as the artwork created at the event.   
 Findings and results from the pubic event were also put forward at 
the Small Island Developing States Conference held in Sāmoa later that 
year.  Although the event received praise from government, specifically 
the planning minister, the foresight eXplorer was not institutionalized or re-
deployed as a means of public engagement.  As a means of making this 
potentiality more real, a Tongan-language edition was produced and made 
available shortly after the public event.  As an arena for experimentation, 
the foresight eXplorer appears to have been an effective tool for critically 
exploring imaginaries and imagining both possible and preferable futures.  
Although there was no post-event survey, both GCPSE and its 
government partners directly expressed their overall satisfaction.  As for 
participants, four of the seven editions of the foresight eXplorer were “lost” 
at the public event, which suggests that at least some attendees wanted to 
keep playing.  
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Playing with the UN: fYR Macedonia  	
 Based on the strength of the Tonga foresightXchange, I was again 
contracted through UNDP to lead an engagement as part of the 
development of a long-term strategy for water management in the 
Strumitsa river basin in southeastern fYR Macedonia.  At this time, I had 
been “living” in Montenegro, which is another former Yugoslavia republic, 
for a few months, so I felt comfortable taking on this project.  From the 
outset, however, my playful approach was contested at the highest level.  
This phrasing resulted from a somewhat tense meeting—my first in the 
country—with the UN Resident Coordinator (RC) in fYR Macedonia, who 
expressed concerns over the usage of this approach, which she thought 
might be seen as trivializing the region’s somewhat serious needs relative 
to generating evidence to use for the strategy development process.  I 
agreed with her sentiment and manufactured the term “enhanced survey 
tool” to ease concerns about the UN being seen as "playing games."  This 
moniker was used throughout the multi-month project and spilled over into 
subsequent UN engagements.  
 For the Water for Life (W4L) project, the foresight eXplorer was 
substantially redesigned to suit the local context and specific needs of the 
W4L project, which was comprised of three series of events:  
1. A prototyping session held in Skopje on October 14, 2014; 
2. 10 multi-stakeholder workshops held in each of the region’s six 
municipalities from October 15 – December 12, 2014; 
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3. A final event to report W4L results held in Strumitsa on 
December 15, 2014.  
 
The aim for each multi-stakeholder workshop was to generate insights and 
data on the key challenges and opportunities surrounding the Strumitsa 
region.  Indeed, the overall scope of the W4L project could have not been 
more different than its predecessor.  Whereas Tonga had an explicitly 
qualitative approach, W4L was far more quantitative in its overall purpose 
and outcomes.  
 A local firm was contracted to facilitate all W4L workshops in 
Macedonian, and simultaneous translation was provided for the final 
event.  Following Tonga, I made it clear that dual-language or even full-
Macedonian events were not a mere preference but rather a necessity.  
Workshops were organized in both rural and urban municipalities, 
including Bosilovo, Konce, Novo Selo, Radovis, Strumitsa, and Vasilevo.  
In total, 210 people attended one of the workshops, and 83 citizens, 
including some participants from previous events, came to the final 
workshop.  At every workshop, groups completed a scorecard after each 
round of play leading to 397 unique entries from 84 gaming sessions (two 
per group) run during the 10 workshops.  This immensely aided with data 
capture. 
 Although the W4L foresight eXplorer used the same basic model for 
play (hex cards organized by category placed in a specific order) as the 
Tongan version, significant changes were made to the surrounding 
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workshop structure as well as the core elements of play.  In contrast to 
Tonga, participants used the foresight eXplorer twice during a half-day 
(about four hours on average) workshop.  In the first session, participants 
were asked to work collaboratively on the challenges and opportunities of 
the present.  Key prompts for this session were: 
• What Challenge will have the most impact on the Strumitsa River 
Basin today?  
• Which Action best fits with one of the Challenges?  
• Which Resource most relates to the Challenges and Actions in 
play?  
• Which Stakeholder is most impacted by the Resource or can act to 
solve the  
challenge using a specific Resource?  
 
After a short break and a brief presentation on “futures literacy,” which 
stressed the importance of moving beyond probability and plausibility in 
imagining futures, participants were asked again to use the foresight 
eXplorer, but instead focus on 2020 (Miller 2007).  Key prompts for this 
session included: 
• What Wild Card do you think will have the biggest impact on the 
Strumitsa region in 2020?  
• What Opportunity do you think can have the biggest effect on the 
Strumitsa region in 2020?  
• What Resource do you think is most critical to a Stakeholder & 
Action relationship in play?  
• What Challenge best connects with the other cards in play?  
 
Although I would have rather preferred to use the term "emerging issue" 
rather than "wild card," this decision was conditioned by the complexities 
of translation.   
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 One of the biggest shifts from Tonga to fYR Macedonia was the 
introduction of tokens, which generate another layer of data and, perhaps 
most importantly, offer a non-verbal means of exchange and engagement 
between the players.  After each player placed a card, players were asked 
to weight cards using tokens during each round.  Figure 6 (below) shows 
the tokens, which were red colored, placed on the cards.  
	
Figure 6: Macedonia foresight eXplorer 	
In placing tokens, players were asked to identify the card or cards that 
would have the biggest “future impact,” which is an intentionally 
amorphous and subjective qualifier aimed at stimulating dissent.  For 
example, “Evacuation of Local Population” was a player-generated card 
created in the Opportunities category.  It emerged three times in three 
different workshops (Bosilovo, Novo Selo, and Strumitsa C), and received 
	 185 	
weightings of 6, 7, and 10 on a scale of 3-12 (minimum to maximum).  
Although this card did not have a high frequency throughout many 
workshops, the strength of its weighting, as well as the fact that it came up 
in three different workshops, demonstrates its prevalence within regional 
imaginaries.  Further detail surrounding this particular example helps to 
frame how token weighting leads to more complex and contextualized 
imaginings, which further strengthened the tool’s overall efficacy as a 
means of engagement and experimentation.  In the Bosilovo workshop, 
the wildcard played just before “Evacuation of Local Population” was 
“Turia Dam Destruction.”  In the Novo Selo workshop, the wild card played 
just before was “Ilovica Mine.”  In the Strumitsa C workshop, the wild card 
played just before was also “Ilovica Mine.”  During the W4L project, the 
Ilovica Mine was under construction, and its looming presence clearly had 
an impact upon local imaginaries.  While the Ilovica Mine was expected to 
create jobs, citizens were clearly concerned about potential environmental 
impacts, although comments from the facilitators suggest that it was not 
discussed substantively.  This highlights a key learning: non-verbal 
gestures and mechanics, such as token weighting, provide a means to 
surface dissenting perspectives.  
As an "enhanced survey tool" emphasizing collaboration and 
discussion amongst multi-stakeholder groups, the efficacy of the W4L 
foresight eXplorer clearly rested in its deployment as a facilitated 
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workshop exercise.  The degree to which it operates as an actual “game” 
is relative to the degree to which one emphasizes the win condition, which 
seemed unimportant, if not completely irrelevant, to many, if not most, 
workshop participants.  As with other engagements, data capture 
remained a significant obstacle, especially given the complexity of the 
outputs, but the scorecard system and close facilitation worked well 
enough to generate a range of outputs.  My report, which was made 
public, is available as Appendix 2 and provides more detail on the overall 
event as well as an analysis of the outcomes.  At the beginning of each 
workshop, the participants were told that their feedback would enhance 
the tool itself, and, according to colleagues at UNDP fYR Macedonia, the 
foresight eXplorer was deployed for another project focusing on urban 
resilience two years later, so it seems as though the experiment is 
ongoing.  
 As with the Tonga edition, facilitators took digital photos of each 
group at each workshop, but many were difficult to read.  Content for the 
W4L foresight eXplorer was adapted from the European Commission’s 
programme of measures for water management, which appears to have 
been overly technical for some participants.  Clearly, there was a great 
deal of “local” knowledge, and meshing this with the game’s pre-created 
content varied by workshop.  The degree to which one utilizes technical or 
more general content to build out a game such as the foresight eXplorer 
points toward the necessity of localization and, perhaps most importantly, 
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experimenting with, rather than on, the participants.  Indeed, assembling 
an efficacious arena for experimentation is tantamount for facilitating a 
safe space for participants to critique, create, and contest as they see fit.		
Were it not for my engagements in Tonga and fYR Macedonia, I cannot 
say for certain that games would have featured so prominently in this 
project.  These specific projects shaped both my awareness of the 
complexities of engaging with participants as well as how the modality of 
play can and might be used as a means to shed light on imaginaries and 
experiment with futures.  In the next section, I provide a brief overview of a 
game that I co-developed for the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Center, which resulted in the release of an open-source gaming platform 
that features the Menagerie.  
Elephants, swans, and jel lyf ish…oh my!  	
Human maturity: this means rediscovering the seriousness we had 
towards play when we were children.  
- Friedrich Nietzsche (2001, 62).   
 
In 2014, the European Commission’s Joint Research Center (JRC) 
inaugurated its Policy Innovation Lab by creating a serious game, which 
was given the title: the JRC's Scenario Exploration System (hereafter JRC 
SES).89  Built as an engagement tool for a scenarios project on moving 
toward a sustainable EU by 2035, this “foresight gaming system" walks 
																																																								
89 Based on previous engagements, Dr. Aaron B. Rosa and I were contracted to work 
with JRC researchers to co-develop the JRC SES. 
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players into alternative futures by staging a series of actions and 
challenges.  In advancing toward 2035(s), players simultaneously uncover 
aspects of pre-created scenarios but also expand and deepen each 
alternative future’s narrative arc through interactive gameplay.  
Experiencing, or rather co-creating, an unfolding scenario is an explicit aim 
of the game, which uses role-play to highlight the range of perspectives 
one might take on what constitutes a “sustainable” EU and how such a 
lofty goal might be achieved.  In addition to providing each player with a 
unique role, such as EU-level policymaker or private sector, the JRC SES 
has a "gamemaster," who facilitates the experience and captures data.  
Although the game has since been repurposed to create other editions, 
there were certainly some lessons learned along the way. 
While much, if not most, of the feedback on the JRC SES was 
overwhelmingly positive, one aspect is worth scrutinizing further.  As 
Bontoux et al. explain, “It was clear that in cases where there was limited 
time after the game had finished, players often didn’t fully understand the 
process and the effects of what they had just gone through” (2016, 105).  
This suggests that the gamemaster role is not a luxury but rather a 
necessity, and the game only “works” when one has adequate time to 
debrief, which is to say that there must be a space to reflect on the overall 
process.  Given the somewhat technical and specific nature of the content, 
this should perhaps not be surprising.  With that said, this game was 
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designed as an engagement tool for audiences beyond the confines of the 
EC.  Following my experience as one of the co-designers of the JRC SES, 
I was extremely interested in playing with different game dynamics and 
creating a tool that had wider applicability.  In 2015, I designed an open 
source game based, in part, on the JRC SES model.  In the remaining 
pages, I provide a brief overview of this tool, which features the 
Menagerie.  I then reflect on how play-driven approaches, such as the 2X2 
SES, can draw on tools such as the Menagerie to produce powerful and, 
ultimately, efficacious affects.   
The 2X2 SES, which is built on the two uncertainties scenario 
modeling method, provides a generic framework for moving participants 
into the future(s).90  The GBN Matrix method, which selects two 
intersecting uncertainties and/or drivers of change to create four 
quadrants, is considered to be one of the most popular and widely used 
scenario modeling methods (Schwartz 1991; Millett 2003; Bishop et al. 
2007).  Although the limits of this approach are evident in its reductive 
framing, the method’s ease of use and plasticity provides fertile ground for 
experimentation (Curry & Schultz 2009; Ramirez & Wilkinson 2013).  One 
of the greatest challenges of this tool is finding the most contextually 
appropriate means by which to expand and explore the content and 
parameters of each quadrant.  With the above in mind, I designed the 2X2 																																																								
90 Appendix Three contains my original design brief for this game, and it provides the 
requisite context for the remainder of the chapter. 
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SES for a mutant form of "incasting."   
Coined by Dator to capture the experience of workshop participants 
inhabiting and enlivening alternative futures, incasting is a process 
‘‘designed to increase the flexibility with which people plan for the future, 
and to increase their creativity in making use of both opportunities and 
challenges emerging from change’’ (Curry and Schultz 2009, 49).91  As 
Jones explains, incasting applies abductive reasoning to the assumptions 
of a particular “image of the future” as a means of identifying the systems 
inherent to that scenario’s world (Jones 2002).  In my mutation of 
incasting, one’s aim is not merely to deduce “plausible” parameters and 
systemic conditions but rather to enter into the world of the image of the 
future under analysis.  As a means of surfacing both actual and perceptual 
framings, incasting complicates how alternative futures are understood, 
which has led some to critique its efficacy.  As Serra argues, incasting has 
more to do with seeing the future from alternative perspectives than it does 
with the “feasibility of any given future” (Serra 2013).  Although Serra 
characterizes this as incasting’s weakness as a method, I envisage this 
aspect as a strength to enliven dissent, which, as previously noted, is a 
means of keeping the future a space of possibility, rather than mere 
plausibility, as well as ensuring that politics remains at the fore of such 
																																																								
91 Per a personal correspondence, Dator has moved away from using “incasting” and now 
uses “deductive forecasting,” using the “seven driving forces matrix,” he argues that it is 
possible to deduce alternative futures for any issue or phenomena (Dator et al. 2015).   
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imaginings.  
As with the JRC SES, the 2X2 variant employs time horizons (5-10-
20 years) as a means of creating spatio-temporal dynamism—simply put, 
staged content to further the scenario.  Players assume a role, create a 
vision or goal within the constraints of the scenario, take actions toward 
the achievement of their individual vision, weight their own actions with 
resource tokens, and then reflect on the overall "future impact" of the 
actions of others using another set of tokens.  Once everyone has taken a 
turn, the "winning" player introduces either a Black Elephant (what are 
most people missing or not seeing?); Black Swan (what do people think 
would never happen?); or Black Jellyfish (what can or might lead to 
chaos?).  This model continues for each of the three rounds and 
culminates in two "win conditions."  In quantitative terms, it is possible to 
calculate which player received the most "future impact" tokens, and this 
simple "scoring" element stimulates competition.  In qualitative terms, 
players discuss who amongst them was the closest to achieving her 
vision, which opens up a more exploratory exchange.  While the first "win 
condition" often provides a good laugh, the second is, without question, 
the most critical and illuminates the tool's implicit learning outcome: the 
impotence of linear planning, policy, and strategy approaches.  Invariably, 
few players achieve their vision, which illuminates how the 2X2 acts as a 
hybrid finite/infinite game.   
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 The 2X2 SES is very much a finite game in that it has a discreet 
start and finish.  The game ends when players reach the final horizon, 
scores are calculated, and the players discuss the results.  On the other 
hand, it becomes clear during play that mixing up the axes and 
randomizing the usage of the Menagerie moves the 2X2 SES more 
towards an infinite game in scope.  Indeed, in the numerous versions of 
the 2X2 SES that I have designed for a range of clients, someone has 
always asked, “Can we keep playing?”  From my perspective, this simple 
query always deserves a positive response, but it is sometimes the case 
that the allotment of time does not permit multiple sessions.  In principle, I 
aim to have players work through at least two quadrants (or scenarios) 
using the same role, which reinforces the different potentialities that can 
and might arise given each scenario’s overall logic.  There is another, 
perhaps less obvious, aspect of the 2X2 SES that positions it as an infinite 
game, and this involves the Menagerie directly.  If the aim of the 
Menagerie is to enliven alternative ethico-political imaginaries, then there 
are an innumerable number of potential subject positions from which to 
model black elephants, black swans, and black jellyfish within and across 
the quadrants.  The aim, then, of elephants, swans, and jellyfish at play is 
not to exhaust all possibilities but rather to unframe such potentialities—to 
move one toward the unthought.  This is where the Menagerie playfully 
enacts Nandy’s game, and this is precisely where dissenting visions come 
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to the fore—in assembled arenas for trans-subjective positionalities to 
compete, cooperate, and collaborate.  
Conclusion: Facts and concerns at play 	
I began this chapter by exploring Latour's distinction between 
matters of fact and matters of concern.  Charting the plight of Ioane 
Teitiota to achieve refugee status in New Zealand, I showed that this 
division has real-world consequences and metaphysical implications.  
Furthermore, this distinction provided a point of entry for games to be 
employed as a critical and creative mode of engagement.  I then reviewed 
how games function as a tool for using a modality of play, which can and 
might act as an affective heuristic for learning and engagement.  Through 
a practice-based reflection on two "case studies," I charted the challenges 
and opportunities of using games within a workshop setting.  I then looked 
at how the 2X2 SES playfully deploys the Menagerie as a means of 
eliciting radical potentialities and fostering dissent.  As a practitioner using 
the modality of play, I have learned how one might play, which is to say 
that my allegiance as a futurist toward the possibility-space is, in no small 
part, driven but also enacted by playful modalities. 
In the next chapter, I begin by looking at how games might (and 
might not) support systems thinking, which is integral to futures as an 
approach. I then offer a design brief that outlines the scope, setting, 
situation, scenario, stuff, audience, structure, setup, content, and 
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gameplay of GeoFutr—an alternative futures-driven gaming platform 
designed to critique, create, and ultimately contest geoengineered 
imaginaries.  Finally, I offer a critical reading of the Oxford Principles as a 
means of setting up my vision of a politics for geoengineering. 
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Chapter 5: A Game for All  Seasons 
 
Curious results 	
 In 2014, the Polar Learning and Responding: PoLAR Climate 
Change Education Partnership at Columbia University’s Barnard College 
developed EcoChains: Arctic Crisis.  The game focuses on helping players 
learn about interconnections amongst the Arctic’s marine food system, the 
role of sea ice in maintaining a balance amongst different species, and 
challenges and changes to this landscape.  In the game, players must 
strategize to sustain as many species as possible, which also involves 
maintaining sea ice reserves, by building food webs.  EcoChains is one of 
a recent number of serious games aimed at spreading science beyond the 
classroom and laboratory. 
 Receiving funding from the National Science Foundation to create 
the game, the PoLAR Hub has made a concerted effort to assess the 
impact of such projects—an actual requirement related to its funding.  
In 2015, a small controlled experiment (n=41) was run to compare the 
learning gains between EcoChains and more traditional methods, 
specifically a “magazine-style” article featuring comparable content.  
Researchers sought to reveal which format (game versus article) would 
produce more robust outputs in a few key areas: 
Knowledge of Climate Change and the Arctic Region 
-  Does the educational approach affect immediate gains in 
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knowledge and longer-term retention of knowledge?  
-  Does the educational approach affect self-assessments of 
learning and gains in knowledge? 
Attitudes and Beliefs about Climate Change and its Impacts  
-  Does the educational approach affect attitudes toward climate 
change, the Arctic region, and humans’ role in and responsibility for 
climate change and the Arctic region? 
Information-Seeking Behaviors  
-  Does the educational approach affect engagement and 
motivation to engage with climate change information and 
resources?  
Systems Thinking  
-  Does the educational approach affect level of systems thinking 
about the Arctic region and ecosystems?  
Impressions of and Engagement with the Intervention Experience  
-  Do level of engagement with and/or enjoyment of each 
educational approach differ?  
-  Does level of engagement with the educational approach affect 
knowledge, perceived knowledge, attitude, behaviors and systems 
thinking? (Pfirman et. al 2015). 
 
In addition to a follow-up survey carried out four weeks after the 
experiment, participants in this study were also given questionnaires and a 
mapping exercise to complete as a means to demonstrate "systems 
thinking," which is the capacity to map the connections between parts, 
specifically, in this instance, the various parts of the Arctic ecosystem. 
 According to the results, game players demonstrated greater and 
more diverse subject matter recall than those who simply read the article, 
which is to say that the game led to greater understanding of the content 
(Pfirman et. al 2015).  As EcoChains relays somewhat technical content in 
a decidedly playful way, this outcome is especially interesting—not to 
mention relevant when thinking about how to design a game on 
geoengineering.  Students who played the game also showed more 
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attachment to the subject matter, which is evidenced by a clear majority 
stating that they had an increase in knowledge about how they might 
personally and individually help protect the Arctic region.  As Pfirman 
playfully points out, EcoChains suggests, "new information is 'stickier' 
when gained through game play than through traditional approaches" 
(Pfirman 2015).92  Interestingly, while the game created more engagement 
and learning, it did not surpass, or equal, the article in fostering “systems 
thinking," which is the primary driver of gameplay.  Indeed, as the overall 
aim of the game is to manage the Arctic ecosystem, this result is rather 
curious, and the team behind EcoChains postulates that this somewhat 
surprising outcome has much to do with the fact that the article contained 
a complete systems map of the Arctic region as with the variable nature of 
content that arises during gameplay.   
 For many in futures, this outcome might raise an eyebrow as many, 
if not most, contemporary futures methods, and scenarios in particular, 
invite, if not necessitate, a systems thinking approach.  It certainly seems 
contradictory that the players retained more information but had trouble 
"mapping" what they learned.  When correlated with feedback from the 
JRC SES, EcoChains raises an interesting issue related to my design: 
																																																								
92 While EcoChains induced “stickiness,” it is unclear if this dynamics extends to other 
games, contexts, and topics. Overall, there is a lack of critical analyses of games and 
gaming approaches, particularly within futures, and I specifically address this in the 
section on future(s) research trajectories. I am thankful to Dr. Jim Dator for raising this 
important matter of concern.  
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what comes after?  If my game aims to act as a replacement for exercises 
performed during a scenario-modeling workshop, then something must 
come (before and) after.  While I have designed such processes, as 
evidenced by the two case studies, I have intentionally limited my scope in 
this chapter to focus solely on the design of a game, although I address 
this issue in the section where I provide my vision for a politics of 
geoengineering.  In the next section, I explore how object-relation mapping 
(ORM) and experiential futures situate my design and inform my approach 
to deploying play.  
Situating play  	
 In seeking ways of creating a game that opens up spaces of radical 
possibility and moves players toward the unthought, the materialist turn 
has proven to be an invaluable resource.  In 2014, Banks published 
"Object-relation mapping: A method for analysing phenomenal 
assemblages of play," which calls attention to the ways with which play 
gets constructed through a network of relations.  ORM draws heavily from 
ANT and opens up the "phenomenal assemblages" that constitute 
gameplay.  As Banks explains: 
ORM [empowers] the human actor (the player) to define the site, 
taking words in their personal accounts of play as conspicuous 
traces of objects and object-relations in that site, and providing a 
structure for analysing assemblages across various play spaces 
and materialities (Banks 2014, 7). 
 
As my game is a physical object intended as a replacement for exercises 
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carried out at a scenarios modeling workshop, it is worth considering the 
game's materiality—the structure of the board, card designs, and choice of 
other elements.  In contrast to other approaches, ORM is acutely attentive 
to the variety of relations, as well as scales, from which play can and 
might unfold.  Presencing macro, meso, and micro-scale phenomena, 
ORM offers not only a means to analyze games, which was the author's 
original intent, but also a guide for how one might design a game.  Given 
how some other games have struggled to engender systems thinking, my 
particular interest in ORM centers in how it might brings one's attention to 
the different scales at play within geoengineered imaginaries.  What scalar 
traces might be realized through play?  How might the game explore the 
relations surrounding and underlying geoengineered imaginaries?  How 
might attentiveness to various relations, human and otherwise, help to 
foster dissent?  How might attentiveness to scale enliven a politics for 
geoengineering? 
 An acute awareness to scale, as well as an emphasis on 
engagement, inspired the rise of experiential futures, which is an 
intellectual and practice-based movement that formalizes, theoretically 
speaking, the wide array of participatory approaches and concretization 
strategies used primarily, but not solely, by futurists to move people to feel 
different and thinking openly about the future(s).  Although I have already 
invoked, and problematized, experiential futures in relation to pre-created 
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scenarios, I want to return to how this approach stages affective 
engagements as it helps to situate my design within a broader movement 
born from futures.  
 Noting the interconnections inherent to futures and design-based 
approaches, Candy and Dunagan explain: 
The breadth of experiential futures as a design space makes it a 
suitable conceptual and generative container for those less 
concerned with particular media or arts traditions than with 
catalysing high-quality engagement, insight, and action to shape 
change, using whatever means fit the situation (2017, 3). 
 
Experiential futures features “tangible, immersive, interactive, live, and 
playable modes” to simulate, literally speaking, a possible future or futures 
within the present (Candy & Dunagan 2017, 2).  My primary interest rests 
in "playable" modes of engagement, specifically how such means can 
bring "into being different worlds as our attention comes to them" (Candy & 
Dunagan 2017, 14).  Invoking attention illuminates the importance of 
percepts and affects in such engagements—indeed, one might say that 
this approach sets out to "game" the brain.  With that said, the "win" 
condition of experiential futures is “thinking and feeling future possibilities,” 
which is to say that the actual game being proposed via this method is 
infinite in scope (Candy & Dunagan 2017, 3).   
 As a means of coalescing this approach into a tangible and usable 
framework, Candy and Dunagan created the "Experiential Futures 
Ladder," which shows the nested framings that one can and must consider 
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when instantiating the future(s).  At the broadest level, one finds the 
setting, which refers to the general context and framing of the future(s).  
One level down one encounters the scenario, which is a more specific 
articulation of the future(s), typically in narrative form.  At the third level, 
the situation is where circumstances and/or events are staged so as to 
elicit an affective response.  Although not part of Candy's original 
framework, stuff has been included to account for the tangible things and 
artifacts that often form points of entry for such engagements.  Image 4 
(below) shows an updated graphic representation of the ladder, which also 
includes the designation of an "experiential threshold" (Candy and 
Dunagan 2016; Candy and Dunagan 2017).  As with any other tool or 
method, theory and practice are symbiotic but not synonymous, which is to 
say that the threshold, as previous anecdotes suggest, is as subjective as 
it is contextual.   
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Figure 7: The Experiential Futures Ladder 	
In using experiential approaches, it has been my experience that 
the development process and subsequent delivery necessitate a high 
degree of agility and fluidity.  As with games, with whom and where one 
plays has an extraordinary affect upon what can and cannot be played 
with.  I find the addition of the threshold to the ladder instructive, as this is 
precisely where I aim to locate my game design, which blends setting, 
scenario, and situation.  I have also instantiated an artifact, or stuff, 
although this does not figure directly into gameplay.  In terms of the design 
itself, experiential futures has challenged me to think about what can be 
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designed and what can and ought to be random, serendipitous, and 
uncertain.  It is very much the case that one cannot (and should not 
attempt to) design for all potentialities, as earlier anecdotes and the two 
case studies suggest—games are uncertainty incarnate.  They must be 
given life through play and reflect the dynamics of the world(s) around 
them.  Given the aegis of postnormal times, randomness figures 
prominently into my design, although I remain acutely aware of its 
potential pitfalls.  As Costikyan explains: 
Randomness thus has strengths: it adds drama, it breaks 
symmetry, it provides simulation value, and it can be used to foster 
strategy through statistical analysis. It has countervailing 
weaknesses: in excess, it imbalances games, it can foster a sense 
that success is a consequence of luck rather than excellent play, 
and it can produce frustration when a streak of bad luck affects a 
player (Costikyan 2013, 86). 
 
Playing a game when one knows the outcome is anathema to play itself; 
indeed, it is precisely not knowing the outcome that ignites play.  The 
challenge, then, is to craft an engagement whereby player choices have 
an impact but also remain subject to larger forces as well as the moves of 
other players.  In short, it is essential to find a balance between ignorance 
and uncertainty in terms not only of content but also play.  As with all other 
games, one makes a move not knowing fully what the results might be, 
although every move is always pregnant with assumptions, expectations, 
and hope.  Capturing this design dilemma succinctly, Costikyan observes, 
"In general, designers rarely think about the tuning of perceptual 
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challenges, but perhaps they should; one way to make any game more 
difficult, after all, is to make it harder for the player to perceive precisely 
what action they must take at any given time" (Costikyan 2013, 101-102).  
Again, finding the requisite balance between deciding what action one 
might take and not knowing its outcome is central to my design. 
 Player perceptions has been at the fore of my thinking, and my 
choice to create a game, rather than alternative futures scenarios, has 
much to do with staging an interactive and affective means to enliven a 
politics for geoengineering.  Central to this politics is an awareness of the 
recalcitrant uncertainties and ignorance surrounding and shaping 
geoengineered imaginaries.  Again, Costikyan elucidates, "games require 
uncertainty to hold our interest, and that the struggle to master uncertainty 
is central to the appeal of games" (2013, 2).  While this is very much the 
case within a finite game, infinite games necessitate a different sort of 
mastery—one more aligned with axioms and assumptions surrounding 
PNT.  In my design, this "mastery," which is more akin to navigation, is 
enlivened through the Menagerie, which the participants enact by 
imagining innovations, disruptions, shocks, threats, uncertainties, and 
even ignorance to continue, complicate, frustrate, and alter play via 
“outside” positionalities.  As with my previous engagements, pre-created 
content merely sets the stage for improvisation, and my design 
intentionally offers openings for players to change the game. 
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 The variable nature of play might frustrate some, but this is another 
means to enliven, as well as enact, an exploratory politics centered on 
experimentation.  As with some of my previous engagements, my design 
balances learning versus localizing, and as geoengineering is the focus of 
play, the design must achieve a relative harmony between technical 
content and creative imagining, although the underlying themes—
centralization, corporatization, and commitment—are certain to be familiar 
to some, if not many.  In the context of geoengineering governance, these 
forces dominate much of the debate and, consequently, geoengineered 
imaginaries, which is why they have a prominent role in the game.  In the 
next section, I provide a design brief that outlines the scope, setting, 
situation, scenario, stuff, audience, structure, setup, content, and 
gameplay of GeoFutr— an alternative futures-driven game designed to 
critique, create, and ultimately contest geoengineered imaginaries.   
Design brief 	
Communicating gameplay is not easily accomplished via textual 
means.  This design brief offers a point of entry for understanding the 
depth and complexity of a gaming experience designed as a facilitated 
exercise for a scenarios workshop setting.  In the sections that follow, I 
outline GeoFutr’s scope, setting, situation, scenario, stuff, audience, 
structure, setup, content, and gameplay while also invoking the theoretical 
framings and concepts developed throughout this project.  Welcome to 
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GeoFutr.  Figure 8 (below) shows the logo I created for the game that 
illuminates the stakes as well as foreshadows the global, yet 
interconnected, aspects of gameplay. 
	
Figure 8: GeoFutr logo 	
Scope 	
GeoFutr takes place in an alternative future—one where 
geoengineering is being hotly debated.93  The when (time horizon) of this 
future is intentionally undefined.  As with the Three Tomorrows (3T) 
method, which blends extended present, familiar future(s), and unthought 
future(s), the game invites and challenges participants to reflect on the 																																																								
93 In relation to the “Mānoa School” scenario modeling method, which uses the 
archetypes of growth, disciplined, transform, and new beginnings, the game blends 
aspects of each, although the players ultimately define the contours of the scenario 
(Dator 2009; Dator 2014). With that said, the blending of both driving forces and themes 
creates the potentiality for various archetypes to emerge within a single gameplay 
session. In the section of the conclusion on future(s) research trajectories, I propose 
integrating other scenario modeling methods, including the “Mānoa School” approach.  
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possibility of such a future as a tomorrow by treating the game as an 
actuality in the here and now.  The immediacy of this future is made 
evident through the utilization of known entities, namely the United Nations 
(UN).  This also supports the game’s global context, and the degree of 
localization that arises during play is reliant upon both player roles and the 
exchanges that arise during play.  Consequently, this particular element is 
left to chance, although the game prompts specificity with regards to place 
through various prompts. 
GeoFutr’s primary scope is critiquing, creating, and ultimately 
contesting geoengineered imaginaries by “incasting” alternative futures.  
As such, the game explores the actual (uncertainty) and perceptual 
(ignorance) dynamics surrounding geoengineering and its underlying 
imaginaries.  To achieve this end, GeoFutr uses two driving forces 
(uncertainty and ignorance) and centers on three predominant themes 
within the ongoing geoengineering debate: centralization, corporatization, 
and commitment.  As a tool for experimentation, the game materializes a 
politics for geoengineering by staging ethico-political provocations, which 
emerge through interactions between the players.  In this way, the game is 
a Latourian arena for participants to assemble and the emergence of 
dissent, which is facilitated through play, materializes a politics for 
geoengineering.  
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Audience 
 
As the game is currently only available in English, this dramatically 
limits its reach.  With that said, the game was designed for a general 
audience, although having some familiarity with geoengineering certainly 
aids in making play more dynamic.   
Setting  
 
The United Nations stands at a crossroads.  The myriad effects of 
climate change have driven millions from their homes and ushered in an 
era of political and economic uncertainty.  Champions for geoengineering 
have lobbied for immediate deployment.  In spite of increasing high-level 
interest in this “remedy,” many still feel that the uncertainties surrounding 
such interventions prohibit implementation.  Some researchers are unsure 
if the public has enough knowledge to make an informed decision.  In 
hopes of bridging this gap, the United Nations has organized an 
aggressive campaign to bring together participants from around the world 
to offer their views, although they have been careful to maintain “neutral” 
ground.   
Situation 
 
As part of its engagement strategy, the UN has asked for specific 
inputs on potential research, possible implementation, and prospective 
governance.  Using holographic virtual environs and real-time translation 
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technology, almost anyone can participate, although representative 
engagement on a global scale continues to be a challenge.  As a means of 
disrupting its usual engagement tactics, the UN General Assembly ratified 
a proposal supporting random selection, although participants can 
delegate to someone else living in their locality.  This has raised concerns 
over potential fraud, but all participants undergo a thorough biometric 
review process.  All sessions are broadcast in real-time all around the 
world, and the public is invited to pose responses, questions, and 
comments during each session. 
Scenario 
 
Play involves “incasting” scenarios, which are constructed by 
randomly selecting key driving forces and themes.  At one level, ignorance 
and uncertainty shape public perceptions of geoengineering research, 
proposals, and potential governance paradigms by acting as perceptual 
and actual constraints by which alternative futures can and might be 
imagined.  At another level, the themes of centralization, corporatization, 
and commitment condition imaginaries by shaping much of the ongoing 
debate.  During the setup stage, dice are rolled to determine the 
combination of the above elements.  To allow for the investigation of truly 
alternative futures scenarios, the game employs a high/low dynamic to 
vary each of the themes and driving forces.  Starting with ignorance and 
uncertainty, this leads to four possible scenarios, which are focused on the 
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geoengineering debate.   
In centering the scenarios on the debate itself, the game offers a 
reflective means by which the players can imagine themselves as 
participants in a real-world discussion.  When the three themes—
centralization, corporatization, and commitment—are added using the 
same high/low dynamic, 32 scenario permutations are created, as seen in  
Appendix 4.  This demonstrates how the game can be used to explore a 
wide array of possible futures.  Each scenario, however, is a mere shell, 
and the players craft the actual scenario as the game unfolds.  
Stuff 
 
The game is materialized through a series of objects, including a 
board, cards, and dice.  Additionally, I created an artifact from the future, 
as seen in Figure 9 below, to support further immersion.  Designed as an 
invitation to play, this artifact introduces a fictional corporation, ROTAD 
CORP, who supported the UN by providing an artificial intelligence to help 
facilitate the engagement process.  ROTAD CORP is used as a means to 
model the dynamics surrounding the Planktos incident, although the 
variable nature of gameplay does not ensure that it will arise during 
gameplay.  As part of the game’s pre-created content, ROTAD CORP is 
suggested to have carried out a legally ambiguous solar radiation 
management (SRM) experiment on Inuit land in Alaska.  This provocation 
is shown in card form in the Content section of this brief. 
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Figure 9: Invitation letter art ifact from the future 	
Structure 	
A “gamemaster” facilitates the experience and ensures that the 
basic guidelines of play are followed.  Furthermore, the gamemaster acts 
as a guide to answer questions and provide clarifications about the pre-
created content.  In principle, which is not the same as practice, the game 
master should be familiar with the pre-created content.  Aside from the 
gamemaster, GeoFutr features two types of player roles.  Four players 
take on the role of an “Official Participant,” who have been invited to play 
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by the UN.  Some roles have been pre-created, such as “Community 
Elder” and “Unemployed PhD Graduate,” but there are also blank cards so 
any of the “Official Participant” players can create their own role.  As part 
of the game, “Official Participant” players are asked to provide depth for 
her role.  A fifth player takes on a very different role: the “Public Voice.”  
This role functions as the game’s primary provocateur and uses the 
Menagerie to actualize the unseen, unspoken, and unheard by introducing 
a range of issues, which might take the form of innovations, disruptions, 
shocks, threats, uncertainties, and even ignorance to continue, 
complicate, frustrate, and alter play.  “Official Participant” players make 
statements in response to challenges and weight the impact of responses, 
which can receive support from the “Public Voice” player.   
Content 	
 GeoFutr uses different categories of cards to carry out gameplay.  
Role cards provide prompts for “Official Participant” players to create more 
depth and complexity for their subject position.  The range of roles used in 
the game can dramatically alter how play unfolds.  As a means of 
diversifying exchanges between players and promoting a rich experience 
that covers all three themes—centralization, corporatization, and 
commitment—a pre-created deck of Challenge cards introduces a range 
of challenges, issues, and obstacles.  These cards are randomly 
distributed to the “Official Participant” players and cover a range of 
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aspects, including research, implementation, and governance related to 
geoengineering.  In support of covering these aspects during play and 
highlighting the three themes, “Official Participant” players use Statement 
Cards to share their views.   These cards prompt players to provide 
insights from local perspectives.  While “Official Participant” players are 
expected to make an oral statement, the cards provide a medium for them 
to write out their thoughts, which also offers a means to capture data.  
Figure 10 (below) shows the design for Role, Challenge, and Statement 
cards.  Blank cards are also available for each, so players may create 
unique content, which adds to the range of potentialities that might arise 
during play. 
 The main act of play for the “Public Voice” player features the use 
of Menagerie cards, which serve to invoke the dynamics of postnormal 
times (PNT) throughout the game.  Introducing Black Elephants 
(contradictions), Black Swans (complexity), and Black Jellyfish (chaos) at 
the outset of play as well as at the beginning of each round, the “Public 
Voice” player exercises an extraordinary amount of influence on the game, 
especially as “Official Participant” players are expected to reference these 
cards as part of their subsequent statements.   
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Figure 10: Role, Challenge, and Statement cards 	
Menagerie cards are location generic, and part of the function of the 
“Public Voice” player is to localize this content.  As with other categories, 
the “Public Voice” player may select from a range of pre-created cards or 
create their own.  The only rule for placing Menagerie cards is this: the 
“Public Voice” player must roll a 12-sided dice to determine a regional 
impact (Arctic, Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, South 
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Pacific islands, North Pacific islands, Central America, North America, 
South America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe).  This ensures that the 
game is both global and local in scope.  Figure 11 (below) shows an 
example of a Menagerie card as well as a blank version.  In the example 
below, the pre-created Menagerie card is a Black Jellyfish, which focuses 
on chaos.  As such, the card queries:  Where is this event? For whom 
does this create chaos? How might this event impact the ongoing debate? 
	
Figure 11: Menagerie card 	
Gameplay 	
The game begins when players listen to the Setting and Situation, 
which provides an introduction to the overall experience.  Next, dice are 
rolled to select the scenario, which is then read aloud to the players.  For 
the purposes of this overview, the following scenario has been selected: 
Uncertainty is high & Ignorance is low; Centralization and Commitment are 
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high and Corporatization is low.  In narrative form, the gamemaster” might 
explain as follows: “In this particular scenario, uncertainty is high, but 
ignorance is low.  This suggests that many, if not most, people are unsure 
of the effects and impacts of geoengineering, but it is also the case that 
the public, broadly defined, understands the technology and its risks.  With 
regards to proposals for geoengineering research, implementation, and 
governance, there is quite a lot of debate on centralization and 
commitment.  Corporatization, on the other hand, is not a major topic of 
discussion.”  Next, this scenario is placed onto the board, which helps to 
guide and direct play.  Figure 12 (below) shows the layout of the board as 
well as the spaces where scenario content is placed. 
	
Figure 12: Board with scenario placement 
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When the scenario is added to the board, this provides an 
opportunity for the players to ask questions or seek clarifications. Should 
players “stray” too far from the scenario’s defining logic (i.e. the mix of 
driving forces and themes), the gamemaster can (and ought) to intervene, 
although this remains at her discretion and has more to do with one’s 
facilitation style as having players break with the scenario can provide a 
unique opportunity during the game’s debrief session, which immediately 
follows play and offers a chance for the players to reflect on their 
experience and learning outcomes.  
Once all questions and clarifications have been addressed, “Official 
Participant” players create a role based on either a pre-created card or 
one of their own choosing.  Depending on the roles chosen, gameplay can 
vary widely.  In order to keep play variable, it would be best to have a mix 
of roles from various sectors: government, corporate, academic, nonprofit, 
etc.  A diversity of roles would ensure that a wide array of topics and 
concerns are engaged.  Once all of the “Official Participant” players have 
created a role, they share who they are with the other players. From this 
point forward in the game, they “are” their role.  Immersion is central to the 
game as part of the debrief centers on asking participants to reflect on 
how much of what was played was “them” versus their “role.”  This 
provides a direct entry point for working through the percepts and affects 
surrounding and underlying geoengineered imaginaries.  
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Next, the gamemaster explains the basic structure of play and 
randomly distributes two Challenge and Statement cards to each of the 
“Official Participant” players as well as a blank version, so players can 
choose what content they want to use.  The “Public Voice” player is then 
asked to place a Menagerie card on the board.  The aim of opening play 
with the Menagerie is to invoke the unseen, unspoken, and unheard from 
the outset.  While “Official Participant” players maintain the same role 
throughout the game, the “Public Voice” player can invoke any and all 
subject positions when asking questions and placing Menagerie cards.  
This further supports the aim of using the Menagerie to engender trans-
subjective positionalities.  As previously noted, there is pre-created deck of 
Menagerie cards, but play would benefit immensely if the “Public Voice” 
player created a provocation that speaks to both the specifics of the 
scenario and the “Official Participant” roles.  Figure 13 (below) shows the 
placement of both the Role and Menagerie cards on the board. 
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Figure 13: Board with role and Menagerie cards 	
After the first Menagerie card has been placed, “Official Participant” 
players roll dice to see who begins the first round of play. Challenge cards 
are sorted according to theme—research, implementation, and 
governance—and placed into three piles.  When “Official Participant” 
players use a Challenge card, they roll the dice to determine from which 
pile they will select a replacement card. If a player wants another blank 
Statement card, they may purchase one using two “impact” tokens. The 
game’s token economy is explained in full on the next page.  After placing 
a Statement card, all players have the opportunity to ask questions and 
seek out clarifications. The “Public Voice” player is expected, although not 
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required, to respond to each of the “Official Participant” players after each 
turn.  Figure 14 (below) shows the placement of Statement cards on the 
board. 
	
Figure 14: Board with statement cards 	
Once all questions have been answered, the “Official Participant” players 
take turns placing “impact” tokens, which offers a reflective, and non-
verbal, means of engaging the ideas in play.  Players can place up to 
three tokens (per round), which may be put on any card or cards.  Simply 
put, the prompt for this act is: which statement or statements do you think 
will have the biggest impact?  “Official Participant” players cannot place 
tokens on their own card, and each has a unique color token to identify 
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scoring.  After “Official Participant” players place “impact” tokens, the 
“Public Voice” player places “support” tokens, which amplify (via 
multiplication) the weight of impact tokens.   
Placing tokens provides both an “economy” for the game but also 
invokes competition, which can be useful for enhancing play experiences.   
The “Public Voice” player places five “support” tokens per round, and, as 
their name suggests, these tokens demonstrate a positive response from 
the public. The player whose Statement card has the highest score 
(impact multiplied by support tokens) starts play in the next round, which 
begins after the “Public Voice” player places another Menagerie card.  
This pattern repeats for two more rounds.  Figure 15 (below) shows a 
completed gaming session. 
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Figure 15: Board showing a completed game 	
Although the game offers a finite win condition, the possibility of playing 
other scenarios with unique conditions, situate the game as infinite.  For 
the purposes of each session, the “winner” is the player whose cards 
received the highest score (impact multiplied by support tokens).  In the 
event of a tie, the gamemaster may ask the “Public Voice” player to place 
three additional “support tokens” on the board.   
Each game ought to conclude with a debrief session to isolate the 
main outcomes and results of play.  Ideally, “Official Participant” players 
retain the same role for play in another scenario.  This furthers the aim to 
“incast” scenarios, and play will likely be accelerated once the players 
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learn the rules.  Following each gaming session, players are also 
encouraged to write a short narrative based on the game.  In locating the 
game as part of a broader workshop setting, outcomes and results can be 
used for other exercises toward a range of outputs, particularly planning, 
policy, and strategy development processes.  
While GeoFutr exploits the benefits of games and play as a conduit 
for creative engagement and experimentation, it also has many of the 
constraints of such approaches, particularly a high degree of variability, 
which is to say that no two gaming sessions are alike. In thinking about 
what might follow GeoFutr gaming sessions, it is most apparent that a 
visioning process to identify one’s preferred future makes the most sense 
and fits with best practices in the field (Dator 2009; Voros 2003a; Hines et 
al. 2017).  As the game centers on the aspects of research, 
implementation, and governance, a preferred future that speaks to the 
interconnections between these areas would benefit the ongoing debate, 
and some have already started to produce such statements.  In the next 
section, I utilize Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) to analyze such a vision 
before offering one of my own. 
A principled vision 	
 Few institutions of higher education have invested as much energy 
into geoengineering as Oxford University, which runs a climate 
engineering research programme at the Martin School—an 
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interdisciplinary center focusing on the grand challenges of the 21st 
century.  In a 2013 special issue of Climatic Change, the “Oxford 
Principles” for geoengineering governance were published in final form:  
Principle 1: Geoengineering to be regulated as a public good. 
While the involvement of the private sector in the delivery of a 
geoengineering technique should not be prohibited, and may 
indeed be encouraged to ensure that deployment of a suitable 
technique can be effected in a timely and efficient manner, 
regulation of such techniques should be undertaken in the public 
interest by the appropriate bodies at the state and/or international 
levels. 
 
Principle 2: Public participation in geoengineering decision-making. 
Wherever possible, those conducting geoengineering research 
should be required to notify, consult, and ideally obtain the prior 
informed consent of, those affected by the research activities. The 
identity of affected parties will be dependent on the specific 
technique which is being researched—for example, a technique 
which captures carbon dioxide from the air and geologically 
sequesters it within the territory of a single state will likely require 
consultation and agreement only at the national or local level, while 
a technique which involves changing the albedo of the planet by 
injecting aerosols into the stratosphere will likely require global 
agreement.  
 
Principle 3: Disclosure of geoengineering research and open 
publication of results.  
There should be complete disclosure of research plans and open 
publication of results in order to facilitate better understanding of 
the risks and to reassure the public as to the integrity of the 
process. It is essential that the results of all research, including 
negative results, be made publicly available. 
 
Principle 4: Independent assessment of impacts.  
An assessment of the impacts of geoengineering research should 
be conducted by a body independent of those undertaking the 
research; where techniques are likely to have transboundary 
impact, such assessment should be carried out through the 
appropriate regional and/or international bodies. Assessments 
should address both the environmental and socio-economic 
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impacts of research, including mitigating the risks of lock-in to 
particular technologies or vested interests. 
 
Principle 5: Governance before deployment.  
Any decisions with respect to deployment should only be taken with 
robust governance structures already in place, using existing rules 
and institutions wherever possible (Rayner et al. 2009) 
 
The Principles come across as precisely the sort of measured and 
thoughtful guidelines that one might expect from an esteemed academic 
institution, but as we live in PNT, they also showcase the limits of "normal" 
approaches.  As a means of analyzing the Oxford Principles, as well as 
setting up my own vision of a politics for geoengineering, I turn to Causal 
Layered Analysis (CLA) in the next section. 
A new metaphor 
 
In using CLA to analyze the Oxford Principles below, I made a point 
to use their language for everything other than the myth/metaphor layer, 
which is my own synthesis.94  In not challenging or calling into question the 
predominant regulatory and policy frameworks whose binary structures 
make truly transformative practices and processes all but impossible to 
manifest, the Oxford Principles ultimately perpetuate a system whose 
defining crisis (e.g. climate change) has promulgated radical "remedies" 
(e.g. geoengineering).  In suggesting that one should rely on "existing 
rules and institutions wherever possible," the Oxford Principles completely 
overlook past and present injustices and assume that such systems are 																																																								
94 I considered using Oxford University’s motto: Dominus illuminatio mea (The Lord is my 
light).  
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suited to postnormal potentialities.95   
Litany 
Disclosure of research plans and open publication of results; 
understanding of the risks; integrity of the process; informed consent 
System 
Existing rules and institutions; appropriate regional and/or international 
bodies; state and/or international actors; robust governance structures  
Worldview 
Affected parties; publicly available; global agreement 
Myth/Metaphor 
“Normal knows best” 
 
Appealing to the all-too-familiar, specifically the statist order, the 
Oxford Principles conceal, as well as reveal, a certain politics—one that 
struggles to confront the limits of plausibility, the banality of risk-based 
approaches, and the failure of traditional institutions to engender creative 
and critical dissent.  Indeed, the principles make no mention of 
experimentation, or futures, and one gets the impression that a present-
centric consensus is precisely what they aim to secure.  It is certainly 
surprising that the Oxford Principles make no mention of “future 
generations” given the uncertainties surrounding some geoengineering 
proposals and the commonly, if not overly, used (and abused) discourse 																																																								
95 In their defense, Oxford has been around for almost 1000 years.  	
	 227 	
on sustainable development.96  A spirited call for governance is made, but 
without any insight as to what such an entity or entities might be and/or do, 
which gives the impression that they may by nothing new. 
In reading as doctrine crafted “by adults for adults,” the Oxford 
Principles illuminate the conservatism that haunts much of the 
geoengineering debate.  As Hamilton argues, "Geoengineering is an 
essentially conservative technology, one whose political appeal risks 
obscuring its inherent faults” (Hamilton 2013).  Awareness of 
geoengineering's faults, particularly its uncertain effects, has increased in 
recent years, but this has done little to quell enthusiasts.  What such 
results have illuminated is the need to shift the relation(s) between public, 
science, and policy spheres.  Arguing that emerging technologies require 
cautious and careful experimentation, Charo writes, "One might say that 
what we need are more roundabouts, four-way stops, and yellow lights to 
supplement our red-light, green-light regulatory system (Charo 2015, 385).  
Invoking new metaphors, Charo alludes to the need for new stories toward 
a transformative vision for a politics of geoengineering.  Below, I use CLA 
to explicate my vision. 
At the core of my vision is the contention that the binary nature of 																																																								
96 At present, a number of governments, notably Wales and Malta, have created positions 
aimed at giving voice to the needs of future generations . Furthermore, the Brundtland 
Commission defines sustainable development as that which “meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(Brundtland 1987). 
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existing policy and regulatory regimes must be transcended by more fluid 
and emergent processes aimed at the proliferation of possibilities and the 
intentional problematization of plausibility.  If premised on play, dissent, 
and humility, a politics for geoengineering can and might transcend the 
binary frameworks endemic to traditional policy and decision-making 
practices.  Beyond mere contestation, a politics for geoengineering can 
and might enact new pathways for public, science, and policy spheres to 
cohabitate, cooperate, and ultimately collaborate on potential research, 
possible implementation, and prospective governance.   
Metaphor 
Game on! 
Worldview 
Play; dissent; postnormal, ethical imagination 
System 
Speculative evidence; critics who create; arenas for participation; 
collective experimentation; unseen, unspoken, and unheard positionalities 
Litany (newspaper headlines) 
“Potential for geoengineering changed us, not the climate” 
“What are we doing? Keep playing to find out!” 
 
Although I remain weary of the diffuse effects of climate change, my 
vision of a politics for geoengineering is intrinsically and, as Carse would 
have it, infinitely hopeful.  As Stengers opines, “hope is the difference 
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between probability and possibility” (Stengers and Zournazi 2012, 245).  
As a game centered on proliferating the possibility-space, GeoFutr 
embodies and enacts this hope.  Featuring a range of scenarios, and a 
gargantuan number of play combinations, GeoFutr, as well as games as a 
metaphor, might come across as nothing more than quicksand, or even 
mere child’s play, to those invested in making “evidence-based” policy 
decisions, which speaks to the power of the systems layer.  My vision of a 
politics for geoengineering aims to unframe such certainty and, perhaps 
most importantly, inject “speculative evidence” into such systems (Jain 
2017).97  Articulating the potentiality for such a shift, Stilgoe contends: 
[I]f we see geoengineering as a verb, under a regime of collective 
experimentation, things become less straightforward.  Rather than 
prioritising freedom from experimental regulation, we might instead 
consider freedom in a positive sense, as a social licence to 
experiment.  In addition to evaluating likely experimental risks and 
scales, we might also encourage scrutiny of experimental intentions 
and the imaginaries that sit behind them (Stilgoe 2016, 865). 
 
Scrutiny is perhaps putting it mildly—my preference, in case it is unclear, 
would be dissent.  In light of the Planktos incident, which can and must be 
seen as an experiment upon the Haida Nation, (neo)colonial proclivities 
within geoengineered imaginaries must be contested, confronted, and 
combated.  A politics for geoengineering must commit itself to 																																																								
97 Until now, I have intentionally avoided using the frame of “anticipatory democracy,” 
which is a term that was coined by Alvin Toffler in Future Shock (1970) and subsequently 
expanded by Clem Bezold in Anticipatory Democracy: People in the Politics of the Future 
(1978).  While the concept generally refers to the capacity for forward-looking and 
participatory governance, anticipatory democracy has been closely associated with the 
US government, which is perhaps a result of the work of Newt Gingrich, who was an 
advocate for using futures—albeit for a specific political agenda.   
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experimenting with rather than experimenting upon and, perhaps most 
importantly, envisage experimentation as a creative, collective, and 
collaborative endeavor.  Stilgoe's proposition to see geoengineering as a 
verb resonates with the processual approach of the materialist turn and 
games as metaphor.  If a politics for geoengineering speaks of actants, 
then it starts to play a different game altogether.  Again, Stilgoe observes, 
"Collective experimentation would value diversity and criticism as a source 
of resilience and variety, rather than dismissing dissent as ‘anti-science’, 
as is often the case in technological controversies" (Stilgoe 2015, 47).  In 
diversifying its inputs, a politics for geoengineering must be open to 
inductive, deductive, and abductive modes of reasoning—it must 
assemble arenas where divergent ways of knowing and epistemological 
claims can have it out, so to speak.  As Stilgoe suggests, a politics for 
geoengineering must also make its values clear and explicit if it is going to 
succeed in creating substantive change, which may or may not actually 
result in the realization of climate engineering as a coordinated enterprise 
or set of practices aimed at remediating climate change.  In this sense, a 
politics for geoengineering has a greater aim—transform how we 
(humans) see ourselves in relation to the global climate system.  
 In sum, my vision of a politics for geoengineering is one where: 
uncertainty and ignorance are felt but not feared; that which is normal is 
viewed with apprehension but also humility; dissent creates and critics 
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assemble; plausibility takes a back seat to possibility; trans-subjective 
positionalities enliven engagement toward the unseen, the unspoken, and 
the unheard; and a different game is played all together.   
Conclusion: A different game 	
 I opened this chapter with a look at EcoChains, which complicates 
the results that one might expect to get from using a game.  I then 
explored ORM and experiential futures to situate my design and raise 
some of the critical choices in designing a playful modality for collective 
experimentation.  Next, I presented a design brief that outlined the scope, 
setting, situation, scenario, stuff, audience, structure, setup, content, and 
gameplay of GeoFutr—an alternative futures-driven game designed to 
critique, create, and contest geoengineered imaginaries.  Finally, I used 
CLA to forge a new vision of a politics for geoengineering.  In the 
conclusion, I provide a review each chapter’s main arguments, reflect on 
my own positionality as a practitioner, highlight some of the contributions 
made by this project, and offer some future(s) research trajectories. 
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Conclusion: Let the games begin 
The road so far 	
 In the first chapter, I set the scene through an extended review of the 
Planktos incident.  In carrying out his geoengineering experiment upon 
rather than with the Haida Nation, Russ George raised a litany of key 
challenges and sparked debate about climate engineering research, 
implementation, and governance.  Based on my reading of the George 
incident, I situated geoengineering as a post-normal science and made 
linkages with postnormal times (PNT)—a recent movement within futures.  
While I received my futures education at the "Mānoa School," it is also the 
case that my professional work and research was shaped by working with 
Zia Sardar at the Centre for Postnormal Policy and Futures Studies.  PNT 
opened both theoretical and methodological doors.  Through a practice-
based reflection, I then explored how scenarios might (and might not) 
function within a workshop setting, and this analysis provided a bearing 
toward games.  As my research developed, it became clear that there was 
more at stake than just replacing pre-created scenarios with a game—an 
argument about the limits of a core practice of futures began to emerge.  
This reaches a crescendo in chapter three.  Finally, I started to explore the 
contours for a politics for geoengineering and devised a pathway to 
commence my sojourn. 
 In chapter two, I linked geoengineering with the Anthropocene 
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debate, which speaks to the complicated ways with which we have come 
to understand and represent the global climate system.  I then mapped the 
two large-scale climate engineering initiatives—primarily solar radiation 
management (SRM) and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)—before 
reviewing a handful of minor methods, such as cloud seeding.  Looking at 
different proposals and practices highlighted the importance of scale 
within geoengineered imaginaries, which are shaped by a confluence of 
things, including fictive imaginings.  My reading of the cli-fi genre 
illuminated key themes—centralization, corporatization, and 
commitment—that point toward the ethico-political complexities underlying 
geoengineered imaginaries.  Finally, I returned to the Anthropocene 
debate as a means of setting up my turn toward the postnormal, which 
offers not only a different means of understanding the present but also 
unique frames for imagining futures. Applying CLA and reflecting at a 
meta-level on this project, chapter two functions as the litany in moving 
through the top-layer texts and contexts that many, if not most, encounter 
geoengineering and geoengineered imaginaries.  
 In "Postnormal Futures," I confronted the uses (and abuses) of 
scenarios as the mainstay practice of futures.  As part of my critique, I 
used both textual and practice-based research to show that scenarios, 
especially pre-created varieties, can be ineffective, even when delivered in 
creative and experiential ways.  My ultimate contention is that pre-created 
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scenarios, especially within a workshop space, actually work against the 
ultimate aim of futures—to keep possibilities for the future(s) open.  This 
argument was furthered by Nandy’s vision of futures, which emphasizes 
the role of dissent in maintaining futures as a possibility-space.  In 
recounting the development of the Three Tomorrows method and the 
formation of a new futures cone, I conveyed the importance of postnormal 
times (PNT) as an approach for complicating how we understand the 
present and future(s), which is evident in the difference between global 
warming and global weirding.  My argument, then, is that futures needs 
PNT (enhancing how it engages with the contradictions, complexities, and 
chaos of the present) as much as PNT needs futures (an openness toward 
radical potentialities and the unthought).  This line of thinking resulted in 
the concept of imaginings, which complicates "images of the future" by 
pointing toward the actual and perceptual forces that shape how we might 
envisage the future(s).  Finally, I provided a detailed overview of the 
Menagerie, including a detailed analysis of the black jellyfish concept, as a 
means of enacting divergent perspectives —what I call trans-subjective 
positionalities.   Invoking the unseen, unheard, and unspoken, trans-
subjective positionalities offers a speculative means to situate dissent at 
the fore of collective experiments.  Again, using the lens of CLA, chapter 
three operates at the systems level by focusing on the limits of plausibility 
within scenarios as a practice that has come to shape the geoengineering 
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debate and define futures as a field.  
 In chapter four, I opened with an explication of Latour’s distinction 
between matters of fact and matters of concern, which invokes materialist 
and speculative framings to expand how things are seen and understood.  
Using the case of the world’s first prospective climate refugee, I showed 
how the stakes in this division have both metaphysical and real-world 
consequences, as Ioane Teitiota was denied asylum and forced to leave 
New Zealand. I then used Latour’s work to substantiate my turn to games, 
which is central to the form and content of a politics for geoengineering.  
Exploring how the modality of play can serve as both a strategy and tactic 
of engagement, I presented two "case studies" from my professional work 
with the United Nations in Tonga and fYR Macedonia.  These cases 
highlighted how games operate in practice, which is always dissimilar from 
how they appear in theory—and this speaks to my development as a 
practitioner.  Next, I revisited the Menagerie and provided further detail on 
the black jellyfish concept, which is a recent contribution to the futures field 
that builds on how emerging issues are identified and framed.  Finally, I 
looked at how a previous game used the Menagerie as a way of eliciting 
radical potentialities and fostering dissent, which are essential to the 
concept of trans-subjective positionalities and central to my game design, 
which constitutes the bulk of the next chapter.  In terms of CLA, chapter 
four moves to the worldview level mapping the ontological tensions at the 
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heart of the geoengineering debate and then positioning the modality of 
play as worldview. 
 In "A Game for All Seasons," I opened with a review of EcoChains, 
which produced rather curious results.  Students who played EcoChains 
retained more knowledge than their peers who read an article, but the 
players showed less capacity for systems thinking, which is one of the 
central aims of the game.  This outcome challenged me to reflect on the 
limits and constraints of my own game and, perhaps most importantly, 
what elements should be designed versus left to chance as part of 
gameplay.  Invoking both object-relation mapping (ORM) and experiential 
futures, I charted a design trajectory using contours from both approaches.  
ORM called my attention to the different scales at play within 
geoengineered imaginaries.  Experiential futures granted me a conceptual 
framework with which I could situate my game design as a futures tool.  
Using the and expanding upon the experiential futures ladder, my design 
brief outlined the scope, setting, situation, scenario, stuff, audience, 
structure, setup, content, and play dynamics of an alternative futures-
driven game designed to critique, create, and ultimately contest 
geoengineered imaginaries.  Finally, I critically analyzed the Oxford 
Principles, which offer guidelines for climate engineering research, using 
CLA as a point of entry for positing my own vision of a politics for 
geoengineering.  My vision of a politics for geoengineering coalesces a 
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diverse array of theoretical alliances—futures, PNT, the materialist turn— 
and methodological commitments—assembling, experimentation, play—
toward the realization of a difference game.  Within the context of CLA, 
chapter five deconstructs the old metaphor so that a new one can emerge.  
Succeeding by fai l ing 	
I'm a pessimist about probabilities,  
I'm an optimist about possibilities. 
- Lewis Mumford 	
 Life, as with games, often leaves much to chance.  Success can 
sometimes come from failure.  Futurists know this all too well.  As Nandy 
observes, “Futurists change the future by changing human consciousness 
and, thus, the actualized future.  Their very ability, to envision the future on 
behalf of the rest of us, sabotages their predictions.  They succeed by 
failing” (1996, 637).  Nandy’s provocation strikes a deep chord, although 
futurists should not be in the business of envisioning the future on behalf 
of anyone.  While I agree with Nandy’s framing about changing 
consciousness and, by extension, the actualized future, futurists must do 
more to “sabotage” certain predictions (and imaginaries), which is a direct 
allusion to my explicit ethical positionality.  With regards to 
geoengineering, this was and remains my intent.  In general, I find the 
potentiality that geoengineering might 1) actually work; 2) be put forward 
as an absolute necessity; and 3) be enacted hastily all to be nothing short 
of terrifying.  The geoengineering debate is multifaceted, complex, and 
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exceedingly technical—for many, if not most, the idea of active 
participation is implausible, improbable, and perhaps even preposterous.  
This dissertation offers an accessible, unique, and playful pathway in 
GeoFutr—an alternative futures-driven game designed to critique, create, 
and ultimately contest geoengineered imaginaries.  While dissertations 
have a five-person audience, I intentionally sought to craft a narrative arc 
that might extend beyond academic discourse, and this speaks to the style 
of writing used throughout this work as well as my turn to games.  As a 
practitioner seeking to foster dissent, gamemaster serves as my guiding 
metaphor, and this moniker does not imply absolute knowledge but rather 
exists as a term for one who facilitates gaming experiences. In this way, 
the gamemaster resonates with the Latourian critic, who assembles 
arenas for collective experimentation, especially via playful means.  
 As such, this dissertation is the equivalent of showing up to a raging 
party with a board game—uninvited.  Some might not be bothered to put 
down their drink.  Others might wonder what is in the box and be inclined 
to play.  In either case, the presence of the game, and the invitation to play 
that comes with it, signals a different approach in how one might begin to 
understand the radical potentialities and unthought possibilities of 
geoengineering.  To my knowledge, this dissertation offers the first 
research-based futures game designed specifically to critique, create, and 
ultimately contest geoengineered imaginaries.  In this way, my project 
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resonates with Nandy’s charge about the challenge at the heart of futures.  
Emphasizing the importance of pluralizing the future(s), he intimates, “The 
challenge of futures studies, thus, is to keep open the option of a plurality 
of dissent […]” (Nandy 1996, 638).  In playing a different game, this 
dissertation makes a unique contribution toward proliferating a plurality of 
dissent, specifically alternative geoengineered imaginaries.  Deployed as a 
provocation for those devising and enacting a politics for geoengineering, 
this work proposes that a different game be played.  As a futurist, I would 
be remiss were I not to close with a consideration of future(s) potentialities 
for research.  
Future(s) research  	
While I have recently published about how games can be 
qualitatively reviewed, I am interested in longitudinal studies to measure 
efficacy, impact, and more serendipitous outcomes.  What metrics might 
be devised for such a study?  Can the affects and impacts of play be 
measured at an organizational scale?  Furthermore, my dissertation only 
tangentially engaged with video games, which was due to my focus on 
playful approaches as a means to transform workshop settings.  Might 
video games, including those leveraging augmented and virtual reality 
environs, be a more efficacious mode of engagement?  Myself and others 
have already “played” with blending mobile augmented reality with 
experiential futures and would like to perform further research on hybrid 
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approaches that leverage digital gaming platforms and technologies (Dator 
et al. 2015).  As a means of owning the gamemaster metaphor, I would be 
interested in exploring how other scenario modeling methods, such as the 
Mānoa School approach, can and might be enhanced through approaches 
such as GeoFutr. 
In addition to looking at mutations of various gaming approaches, I 
am also interested in what comes after.  Although I briefly mention the 
placement of GeoFutr within a broader learning journey, I am interested in 
exploring approaches and tools that works toward the development of 
governance models.  In achieving this aim, I would like to research 
systems and processes, such as Buckminster Fuller’s World Game and 
modeling projects aimed at creating systemic views and assessments of 
global-scale challenges.  Ultimately, I envisage this research as part of a 
separate book project that looks at how such approaches have been used 
within the broader futures field. 
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not want to put GeoFutr in the 
hands of the geoengineering research community.  As the game only 
exists in brief form, I would very much like to see a fully developed version 
in action, and additional research would be needed to flesh out a playable 
edition, which I can envisage being played at the next Climate Engineering 
Conference.  Game on. 
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